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ABSTRACT 
 
This thesis provides an interpretation and critical examination of Karl Marx’s vision 
of the good life, a vision that is potent but also notoriously unspecified and opaque. It 
makes three major interpretive claims. First, it argues that at the heart of Marx’s 
vision is an uncompromising commitment to ethical individualism, the view that the 
ultimate value and goal of human societies is the self-realisation of individuals. This 
individualism is explored through an examination of Marx’s critique of the division 
of labour (Chapter 2) and hostility to social roles (Chapter 3). Second, it argues that 
Marx’s ideas about the good life are not of a piece but change in crucial respects 
throughout his lifetime. For instance, it is argued that Marx gives different arguments 
in different texts as to why community is necessary for self-realisation (Chapter 3), 
and different arguments, too, about whether labour or leisure constitutes the true 
realm of self-realisation under communism (Chapter 4). Third, while Marx’s views 
do indeed change in crucial respects throughout his lifetime, it argues that these 
changes cannot be understood in terms of a break between the ‘early’ and ‘late’ Marx, 
as is commonly claimed. Rather, it argues that Marx oscillated between different 
conceptions of the good life throughout his lifetime, never fully settling on one. On 
top of these interpretive claims, the thesis also addresses the question of which, if 
any, of Marx’s visions provides the most feasible and desirable foundation for a 
Marxist conception of the good life today. Here, it is argued that in the concluding 
paragraphs of the ‘Comments on James Mill’s Éléments D’économie Politique’ 
(hereafter the Comments) Marx puts forward a richer and more plausible conception 
of the good life than that which he put forward in other texts.   
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INTRODUCTION 
 
This thesis is about Karl Marx’s vision of the good life, a vision that is potent but also 
notoriously unspecified and opaque. It aims to provide an interpretation and critical 
examination of its central features.  
While each chapter engages in a number of textual disputes, in what follows I 
make three major interpretive claims. First, I argue that Marx’s vision of the good life 
contains an uncompromising commitment to ethical individualism, the view that the 
ultimate value and goal of human societies is the self-realisation of individuals.1 
Thus, in Chapter 2, I show that Marx’s critique of the division of labour is based on 
the individualistic view that the enrichment of the powers and capacities of society 
cannot come at the expense of the powers and capacities of the individual. Likewise, 
in Chapter 3, I show how Marx rejects the communitarian idea that the only way to 
overcome alienation is to accept the duties that flow from one’s social role; on 
Marx’s view, by contrast, really free activity is unconstrained by roles altogether. The 
individualistic side of Marx’s thought has not received much attention in the 
literature.2 By focusing on this side in some detail in the chapters the follow I hope to 
bring Marx’s individualism out of the shadows.  
Second, I argue that while Marx’s commitment to individualism is 
unwavering, his ideas about how individuals achieve self-realisation change in crucial 
respects throughout his lifetime.	  For instance, in Chapter 3 I argue that while Marx is 
always committed to the view that community is necessary for self-realisation, he 
gives different arguments in different writings as to why this is so. Likewise, in 
Chapter 4, I argue that while Marx is always committed to the view that self-
realisation consists in creative activity, he changes his mind about whether necessary 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1 Jon Elster, Making Sense of Marx (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1990), p.8. 
Note that I do not take a stand on whether Marx is committed to other forms of individualism 
(e.g. methodological individualism).   
2 To be sure, the individualistic themes I pick up here have been noticed and emphasised by 
commentators before me, yet there is no full-length treatment of them, and overly 
communitarian interpretations of communism still tend to be advanced in the literature. More 
will be said about these communitarian interpretations in Chapter 3, where I shall examine 
Marx’s idea of a reconciliation of self-realisation and community under communism. For 
other individualistic interpretations of Marx’s ideas about the good life, see Elster, Making 
Sense of Marx, pp.521-528; G.A. Cohen, Karl Marx’s Theory of History: An Interpretation 
and Defence (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1978), pp.129-133; and Will Kymlicka, Liberalism, 
Community and Culture (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1989), Chapter 6. 
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labour or leisure constitutes the ‘realm’ within which future individuals will realise 
the inherent creativity of their nature. In this way, I argue that Marx’s ideas about the 
good life under communism are not of a piece but change in crucial respects 
throughout his lifetime.  
The third and final major interpretive claim concerns the much-debated issue 
of Marx’s intellectual development. The claims of the previous paragraph – that 
Marx’s views change during the course of his lifetime – are not new. In fact, it is 
common for commentators to argue that there is a shift, or even a ‘break’,3 between 
the writings of the ‘early’ Marx and ‘late’ Marx. With regards to his ideas about the 
good life, Marx’s ideas are generally thought to become more pessimistic as time 
wore on. Thus, according to what we might call the ‘standard story’, while Marx’s 
early writings are buoyantly optimistic that alienated labour will be overcome under 
communism, his later writings acquiesce in the permanence of alienated labour in all 
forms of human society. Consequently, Marx is said to look to leisure rather than 
labour as the sphere of life best suited for human self-realisation. In what follows, 
however, I argue that the ‘standard story’ misconstrues the exegetical evidence, and 
that, properly interpreted, Marx’s intellectual development on these matters is less 
even and more complex than the standard story supposes. In my view, Marx moves 
between different conceptions of the good life throughout his lifetime, never fully 
settling on one. On this issue, I shall argue, Marx’s intellectual development is best 
understood as an oscillation rather than a shift.  
On top of these interpretive claims the thesis also contains a critical 
component. Having distinguished a number of different models of the good life in 
Marx’s texts, the thesis aims to provide a response to the question of which, if any, of 
Marx’s descriptions of communism provides the most feasible and desirable basis for 
a Marxian vision of the good life today. Here, I shall argue that in the concluding 
paragraphs of the Comments the young Marx puts forward a conception of self-
realisation and community which, for reasons given during the course of the thesis, 
provides a richer and more attractive model of the good life than that which he tilts 
towards in other texts. To make this claim, Chapters 2 through to 4 identify a family 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
3 The idea of the ‘break’ was first put forward by the French Marxist Louis Althusser 
(Althusser, For Marx, translated by Ben Brewster (London: Allen Lane, 1968).  
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of problems that Marx’s other visions of the good life run up against, and to which, I 
subsequently argue in Chapter 5, Marx’s position in the Comments can respond.   
Let me say something about the structure and organisation of the thesis that 
follows. I start in Chapter 1 by examining some fundamental problems that are often 
thought to undermine Marx’s vision of the good life. My hope in addressing these 
problems is not that we will settle them decisively, but that we will come to a clearer 
understanding of what these problems are, and what criteria Marx’s vision would 
have to meet if we are to take it seriously.  
In Chapter 2, I examine Marx’s notorious claim in The German Ideology that 
future individuals will ‘hunt in the morning, fish in the afternoon, rear cattle in the 
evening, criticise after dinner…without ever becoming a hunter, fisherman, shepherd, 
or critic’.4 In this chapter, I am especially concerned with Marx’s ideal of all-round 
development, that is, the idea that self-realisation consists in the all-round 
development of the individual’s powers and capacities. This ideal has been widely 
criticised. For instance, both Jon Elster and G.A.Cohen have argued that all-round 
development represents an implausible and not necessarily attractive ideal of 
individual self-realisation. In response, I argue that all-round development is not as 
implausible as Elster and Cohen suggest. However, while I defend the ideal of all-
round development, I shall argue that Marx was wrong to think that the 
implementation of that ideal requires an abolition of the division of labour, and that, 
on the contrary, the ideal of all-round development could be realised within 
specialised activities. In this way, I hope to show that Marx’s out and out hostility 
towards the division of labour was misguided.  
In Chapter 3, I argue that Marx’s claim that in a future society ‘there are no 
painters but at most people who engage in painting among other activities’,5 goes 
beyond a hope that specialisation will be abolished, to suggest that social roles will 
also be overcome. That is to say, there will be no painters in a communist society not 
simply because no one will spend all their time painting but also and more 
intriguingly because no one will occupy the social role of painter. I argue that Marx 
sought to abolish roles because he thought that the constraints of a role were 
incompatible with the free development of individuals. While I argue Marx’s desire 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
4 Marx and Engels, The German Ideology, MECW, volume 5 (London: Lawrence and 
Wishart, 1975), p.47. 
5 Marx and Engels, The German Ideology, p.394.  
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to abolish roles provides a reply to the objection that Marx’s vision of the good life 
aims to subsume the individual in society, I show how it leaves Marx vulnerable to a 
surprising criticism made by G.A. Cohen: namely, that in its excessive concentration 
on individual development, Marx’s vision of the good life provides an impoverished 
conception of human community. To anticipate my response, I will concede that 
Marx is sometimes guilty of this failing, but argue that the Marx of the Comments is 
not, for in that text Marx provides a much richer account of human community.  
In Chapter 4, I examine the well-known discussion in the third volume of 
Capital where Marx describes work as belonging to a ‘realm of necessity’, and talks 
of the ‘realm of freedom’ that exists beyond it, in leisure.6 This passage has seemed to 
many to provide irrefutable evidence that Marx did change his views about 
communism, moving away from the youthful optimism of his early writings to adopt 
a more sober and realistic account of labour in a future society. Others, however, have 
argued that there is no such change, and that the view expressed in the in the third 
volume of Capital is entirely consonant with Marx’s early ideas about the good life 
under communism.   
 In this chapter, I offer a new reading of this debate. I argue that while Marx’s 
view in Capital Volume III does represent a significant departure from the view he 
holds at others points, where labour constitutes the ‘realm of freedom’, the transition 
between these two views cannot be understood in terms of a simple shift between a 
‘early and ‘late’ Marx. Rather, I argue that Marx moves between two models of the 
good life throughout his writings, never fully settling on one. In this way, I suggest 
that Marx’s intellectual development on this issue is best understood as an oscillation 
rather than a shift. Once this interpretive claim is advanced, the chapter moves on to 
consider the potential causes and implications of Marx’s life-long oscillation between 
two different conceptions of the good life.  
In Chapter 5, I examine in some detail the concluding passage to the 
Comments, where Marx invites us to imagine that we had ‘carried out our production 
as human beings’.7 Here, I will argue, Marx puts forward a vision of the good life that 
contains more resources with which to respond to the family of problems which 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
6 Marx, Capital A Critique of Political Economy, Vol. III, MECW, volume 37 (London: 
Lawrence and Wishart, 1998), p.807. 
7 Marx, ‘Comments on James Mill’s Éléments D’économie Politique’, MECW, volume 3 
(London: Lawrence and Wishart, 1975), pp.226-228. 
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Marx’s other conceptions of communism run up against. Unsurprisingly, however, 
the position Marx adopts in the Comments also faces problems of its own, especially 
with regards to the issue of whether it could be applied on a society-wide basis. I 
conclude by considering these problems, and some lines of response at Marx’s 
disposal.  
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CHAPTER 1 
 
THE PROBLEMS OF MARX’S VISION OF THE GOOD LIFE 
 
As soon as we start to think Marx’s vision of the good life a family of problems arise. 
For instance, given Marx’s well-known reticence for the drawing up of blueprints for 
the future, one may doubt whether Marx even had a ‘vision of a good life’. 
Alternatively, given the voluminous literature on Marx and Marxism, one may 
wonder whether there is anything new to be said on the topic pursued here. Even if 
one accepts that Marx has a vision of the good life, and that the secondary literature 
has not covered all the relevant issues, one may still doubt the value of a full-length 
study of its central ideas: for instance, one may think that Marx’s vision of the good 
life is irredeemably utopian or based on a one-sided account of the human good.  
It is the primary purpose of this chapter to examine some of these issues that 
Marx’s vision runs up against. My hope in addressing these issues is three-fold: first, 
that we will come to a clearer understanding of what these problems are; second, that 
we will see that these problems may not, in some respects at least, be as damaging as 
they first appear; and finally, third, that we will start to determine a criterion that a 
defensible vision of the good life must satisfy.  
The chapter proceeds as follows. I start (in §1.1) by anticipating two doubts 
that one may have with a project of this kind, before going on to consider whether 
Marx’s vision of the good life is vitiated by its determinism (in §1.2), its 
perfectionism (in §1.3), or its utopianism (in §1.4). 
 
1.1. Two Doubts 
 
Let us start by anticipating two doubts one might have with the study of Marx’s 
vision of the good life.  
 First of all, whatever one thinks of other aspects of Marx’s thought, one 
might consider his vision of the good life to be too fragmentary and unspecified, and 
thus doubt the value of a full-length study of its central ideas. A survey of the 
secondary literature would heighten this worry. Sympathetic commentators have 
described Marx’s vision of a future society as ‘extremely thin’,1 ‘vague and 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1 Steven Lukes, Marxism and Morality (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1985), p.9. 
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uninformative’,2 and ‘so non-committal as to be almost vacuous’.3 What little Marx 
did write on this matter has been described as ‘astonishingly implausible’4 and 
‘defective and misleading’.5 Jonathan Wolff sums up the prevailing view when he 
says that although Marx provides us with some of the ‘sharpest tools’ for criticising 
existing society, as a ‘creative thinker’, by contrast, he was ‘hugely optimistic, 
sometimes mistaken in his arguments and assumptions, often infuriatingly vague 
about the details and, in consequence, he has little to tell us now about how to arrange 
society’.6 
While I cannot hope to answer objections of this kind at the outset, let me 
make a couple of preliminary points that may at least ease this worry. First, while it is 
true that Marx says comparatively little about his vision of the future society, it would 
be wrong to suggest that discussion of this theme is completely absent from Marx’s 
texts. In fact, most of Marx’s major works, from the early Economic and 
Philosophical Manuscripts through to his magnum opus, Capital, contain a 
description of the society that he believed was destined to replace capitalism. Second, 
while these descriptions are – without exception – brief in length, they are also rich in 
content, containing a number of philosophically interesting ideas. For instance, Marx 
makes some distinctive claims about the human good (that man is by nature a creative 
being, who achieves self-realisation through the exercise of his creative capacities), 
some striking social recommendations (that we should abolish the division of labour 
and the social roles created therein), and some controversial claims about the 
compatibility of values (that freedom and community are not compatible but deeply 
complementary). Thus, although Marx’s vision of the future society is undeniably 
short on detail, there are some reasons for thinking that it contains more of 
philosophical interest than is commonly supposed.  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
2 Allen W. Wood, ‘Antimoralism’ in Allen W. Wood and Songsuk Susan Hahn (ed) The 
Cambridge History of Philosophy in the Nineteenth Century (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 2012), p.506. 
3 John Plamenatz, Karl Marx’s Philosophy of Man (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1975), p.465. 
4 Michael Rosen, ‘Karl Marx’ in E.Craig (ed) The Routledge Encyclopaedia of Philosophy 
(New York: Routledge, 1998), p.562. 
5 Alec Nove, ‘Introduction’, The Economics of Feasible Socialism, (London: George Allen 
and Unwin, 1983), p.x. 
6 Jonathan Wolff, Why Read Marx Today? (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2005), p.3. 
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Even if one accepts the theoretical interest in Marx’s vision of the good life, 
however, one might think that the secondary literature has already covered the 
relevant issues. This brings us to our second worry, that there is nothing left to be said 
on the topic of Marx’s vision of a future communist society.   
This is a reasonable but ultimately mistaken worry. For although many works 
contain some discussion of Marx’s vision of the good life, full-length philosophical 
studies of the themes broached here are rare. There are two explanations for why this 
has been the case. The first lies with the fact that some of Marx’s most interesting 
descriptions of the good life were buried in texts that only became available long after 
Marx’s death. So, for example, the notebooks Marx kept in Paris in 1844, which have 
come to be known as the Economical and Philosophical Manuscripts and the 
‘Comments on James Mill’ – a rough but fascinating body of works containing some 
of Marx’s most philosophically interesting ideas – were first published in 1932 and 
only translated into English in 1956.7 Likewise, the notebooks known as the 
Grundrisse, another text now considered of seminal importance, was first published 
even later in 1941 and only translated into English in 1973.8 Even important works 
published in Marx’s lifetime, such as ‘On the Jewish Question’, could not be said to 
be widely available until the latter half of the twentieth century.9 The late publication 
of these writings has been significant in two ways. First, it has meant that Marx’s 
legacy was formed when knowledge of his philosophical writings was partial and 
incomplete. Since Marx’s philosophical writings were not readily available to the 
public until the 1950s, it is hardly surprising that Marx was regarded primarily as an 
economist for the first half of the twentieth century. Second, the late publication of 
these texts denied earlier commentators the opportunity of engaging with some of 
Marx’s most important pronouncements about the good life under communism. 
Crucially, this includes the text that I take to contain Marx’s most philosophically 
interesting account of the good life, the ‘Comments on James Mill’. 
The second explanation lies with the nature of twentieth century Anglophone 
philosophy. For much of the twentieth century, and at least up in till the late 1960s, 
the discipline of political philosophy seemed to be in a state of decline. Indeed, in the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
7 David Leopold, The Young Karl Marx (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2007), p.4. 
8 David McClellan, Marx’s Grundrisse (London: Macmillan, 1971), p.2. 9	  Leopold, The Young Karl Marx, p.4.	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1950s and 1960s a number of commentators wondered whether the tradition of 
political philosophy had come to an end.10 Not surprisingly, then, although Marx’s 
ideas received a good deal of attention from economists, historians and sociologists in 
this period, they received far less attention from philosophers.11 Consequently, at the 
start of the 1970s Marx’s philosophy would have had a credible claim to be the least 
well-known aspect of his thought.  
The fortunes of political philosophy changed dramatically in the 1970s with 
the publication in 1971 of John Rawls’s A Theory a Justice. Whilst Rawls saw his 
own work as belonging to the tradition of Kantian liberalism, its publication also 
sparked a revival of interest in Marx. The reasons for this were two-fold. First, the 
remarkable emphasis Rawls placed on the value of justice prompted Marxists to 
consider what role, if any, the value of justice played in Marx’s thought. 
Consequently, in the years following the publication of A Theory of Justice there was 
a vigorous debate in Philosophy & Public Affairs on the question of whether Marx 
thought capitalism was unjust.12 Second, because Rawls aimed to defend a theory of 
justice that could accommodate traditional socialist criticisms of classical liberalism, 
A Theory of Justice invited philosophers in the Marxist tradition to consider whether 
there was still space for a Marxist critique of Rawlsian liberalism – an answer that 
some, at least, answered in the affirmative.13  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
10 For a helpful overview of twentieth century political philosophy, see Jonathan Wolff, ‘The 
History of Analytic Political Philosophy’, in M.Beaney (ed) The Oxford Handbook to the 
History of Analytic Philosophy (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2013). 
11 This is not to say that Marx received no attention from philosophers in this period. The 
American pragmatist, Sidney Hook, published an overview of Marx’s early writings and their 
relation to the young Hegelians (S. Hook, From Hegel to Marx (New York: Humanities 
Press, 1950)); John Plamenatz published a thoughtful study of Marx’s political theory and 
Soviet communism (J. Plamenatz, German Marxism and Russian Communism (London: 
Greenwood Press, 1954)). H.B. Acton published a critical account of Marx’s theory of 
history (H.B. Acton, The Illusion of the Epoch (London: Cohen and West, 1955)); and Isaiah 
Berlin published an intellectual biography (I. Berlin, Karl Marx: His Life and Environment 
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1963)). But even so, given Marx’s enormous historical and 
cultural significance in the twentieth century, the paucity of philosophical work on Marx in 
this period is striking.  
12 See Allen W. Wood, ‘The Marxian Critique of Justice’, Philosophy and Public Affairs, 1:3, 
(1972); Ziyad Husami, ‘Marx on Distributive Justice’, Philosophy and Public Affairs, 8:1, 
(1978); Allen W. Wood, ‘Marx on Right and Justice: A Reply to Husami’, Philosophy and 
Public Affairs, 8:3, (1979). 
13 For example, see Robert Paul Wolff, Understanding Rawls: A Reconstruction and Critique 
of ‘A Theory of Justice’, (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1977). 
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It is worth noting, however, that while there was something of a revival of 
interest in Marx in these years, the topic under consideration here – Marx’s vision of 
the good life – remained very much in the background. Of course, the discussion in 
Philosophy & Public Affairs touched on the issue of whether Marx thought that 
communism would be more just that capitalism, but significant discussion of Marx’s 
vision of the good life was largely absent from the debate. The paucity of work on 
Marx’s vision of the good life continued in the subsequent years. In 1978, G.A. 
Cohen published an influential interpretation and defence of Marx’s theory of history, 
which attempted to apply the standards of clarity and rigour of analytic philosophy to 
historical materialism.14 Following the publication of Cohen’s book, a group of like-
minded scholars formed and a stream of books and articles appeared.15 But although 
the concerns of the so-called ‘analytical Marxists’ shifted away from Marx’s theory 
of history and towards issues in ethics and normative political philosophy over the 
years, discussion of Marx’s vision of the good life remained almost completely absent 
from their works.16 In the 1980s and early 1990s, there were articles on exploitation 
and the labour theory of value,17 more work of Marx on justice and morality,18 some 
important studies of the Marxist notion of ideology,19 and some accounts of Marx’s 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
14 G.A. Cohen, Karl Marx’s Theory of History: An Interpretation and Defence (Oxford: 
Clarendon Press, 1978). 
15 For a survey of these publications, see Thomas Mayer, Analytical Marxism (London: Sage, 
1994). 
16 One notable exception here is Jon Elster’s ‘Self-Realisation in Work and Politics’ in Jon 
Elster and Karl O. Moene (ed) Alternatives to Capitalism (Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, 1989).  
17 See, for example, G.A. Cohen, ‘The Labor Theory of Value and the Concept of 
Exploitation’, Philosophy and Public Affairs, 8:4, (1979); John Roemer ‘Should Marxists be 
Interested in Exploitation?’, Philosophy and Public Affairs, 14:1, (1985); Jeffrey Reiman 
‘Exploitation, Force and the Moral Assessment of Capitalism: Thoughts on Roemer and 
Cohen’, Philosophy and Public Affairs, 16:1, (1987). 
18 See, for example, Steven Lukes, Marxism and Morality; Phillip J. Kain Marx and Ethics 
(Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1988); Norman Geras, ‘The Controversy About Marx and Justice’ 
in A. Callinicos (ed) Marxist Theory (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1989). 
19 See, Raymond Geuss, The Idea of a Critical Theory: Habermas and the Frankfurt School 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1981), and Michael Rosen, On Voluntary 
Servitude: False Consciousness and the Theory of Ideology (Cambridge Mass: Harvard 
University Press, 1996). 
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philosophical ideas as a whole.20 But Marx’s vision of the good life was only 
discussed in passing, if at all. 
Interestingly, the neglect of Marx’s vision of the good life was also replicated 
in the major strand of continental Marxism, albeit in a different way. In a series of 
works, Louis Althusser drew a line between the humanism of the early Marx and the 
scientific socialism of the mature Marx, rejecting the former as early juvenilia and 
consigning it to the dustbin of Marxism.21 On this reading, fully-fledged Marxism is 
an objective, value-neutral science, devoid of value-judgements. The idea that Marx 
provided a vision of a better society that would eventually come to replace capitalism 
was entirely foreign to Althusser’s interpretation of Marx.  
Why the neglect of the vision of the good life in Marx scholarship? At least in 
Anglophone philosophy one plausible explanation lies in the path political philosophy 
took following the publication of Rawls’s A Theory of Justice. For one distinctive 
feature of that book, and much political philosophy that has been published in its 
wake, is its emphasis on ‘neutrality’ – the view that political philosophy should not 
argue from a ‘comprehensive’ conception of the good, but should limit itself to 
providing a neutral framework within which different conceptions of the good can be 
pursued.22 It is hard to resist the conclusion that the Rawlsian move away from 
perfectionism and towards neutralism played an important role in shaping the issues 
that Marx’s commentators addressed in these years. It is, for instance, surely not 
coincidental that the most sustained debate in this period centred on the issue of 
justice in Marx’s thought, while at the same time the perfectionist side of Marx’s 
writings received far less attention.23 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
20 See Allen W. Wood, Karl Marx: Arguments of the Philosophers (London: Routledge, 
1981) and Jon Elster, Making Sense of Marx (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
1985).  
21 See Louis Althusser, For Marx, translated by Ben Brewster (London: Allen Lane, 1968); 
and Reading Capital, translated by Ben Brewster (London: New Left books, 1970). 
22 John Rawls, A Theory of Justice (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1971). If anything, 
Rawls’s neutralism hardened over the years. His later work insisted that liberalism was not 
founded on a ‘comprehensive’ ethics (à la Kant and Mill), but a strictly ‘political’ doctrine 
that could be accepted by reasonable citizens with diverse and potentially conflicting 
conceptions of the good. See, John Rawls, Political Liberalism (New York: Columbia 
University Press, 1996).  
23 In recent years, there have been some signs of renewed interest in the perfectionist side of 
Marx’s thought. One could speculate that this recent revival may have been provoked, at least 
in part, by a growing dissatisfaction with Rawlsian neutralism. For discussion of perfectionist 
	   12	  
The purpose of this abbreviated history has been to underline the point that, 
despite Marx’s huge historical and cultural significance, Marx’s vision of the good 
life has received relatively little attention from philosophers. But let us consider, if 
only briefly, how the story has developed from here. Of course, the major event in 
this regard was the sudden and unexpected collapse of the Soviet Union in 1989. This 
had a profound impact on the philosophical study of Marx’s thought. By the 1990s 
the various movements that had debated Marx’s philosophical ideas in the 1970s and 
1980s ran their course. Discussion of Althusser’s work ceased. The analytical 
Marxists continued to publish important works in political philosophy, but it no 
longer focused on Marx. Instead, their work increasingly centred on issues of justice 
and equality and a critical engagement with the egalitarian liberalism of John Rawls 
and Ronald Dworkin.24 In sum, Marx seemed to be something of a ‘dead dog’ in 
political philosophy. G.A. Cohen summed up the prevailing mood in his 1996 Gifford 
lectures: 
 
‘Marxism has lost much or most of its carapace, its hard shell of supposed 
fact. Scarcely anybody defends it in the academy, and there are no more 
apparatchiki who believe that they are applying it in Communist Party offices. 
To the extent that Marxism is still alive…it presents itself as a set of values 
and a set of designs for realizing those values. It is therefore, now, far less 
different than it could once advertise itself to be from the utopian socialism 
with which it so proudly contrasted itself. Its shell is cracked and crumbling, 
its soft underbelly exposed.’25 
 
Despite the rather gloomy tone of this passage, there are reasons to be more 
optimistic about the study of Marx’s thought today. The twentieth century was a 
difficult one for Marx scholarship. In a number of ways the Soviet Union sustained a 
very rigid and simplistic interpretation of Marx’s thought, while much of the 
secondary literature was also marred by anti-Soviet bias. It is too early to tell whether 
the fall of Soviet communism, and the slow settling of ideological dust surrounding 
these issues, will give rise to another revival of interest in Marx like that seen in the 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
themes in Marx, see Daniel Brudney, Marx’s Attempt to Leave Philosophy (Cambridge Mass: 
Harvard University Press, 1998), and Leopold, The Young Karl Marx, Chapter III. 	  
24 See, for example, John Roemer, Theories of Distributive Justice (Cambridge Mass: 
Harvard University Press, 1996); and G.A. Cohen, Rescuing Justice and Equality (Cambridge 
Mass: Harvard University Press, 2008).  
25 G.A.Cohen, If You’re an Egalitarian How Come You’re So Rich? (Cambridge Mass: 
Harvard University Press, 2000), p.103. 
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1970s. There does seem to be a moderate revival of interest in socialism within 
contemporary political philosophy.26 But at the very least, the collapse of the Soviet 
communism provides a more conducive context for a sober assessment of Marx’s 
ideas.  
 
1.2. The Problem of Determinism 
 
Having provided a response to these two doubts, I now turn to series of problems that 
are often thought to undermine Marx’s vision of the good life. The next problem I 
consider centres on the determinism that is commonly associated with Marx’s social 
theory and philosophy of history.  
The idea that Marx has a vision of the good life may strike some readers as 
strange. After all, Marx did not think of himself as a visionary of the good society but 
as a social theorist who attempted to explain the nature of the modern social world 
and the dynamics of its history. Furthermore, Marx saw his social theory as 
underpinning a deflationary account of ethics according to which ethical ideas are 
determined by the needs of the prevailing economic structure. Marx provides a 
crystalline statement of his theory in the Preface to A Contribution to A Critique of 
Political Economy of 1859 (hereafter the 1859 Preface): 
 
‘In the social production of their existence, men inevitably enter into definite 
relations, which are independent of their will, namely, relations of production 
appropriate to a given stage in the development of their material forces of 
production. The totality of these relations of production constitutes the 
economic structure of society, the real foundation, on which arises a legal and 
political superstructure and to which correspond definite forms of social 
consciousness. The mode of production of material life conditions the general 
process of social, political and intellectual life. It is not the consciousness of 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
26 See, for example, the articles published in the wake of G.A. Cohen’s Why Not Socialism? 
Miriam Ronzoni, ‘Life is Not a Camping Trip: On the Desirability of Cohenite Socialism’, 
Politics, Philosophy & Economics, 11:2, (2012); and Pablo Gilabert, ‘Feasibility and 
Socialism’, Journal of Political Philosophy, 19:1, (2011). 
One area of specifically Marxist (rather than broadly socialist) research that has been 
developing in the last few years has focused on the topic of Marx and recognition – more 
precisely, on the questions of whether Marx developed a philosophy of recognition, and, if 
so, whether that philosophy could enrich contemporary debates in this area. A special issue 
on  ‘Marx and Recognition’ has just been published in Ethical Theory and Moral Practice, 
16:4, (2013). 
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men that determines their existence, but their social existence that determines 
their consciousness’.27 
 
On this view, productive power (i.e. technology) tends to develop throughout history 
as human beings develop more and more dynamic productive methods in order to 
satisfy their ever-expanding needs. At each stage in history, ‘economic structures’ 
arise – previously feudalism, today capitalism, one day, perhaps, communism – that 
correspond to the level of the development of productive power. In turn, the 
economic structure itself determines the ‘political, legal and intellectual’ 
superstructure, of which ethics are also a part. In this way, Marx’s theory of history 
moves outwards from its materialist starting point: productive power develops 
throughout history; the level of the development of the productive powers determines 
the economic structure; and the economic structure in turns determines the 
ideological superstructure.  
How, according to this theory, does one form of society give way to another? 
Marx continues: 
 
‘At a certain stage of development, the material productive forces of society 
come into conflict with the existing relations of production…From forms of 
development of the productive forces these relations turn into their fetters. 
Then begins an era of social revolution. The changes in the economic 
foundation lead sooner or later to the transformation of the whole immense 
superstructure.’28 
 
In other words, social change occurs when an economic structure that had previously 
facilitated the development of productive power plays out its historical role and 
becomes a fetter to them. To be sure, it is individuals that ultimately overturn one 
economic structure and replace it with another. But the root cause of change is not 
individuals or their ideals of a better society, but the tension between the productive 
forces and the prevailing economic structure.   
On the view propounded here, the whole domain of ethics plays an 
epiphenomenal role in human history; ethical ideas are determined, or at least 
conditioned, by the prevailing economic structure of society. Hence, they lack any 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  27	  Marx, Preface to A Contribution to A Critique of Political Economy, MECW, volume 29 
(London: Lawrence and Wishart, 1987), p.263. 28 Marx, Preface to A Contribution to A Critique of Political Economy, p.263. 	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kind of autonomous force. In fact, the only real role for ethics within historical 
materialism is a conservative and obfuscatory one: their purpose is to stabilise the 
prevailing economic structure by sanctioning its practices (for example, by treating 
what are in reality class interests as impartial and universal standards of right).   
Given the circumscribed role ethics have within Marx’s social theory, it is of 
little surprise that when Marx discusses communism the point he often makes is that 
it is not the realisation of a pre-conceived ethical ideal but the culmination of 
complex historical processes. Thus, in The German Ideology, Marx and Engels claim 
that ‘communism is not for us a state of affairs which is to be established’, but is ‘the 
real movement which abolishes the present state of things.’29 Likewise, twenty-five 
years later, in The Civil War in France, Marx reiterated that communism is not the 
realisation of a pre-conceived vision of the good life. The working class, says Marx: 
 
‘…have no ready-made utopias to introduce. They know that in order to work 
out their own emancipation, and along with it that higher form to which 
society is irresistibly tending…they will have to pass through long 
struggles…. They have no ideas to realise, but to set free elements of the new 
society with which old collapsing bourgeois society itself is pregnant.’30 
 
And yet, while statements such as the ones quoted above may seem to preclude the 
very idea that Marx has a vision of the good life, there are several reasons for not 
taking them entirely at face-value. One compelling point is that it is simply hard to 
make sense of Marx’s life as a revolutionary unless one ascribes to him the belief that 
individuals and their ideas can have some positive role in shaping human society. For 
Marx not only tried to comprehend the inner motions of the capitalist economy, he 
also wrote the Manifesto of the Communist Party and other incendiary works, which 
aimed not to disinterestedly understand capitalism but to galvanise the class 
oppressed by it. Intermittently or implicitly, then, Marx seems to have believed that 
ideas could be a source of power to bring about change.  
 A second point is that while the 1859 Preface puts forward a very 
deterministic line on the relationship between economic base and (political, legal and 
moral) superstructure, a number of commentators have interpreted Marx’s theory of 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
29 Marx and Engels, The German Ideology, p.49.  
30 Marx, The Civil War in France, MECW, volume 22 (London: Lawrence and Wishart, 
1986), p.335. 
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history in a more nuanced and less deterministic way, which has consequently opened 
the door for a much greater role for ideas and human initiative in the historical 
process.31 While this is not the place to go into the finer details of Marx’s social 
theory and philosophy of history, it is certainly true that when Marx analyses an 
actual historical event – as he does, for example, in the ‘18th Brumaire of Louis 
Napoleon’ – he seems to allow a much greater scope for human agency than that 
which is hinted at in the 1859 Preface. Thus, although some of Marx’s discussions of 
his theory of history seem to out forward a very uncompromising form of 
determinism, it is not obvious that this is Marx’s considered view.  
The third and most important point, however, is that while Marx often claims 
that communism is merely a form of society that human history is inexorably moving 
towards, in reality it is obvious that Marx did have a vision of the future communist 
society which he believed would one day replace capitalism. That vision is especially 
clear in the young Marx’s Comments, where we are invited to ‘imagine that we had 
carried out our production as human beings’,32 and in the notorious passage in The 
German Ideology, where future individuals are said to ‘hunt in the morning, fish in 
the afternoon, rear cattle in the evening, criticise after dinner…without ever becoming 
a hunter, fisherman, shepherd, or critic.’33 But these passages cannot be discounted as 
early juvenilia, which a later more realistic Marx would disavow. For much later in 
Capital we are also told to ‘picture to ourselves…a community of free individuals, 
carrying on their work with the means of production in common, in which the labour 
power of all the different individuals is consciously applied as the combined labour 
power of the community.’34  
Despite all the frequent disavowals to the contrary, then, there is no doubt that 
Marx was committed to an ethical vision of a future communist society. Of course, 
one could object that Marx cannot be consistently committed to a deterministic theory 
of history and an ethical vision of a future society. But this is not an objection we 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
31 For a rejection of the view that Marx is committed to strict economic determinism, see 
Allen W. Wood, Karl Marx, Part II.  
32 Marx, ‘Comments on James Mill’, p.227. 
33 Marx and Engels, The German Ideology, p.47. 
34 Marx, Capital: A Critique of Political Economy, Volume I, MECW, volume 35 (London: 
Lawrence and Wishart, 1996), p.89. 
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need answer here, for our focus is on Marx’s vision of the good life, and not on how 
well that vision hangs together with the other aspects of his thought.   
  
1.3. The Problem of Perfectionism 
 
The next problem concerns Marx’s perfectionism, that is, his conception of human 
nature and the human good. Marx’s perfectionism has been heavily criticised. For 
instance, left-liberal philosophers, like Richard Arneson and Will Kymlicka, have 
argued that Marxian perfectionism is based on a one-sided account of the human 
good, while Axel Honneth has argued that Marxian perfectionism is at odds with 
autonomy. These criticisms have led a number of Marx’s followers to conclude that 
‘a perfectionist defence of nonalienation seems remote.’35  
In his fine book on the topic, Thomas Hurka defines the perfectionist position 
as follows: 
 
‘It [perfectionism] starts from an account of the good life, or the intrinsically 
desirable life. And it characterizes this life in a distinctive way. Certain 
properties, it says, constitute human nature or are definitive of humanity – 
they make humans human. The good life, it then says, develops these 
properties to a high degree or realises what is central to human nature. 
Different versions of the theory may disagree about what the relevant 
properties are and so disagree about the content of the good life. But they 
share the foundational idea that what is good, ultimately, is the development 
of human nature’36 
 
Marxian perfectionism states that humans are by nature creative beings. It says that 
they achieve self-realisation through the development of their creative powers. It 
criticises capitalism because while it creates the conditions for the achievement of 
individual self-realisation – chiefly by giving rise to a development of productive 
power that promises to liberate humanity from scarcity – it fails to achieve the goal of 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
35 John Roemer, ‘Should Marxists be Interested in Exploitation?’, p.52. 
Of course, not everyone has found Marx’s ideas about the human good controversial. In his 
recent magnum opus on the history of ethics, for instance, Terrence Irwin argues that: ‘the 
features of human nature he [Marx] appeals to do not seem especially controversial; nor does 
it seem very controversial that expression of them is a central aspect of the human good; nor 
does it seem completely strained to argue that capitalism des not allow the degree of 
expression of them that would be desirable.’ (Terence Irwin, The Development of Ethics, 
Vol.3: From Kant to Rawls, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2009), p.251).  
36 Thomas Hurka, Perfectionism (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1993), p.3. 
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self-realisation that its own developments put tantalisingly within reach. 
Communism, by contrast, promises to create the conditions where our distinctly 
human capacities can flourish to a quite unprecedented degree.  
Now, Marxian perfectionism has drawn criticism from different quarters in 
different ways. But the major complaint is that it is based on an insufficiently 
pluralistic account of the human good. That is, Marx’s perfectionism over-emphasises 
one good, self-realisation through labour, over a whole range of equally valuable 
goods, which it thereby overlooks or undervalues.37 In this way, some of Marx’s 
critics have claimed that Marxian perfectionism is at odds with value-pluralism. For, 
as Kymlicka puts it: 
 
‘There are many values that may compete with unalienated production, such 
as bodily and mental health, the development of cognitive facilities, of certain 
character traits and emotional responses, play, sex, friendship, love, art, 
religion. Some people will view productive labour as life’s prime want, but 
others will not. A prohibition on alienated labour, therefore, would unfairly 
privilege some people over others’.38  
 
 As well at being based on an insufficiently pluralistic account of the human good, 
critics also suggest that Marxian perfectionism precludes autonomy, understood here 
simply as the capacity to choose for oneself how to live. This is because Marxian 
perfectionism dictates the activities individuals should perform rather than leaving 
them free to choose for themselves. Thus, as Honneth has put this point: ‘instead of 
leaving subjects free to decide how they wish to pursue their happiness under 
conditions of autonomy, this perfectionism imposes from above the stipulation that it 
is only if all members carry out meaningful, non-alienated labour that a society is free 
and just’.39 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
37 For criticisms of this sort, see Will Kymlicka, Contemporary Political Philosophy: An 
Introduction (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1990), Chapter 5; Richard Arneson, ‘Meaningful 
Work and Market Socialism’, Ethics, 97:3, (1987); A. Brown, Modern Political Philosophy: 
Theories of the Just Society (Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1986); G.A. Cohen, ‘Reconsidering 
Historical Materialism’, History, Labour and Freedom (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1998). I 
return to Cohen’s criticism of Marx in Chapter 3, Section §4.   
38 Kymlicka, Contemporary Political Philosophy, p.90. 
39 Axel Honneth, ‘Rejoinder’, in B. van den Brink and D. Owen (eds) Recognition and 
Power: Axel Honneth and the Tradition of Critical Social Theory (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 2007), p.359. 
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 As a consequence, writers like Kymlicka, Arneson and Honneth, all broadly 
sympathetic to the traditional aims of socialism, argue that the identification of 
socialism with a particular vision of the good life is ‘unfortunate’.40 Instead, they 
propose that socialists should direct their attention exclusively to considerations of 
justice and equality in the economic sphere. Socialists, they might say, should be 
concerned with the right not the good.41 
Now, one preliminary point is that Marx is by no means a straightforward 
representative of the perfectionist tradition, in that perfectionism represents one 
strand amongst others in his ethical outlook. Thus, as well as the perfectionist concern 
with self-realisation, Marx’s writings also contains more Kantian themes, for example 
in the idea of exploitation, where the primary complaint against capitalism is not that 
it prevents workers from developing their creative powers and potentialities, but that 
it is a social system that treats workers as a means to a further end (i.e. making a 
profit).42 In this way, Marx is something of an ambiguous perfectionist, whose 
critique of capitalism and vision of a future society contains different ethical strands. 
Thus, it might seem that one way to place Marx in a positive light would be to 
minimise the perfectionist strand in Marx’s thought, and reconstruct Marx on more 
Kantian terms, so that concerns with exploitation rather than alienation and self-
realisation come to the fore. This is a route that has been taken by some of Marx’s 
followers.43 Yet it is not one that I shall take here. For not only do I doubt whether a 
distinctly Marxian ethics can be reconstructed free from its perfectionist roots,44 I also 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
40 Arneson, ‘Meaningful Work and Market Socialism’, p. 518 
41 Thus, as Honneth puts it, ‘the criteria of moral assessment cannot be related to the internal 
character of the work process itself, but rather only to the institutional framework in which it 
is necessarily embedded.’ (Honneth, The Fragmented World of the Social: Essays in Social 
and Political Philosophy, edited by C. W. Wright (New York: State University of New York 
Press, 1995), p. xviii).  
42 In addition, some commentators have claimed that there is a utilitarian aspect to Marx’s 
ethics (though for myself I find it hard to read Marx in this way). For a utilitarian reading of 
Marx’s ethics, see Allen Buchanan, Marx and Justice: The Radical Critique of Liberalism 
(London: Rowman and Littlefield, 1982).  
43 This way of rescuing Marx has been proposed by John Roemer; see his ‘Should Marxists 
be Interested in Exploitation?’  
44 More precisely, I share Kymlicka’s doubt that ‘it is difficult to tell whether Marxism 
provides a distinctive account of justice from those of other political traditions’ (Kymlicka, 
Contemporary Political Philosophy, p.192). Shorn of the perfectionist strand in Marx’s 
thought is difficult to see what differentiates Marxism as a moral and political philosophy 
from egalitarian liberalism.   
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think that the perfectionist strand in Marx – the humanist ideal of self-realisation – is 
one of the most valuable aspects of Marx’s philosophical inheritance. Therefore, a 
provisional defence of Marxian perfectionism is in order.  
Perfectionist theories, we have seen, are often thought to be marred by two 
related defects: they (arbitrarily) elevate one good at the expense of all others, and 
they do not leave people free to choose how to live. What, then, would a plausible 
account of perfectionism look like? It would be one that is compatible with a 
significant degree of pluralism about what activities and projects are valuable. Thus, 
for example, Richard Arneson says that ‘to be remotely plausible any perfectionist 
doctrine would have to be very unspecific or disjunctive in its content: there are many 
human goods any of which could serve equally well to frame a rational plan of life.’45  
Now, contra Arneson and others, I think that Marxian perfectionism may not 
be so far away from such an ideal. Marxian perfectionism, we have seen, identifies 
the human good with free creative activity, that is, with labour. In this respect, it 
might appear to be a monistic perfectionism, one that identifies a single life as best 
for all human beings. However, while Marx’s theory might appear to be monistic in 
this sense, the identification of labour as the human good actually leaves the issue of 
what activities individuals should perform relatively open. In this way, Marxian 
perfectionism differs from other varieties of perfectionism that specify that one very 
specific activity – philosophical contemplation, say – best actualises and promotes the 
human good. For the identification of labour as the chief human good, by contrast, 
means that there are many different ways which people can realise their nature: in 
activities like philosophical contemplation, politics and art that have traditionally 
been held in high regard in the history of philosophy, but also in activities like 
farming, craftwork and childcare which have not. 
Of course, this is not to say that Marxian perfectionism is compatible with 
every form of human life: it is pluralistic to a degree but not infinitely so. On the 
Marxian view, for instance, a life of passive consumption is not form of self-
realisation, neither is a life of purely private activity. But all perfectionist theories 
must discriminate between activities that are valuable and hence worthy of 
encouragement and promotion, and those that are not. The point I press here is simply 
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that Marxian perfectionism is compatible with a significant degree of pluralism about 
what activities are valuable. 
Critics of Marxian perfectionism say that Marx over-emphasises the 
importance of creativity. To be sure, they do not deny that creativity is a good, but 
they question whether creativity is the singularly most important good in a human 
life. But for Marx creativity is not the sole value in labour. On the contrary, labour is 
an activity through which individuals realise other values, like community. Like 
Hegel, Marx emphasises that labour is not only an activity through which individuals 
develop certain talents and abilities, but also an activity through they relate to others 
and forge social bonds. In a future communist society, Marx maintains, I realise 
myself as an individual by producing in a way that develops powers and capacities, 
but also as a communal being by serving the needs of my fellows: 
 
‘In the individual expression of my life I would have directly created your 
expression of your life, and therefore in my individual activity I would have 
directly confirmed and realised…my human nature, my communal nature.’46 
 
Moreover, I am not persuaded by the unqualified charge that in his emphasis of the 
creative side of human nature, Marx completely overlooks other equally important 
human needs. For, as David Leopold has shown in his erudite study of the young 
Marx, on top of the need for meaningful work an extensive list of other needs can be 
reconstructed from Marx’s texts.47 These include basic physical needs (for 
sustenance, shelter, physical exercise, basic hygiene and sex, for example) as well as 
less basic social needs (recreation, education, culture, artistic expression, emotional 
fulfilment, and aesthetic pleasure).48 Marx gives no reason to think that a life where 
many of these needs lay unfulfilled could be a fully satisfying one. Neither does he 
give any reason to think that meaningful work is a sufficient condition for human 
flourishing.  
Still, it is true that Marx’s vision of the good life contains an extraordinary 
emphasis on labour. Does this focus mean that Marx overlooks, or fails to give 
sufficient weight to, other human goods? Would a Marxian perfectionism disqualify 
other equally valuable ways of living? These are important questions to which we 	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47 Leopold, The Young Karl Marx, pp.228-229. 
48 Leopold, The Young Karl Marx, pp.228-229.  
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shall return. Yet even if we conclude that Marxian perfectionism does fall foul one or 
more of these criticisms, we need not conclude that Marxian perfectionism is of no 
value. For, as I shall stress in Chapter 4, work has generally been held in low regard 
(or simply ignored) in the history of philosophy. Thus, even if Marx goes too far in 
stressing the importance of work over other aspects of human life, his vision of the 
good life may still have value in providing a corrective to the prevailing treatment of 
work in the history of philosophy. 
 
1.4. The Problem of Utopianism 
 
The final problem I want to consider centres on the charge that Marx’s vision of the 
good life is utopian. The charge is complicated by a number of issues, however, so I 
start with some ground-clearing.  
 The charge of utopianism is complicated, first of all, by Marx’s seemingly 
paradoxical stance towards utopianism. The paradox is easily seen. On the one hand, 
Marx plainly did not think of himself as a utopian. In contrast to the socialism of 
Fourier, Saint-Simon and Robert Owen, Marx saw his own brand of socialism as 
resolutely anti-utopian: not wishful thinking but ‘real, positive science’, as he 
famously puts it.49 On the other hand, however, Marx’s texts seem to abound with 
quintessential utopian claims, for example, about the perfectibility of human nature, 
and the possibility of material abundance. This leaves us with a puzzle. For although 
Marx presented himself as an anti-utopian thinker, his own ideal of a future 
communist society presents us with an ideal which, according to one commentator, is 
‘more dazzling in its utopianism than even that of even the most utopian of utopian 
socialists’.50  
This, then, generates a number of separate questions: (1) On what grounds did 
Marx reject utopianism? (2) Is that rejection convincing? (3) Was Marx himself a 
utopian, despite his frequent disavowals to the contrary? (4) And, if so, is Marx’s 
vision of the good life vitiated by that utopianism? In what follows, I provide a 
response to questions (1) through to (3). Question (4) is not something that we can 
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settle here, but in closing I will put forward one way of addressing this question, 
which will be of use for the chapters that follow.  
Let us start by considering why Marx rejected utopianism. In this regard, it is 
important to note that Marx’s understanding of ‘utopia’ is different way from the 
everyday use of that term. In everyday use, utopia is often taken to mean a vision of 
an ideal society that does not yet exist. Marx did not reject utopianism in this 
everyday sense. Rather, in rejecting utopianism he had something different in mind. 
In particular, Marx associated utopianism with the creation of detailed accounts of an 
ideal society, that is, with the drawing up of comprehensive blueprints for the future. 
It is this idea of utopianism – the creation of detailed accounts of a future society – 
that Marx criticised and rejected. Thus, as Steven Lukes has summarised this view, 
‘Marx and Engels were not opposed to utopianism in the sense of vesting high hopes 
in the future: few have held higher hopes than they did. But they did criticise the 
Utopian Socialists for drawing up utopian blueprints’. 51 
Why did Marx reject blueprints? He gives two main arguments. The first is 
that the drawing up of blueprints is impossible, because history will unfold in ways in 
which we cannot possibly foresee. Thus, in a letter to the Dutch socialist, Ferdinand 
Domela Nieuwenhuis, Marx wrote that the attempt by utopian thinkers to anticipate 
‘a future revolution’s programme of action’ is ‘of necessity fantastic’.52 Underpinning 
the claim that any attempt to anticipate the future is impossible is a form of 
historicism – the epistemological view that human understanding is always captive of 
its historical situation, which it cannot consequently go beyond. Since, on Marx’s 
view, human understanding is always limited to its own time, it would be impossible 
for him living under capitalism to draw up detailed plans for a future communist 
society. 
Marx’s second argument is the stronger one that blueprints are unnecessary, 
because the solutions to major social problems – like the design of a future society – 
are immanent in the development of history. This view is at the heart of the so-called 
‘obstetric metaphor’ which run through Marx’s writings, for example, in the claim, 
already quoted, that the working-class ‘have no ready-made utopias to introduce…but 
to set free elements of the new society with which old collapsing bourgeois society is 	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itself pregnant.’53 Elsewhere, Marx puts this point in more strongly. ‘Mankind’, he 
claims: 
 
‘…sets itself only such tasks as it is able to solve; since closer examination 
will always show that the problem itself arises only when the material 
conditions for its solution are already present or are at least in the course of 
formation.’54 
 
Marx’s arguments against blueprints are unconvincing. First, Marx’s claim that the 
drawing up of blueprints is impossible, because human thought is limited to its own 
time, is open to doubt. In particular, while the historicist claim that human 
understanding is limited seems plausible, it is not clear that it justifies the stronger 
conclusion that the drawing up of blueprints is impossible. For even if human 
understanding is limited in the way the historicist suggests, we may still know enough 
about the tendencies of human nature and the social world to make the drawing up of 
‘realistic utopias’ an eminently possible enterprise.55 In fact, I think that acceptance 
of the historicist claim that human understanding is limited, and that history will 
develop in ways we cannot foresee, would lead us, not to abandon blueprints, but to 
change the way we consider them. For instance, an awareness of the limitations of 
human understanding and contingencies of historical development may make us take 
a more flexible and non-dogmatic approach to the implementation of blueprints. 
Second, Marx’s claim that blueprints are unnecessary, because the answers to 
key social questions will be revealed in the course of history, shows an extraordinary 
confidence in the historical process. This confidence was something of a 
commonplace in the nineteenth-century, but it is one that few of us share today. As 
David Leopold puts it, living after the various horrors of the twentieth century, 
Marx’s confidence that ‘the solutions to the social problems that face humankind 
need only to be delivered (and not designed) no longer seems a reasonable one to 
hold.’56   
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
53 Marx, The Civil War in France, p.335. 
54 Marx, Preface to A Contribution to A Critique of Political Economy, p.263. 	  
55 The phrase ‘realistic utopia’ comes from Rawls, Justice as Fairness: A Restatement 
(Cambridge Mass, Harvard University Press, 2001), p.4. 
56 Leopold, The Young Karl Marx, p.294. 
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More importantly, Marx’s rejection of blueprints has also tended to encourage 
a critical ‘lack of attention to questions of socialist design.’57 Marx wanted to change 
the world dramatically, yet he declined to specify in detail the ways he wanted it 
changed. The obvious rejoinder is that history may not – for all of Marx’s optimism 
to the contrary – develop in ways we desire. Famously, in the afterword to Capital, 
Marx said that it was not for him to write ‘recipes for the cook-shops of the future.’58 
But, as G.A. Cohen has responded, ‘unless we write recipes for future kitchens, 
there’s no reason to think we’ll get food we like.’59  
Furthermore, to the extent that Marxism has presented itself as a resolutely 
anti-utopian theory, it deprives itself of some valuable theoretical resources. I have no 
space to consider the positives of utopianism in detail, but I mention four, briefly, 
here. First, utopianism can open our minds to new possibilities, to ways of living that 
are different from and perhaps better than the way in which we live now. Second, 
utopianism can play an important role in clarifying our social and political values. 
Famously, for example, John Rawls invites his readers to imagine themselves in an 
‘original position’, where they abstract themselves from circumstances that are 
irrelevant to justice (like their race or gender or social class), to see, more clearly, 
what justice requires. Third, by highlighting the gap between society as-it-is and 
society as we-would-like-it-to-be, utopianism can provide a useful tool for social 
criticism. Finally, utopianism can inspire hope, or at least provide consolation, in 
discouraging times. I am sceptical about whether a purely critical theory – which 
Marxism has, at times, proudly boasted itself to be – can do that. In these ways, 
Marxism has, in its embracement of a resolutely anti-utopian outlook, failed to 
exploit the strengths of utopian thinking.  
Let us now turn away from Marx’s rejection of utopianism and towards his 
own alleged utopianism. The first question to consider here is whether Marx was 
himself a utopian. Naturally, as we have already seen, the answer to this question 
depends on the definition of ‘utopia’ that is adopted. If by utopia we mean the 
creation of detailed accounts of an ideal society, the drawing up of blueprints for the 
future, then the answer is “no”: Marx never provides the kind of detailed descriptions 
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of a future society that are a hallmark of the writings of utopian socialists like Charles 
Fourier and Robert Owen, for example. But if by utopia we mean a broad vision of an 
ideal society that does not yet exist, then I believe the answer is unequivocally “yes”: 
Marxian communism is a vision of human lifestyles and social arrangements, an ideal 
of what human life could be. In this sense, Marx’s vision of a future communist 
society is, plainly, utopian.  
However, the claim that Marx was a utopian is one that should be made with 
care. For while Marx is undeniably a utopian thinker in the particular sense described 
above, there is one obstinate myth about Marx’s vision of a future communist society 
and its alleged utopianism that remains prevalent in the literature. This is the myth 
that Marx envisioned communism, in the words of Leszek Kolakowski, as a ‘dream 
offering the prospect of a society of perfect unity, in which all human aspirations 
would be fulfilled, and all values reconciled.’60 Consider the claim that communism 
will satisfy ‘all human aspirations’. No doubt, Marx thinks that some of the most 
important aspirations that lie unfulfilled under capitalism would be fulfilled under 
communism. For instance, he thinks that communism will satisfy the deep human 
need for meaningful work. But there is no exegetical evidence that Marx thought that 
communism would satisfy ‘all human aspirations’. For even in a communist society 
that knows nothing of alienated labour or class antagonisms a multitude of 
frustrations and discontents will remain: some lives will be tragically cut short, some 
will experience misfortune in love, some will fail in their chosen project of self-
realisation. Marx gives no reason to think that such frustrations  – part and parcel of 
human life – will not feature in communism. Neither does he suggest that they will be 
trivial or insignificant.61 
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Let us turn to the final question, of whether Marx’s vision of the good life is 
vitiated by its utopianism. Again, there is some ground-clearing to be done here, since 
the criticism that a theory is ‘utopian’ can signal different failings. For example, it 
can mean (i) that a theory is implausible, because the proposals it recommends are not 
ones that could be realised in a feasible social world; (ii) that a theory is distracting 
and counter-productive, because it focuses attention on an unreachable beyond rather 
than on the possibilities for social change that are more readily available in the 
present; and finally (iii), that a theory is dangerous, because the illusion of a perfect 
world, where all sources of tension and frustration have melted away, can be used to 
justify any short-term sacrifice in a vain attempt to bring it to fruition. 
Marx’s vision of the good life has been criticised in all these ways, but I am 
inclined to think that (i) presents the most telling criticism. I do not think that (ii) 
presents a convincing case against utopianism, for there is not obvious reason why 
utopias must be counter-productive and distracting: it seems possible, for example, to 
engage in utopian theory to clarify what it is that we ultimately want, while 
simultaneously seizing the opportunities for social change more readily available in 
the present. Indeed, one could plausibly argue that utopianism is valuable in this 
regard, in that it can give necessary direction to those short-term measures. The final 
point (iii) might seem more relevant to Marx, since it has been pressed against him by 
a number of critics. Yet, as will be clear from the foregoing discussion, I do not think 
that Marx was committed to the paradisiacal vision of communism that is sometimes 
attributed to him. Moreover, I am inclined to think that it is Marx’s anti-utopianism, 
that is, his rejection of the need for detailed ethical reflection on the nature of a future 
society, rather than Marx’s utopianism, that is, his commitment to a broad vision of 
future lifestyles and social arrangements, that is Marx’s more serious theoretical 
shortcoming.  
So, it is, I think, the first charge – of implausibility – that constitutes the most 
serious criticism of Marx’s vision of the good life. The issue of whether Marx’s 
vision is utopian in this particular, negative sense is not one we can settle at the 
outset. But in concluding this section it will be useful to put forward a threshold of 
realism that Marx’s vision of the good life must meet if it is to represent a serious 
ideal. The threshold I have in mind, to which we shall return in the course of the 
thesis, comes from Rawls: 
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‘We view political philosophy as realistically utopian: that is, as probing the 
limits of practicable political possibility…we ask: What would a just 
democratic society be like under reasonably favourable but still possible 
historical conditions, conditions allowed by the laws and tendencies of the 
social world? What ideals and principles would such a society try to realise 
given the circumstances of justice in a democratic culture as we know 
them?’62 
 
1.5. Conclusion 
 
In this chapter, I have examined in some detail a family of objections that are often 
thought to undermine Marx’s vision of the good life, and argued that, on closer 
inspection, they may not be as damaging as they first appear. So, for example, while 
the very idea that Marx has a vision of the good life may seem hard to square with the 
determinism of Marx’s social theory, I have argued that there are reasons for not 
taking that determinism entirely at face-value; while Marx’s vision is often thought to 
be undermined by a one-sided account of the human good, I have argued that Marx’s 
perfectionism is in fact more pluralistic than its critics have suggested; and likewise, 
while Marx’s vision is often thought to be undermined by its utopianism, I have 
argued that utopianism should not be rejected out of hand. In this way, therefore I 
hope to have eased some of the worries one might have with Marx’s vision of the 
good life. 
 As well as defending Marx from certain objections, I have also put forward a 
number of more positive arguments for thinking that Marx’s vision of the good life 
may, not only be defensible from certain objections, but merit attention in its own 
right. So, for example, I have argued that there are reasons for thinking that our own, 
post-communist age may prove conducive to the examination and assessment of 
Marx’s philosophical ideas; that Marx’s perfectionism – with its focus on labour – 
emphasises an important aspect of human life, which philosophers have generally 
said little about; and that utopianism contains a number of valuable theoretical 
resources, which Marxists, as much as anyone else, have tended to undervalue.  
 Finally, I have put forward two desiderata for a defensible vision of the good 
life. First, following Arnseon, I have argued that a plausible perfectionism must be 
‘unspecific or disjunctive in its content’. It must allow for the fact that there ‘are 	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many human goods any of which could serve equally well to frame a rational plan of 
life’. Second, I have argued a desirable utopianism must pass a certain threshold of 
realism: it can probe, but not go beyond, ‘the limits of practicable political 
possibility’, to use Rawls’s phrase. I return to these points in Chapter 5, where I argue 
that Marx’s vision of the good life in the ‘Comments on James Mill’ comes closest to 
satisfying these desiderata.  
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CHAPTER 2 
 
ALL-ROUND DEVELOPMENT AND THE ABOLITION OF THE DIVISION 
OF LABOUR 
 
In the previous chapter, we examined a family of problems associated with Marx’s 
vision of the good life. Having come to a sharper understanding of these problems, 
we are now in a position to examine some of the specific features of that vision. I 
start by looking at a central tenet of Marx’s individualistic conception of the good 
life, the ideal of all-round development and the critique of the division of labour. For 
Marx, self-realisation consists in the all-round development of the individual and 
realising oneself in this all-round way requires an abolition of the division of labour. 
Marx makes this claim in the notorious ‘hunt in the morning’ passage in The German 
Ideology.1 There, he draws a contrast between capitalist society, where workers are 
chained to a narrow specialism and develop only a fragment of their many-sided 
potentials, and a communist society of the future, where individuals are free to choose 
the work they do and develop their powers in an all-round way.  
Marx’s thought on these matters has been heavily criticised. For instance, Jon 
Elster and G.A.Cohen have argued that all-round development represents an 
unrealistic and not necessarily attractive ideal of self-realisation. In what follows, I 
argue that the ideal of all-round development is not as implausible as Elster and 
Cohen suggest. While I shall defend the ideal of all-round development from Elster 
and Cohen’s criticisms, however, I shall argue that Marx was wrong to think that the 
implementation of that ideal requires an abolition of the division of labour. In 
particular, I will question whether overcoming the division of labour would create the 
conditions where the all-round development of individuals would flourish, and 
whether one could not, in fact, achieve an all-round development of one’s powers 
within specialised activities. In this way, I hope to show that Marx’s out and out 
hostility towards specialism was misguided, and that the ideal of all-round 
development could be realised by preserving rather than abolishing the division of 
labour. 
I begin (§2.1) by introducing the themes of all-round development and 
division of labour via a brief discussion of the famous sixth letter of Friedrich 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1 Marx and Engels, The German Ideology, p.47. 
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Schiller’s Aesthetic Education of Man. Next (§2.2), I examine Marx’s so-called ‘hunt 
in the morning’ passage in The German Ideology. Terrell Carver has questioned the 
reliability of this passage as a source of Marx’s ideas, but I argue that his attempt to 
discredit the passage is unconvincing. Having put this issue aside, the chapter then 
moves on to critically consider the nature of Marxian self-realisation. I briefly (§2.3) 
consider the idea of the idea that individuals under communism will be free to choose 
the activities they realise themselves in, before returning to the chief theme of the 
chapter, the idea of all-round development. My strategy is to defend a moderate 
version of all-round development from Elster and Cohen’s criticisms (§2.4), before 
going on to argue, contra Marx, that all-round development is compatible with a 
division of labour (§2.5).  
 
2.1. Schiller and Marx on the Division of Labour  
 
(i) Schiller 
 
In the sixth letter of his major philosophical work, The Aesthetic Education of Man, 
Schiller drew an influential contrast between the exquisite wholeness that 
characterised ancient Greece and the thoroughgoing fragmentation of modern society: 
 
‘That polypoid character of the Greek States, in which every individual 
enjoyed an independent existence but could, when need arose, grow into a 
whole organism, now made way for an ingenious clock-work, in which, out of 
the piecing together of innumerable but lifeless parts, a mechanical collective 
life ensued…Everlastingly chained to a single little fragment of the Whole, 
man himself develops into nothing but a fragment; everlastingly in his ear the 
monotonous sound of the wheel that he turns, he never develops the harmony 
of his being, and instead of putting the stamp of humanity upon his own 
nature, he becomes nothing more than the imprint of his occupation or of his 
specialised knowledge.’ 2 
 
For Schiller, as for many of his contemporaries, the stultification wrought by the 
division of labour was one of the chief social problems of the day. Its cause lay in the 
modern division of labour. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
2 Friedrich Schiller, On the Aesthetic Education of Man in a Series of Letters, edited and 
translated by E.M. Wilkinson and L.A. Willoughby (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1967), p.35 
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 For Schiller, this stultification had both individual and communal aspects. 
First, with the increasing specialism of modern labour the individual develops 
‘nothing but a fragment’ of their many-sided potentials. In marked contrast to the 
ancient Greek, who did not limit himself to one activity but developed his manifold 
powers in an all-round way, modern man was stunted: ‘Everlastingly chained’ to his 
narrow and increasingly one-sided occupation, Schiller writes, modern man is 
‘sacrificed to advance the abstract life of the whole’.3 
As well as the stultification of the individual, Schiller also argues that the 
division of labour has had a corresponding effect on the community, as the harmony 
of the Greek state gave way to mechanical society, lacking in social belonging and 
togetherness.4 As a result of the intense particularisation of human beings within the 
division of labour, there no longer exists any kind of commonality between people; 
and so, in sharp contrast to the Greek state, where each citizen had a deep connection 
with one another and with the social whole, modern society itself was fragmented. 
From the botching together of ‘innumerable but lifeless parts’, Schiller says, a 
‘mechanical kind of collective life ensued.’5 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
3 Schiller, Aesthetic Education, p.37 
4 The idea that the division of labour resulted in a stultification of the individual was a 
common theme in nineteenth century writings. Thus, as well as Schiller and Marx, similar 
ideas about individual stultification can be found in the wrings of Herder and Hölderlin  
(among others) on the continent, and Adam Ferguson, Thomas Carlyle, and John Ruskin 
(among others) in Britain.   
While these themes were prevalent in a number of works, however, some dissenting figures 
saw the modern division of labour in a more positive light: not as precluding individuality 
and social unity but leading to a higher forms of them. Key figures in this respect include 
G.W.F. Hegel, the French sociologist, Émile Durkheim, and the British idealist, F.H. 
Bradley.  
5 Schiller, Aesthetic Education, p.35.  
The metaphor of the ‘machine’, employed here by Schiller, was common in nineteenth 
century writings. As Alex Zakaras notes, for these writers the machine represented the 
antithesis of the individual: ‘the machine has no distinctive character; its movements are 
calculated to serve ends that are not its own; it is incapable of growth or development; and 
efficiency is the sole measure of its worth’. (‘Individuality, Radical Politics and the Metaphor 
of the Machine’ in Alison Stone (ed) The Edinburgh Critical History of Nineteenth-Century 
Philosophy (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 2011). p.225).  
In this regard, it is interesting to note that Durkheim reverses this metaphor, and describes the 
solidarity of ancient societies as ‘mechanical’, which he contrasts with the ‘organic’ 
solidarity of modern societies. His idea is that modern societies are composed of a variety of 
different parts, but that each part fits together to perform some vital function of the organism 
as a whole. Before him, Hegel had also used the metaphor of the organism to describe 
modern civil society and its division of labour For a brief but illuminating comparison of 
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Schiller’s contrast between ancients and moderns might seem to suggest that 
the way to overcome the stultification of the modern world would be to revert back to 
the Greek ideal where individual wholeness and communal unity were displayed so 
exquisitely. An argument of this sort would be problematic for two reasons. First, it is 
not at all clear whether Schiller’s portrayal is an accurate one, that is, whether ancient 
Greece really had the properties Schiller ascribes to it.6 Second, even if ancient 
Greece really was as Schiller described it, that does not prove that it could serve as a 
model for emulation today. For there may be features of Ancient Greece that make it 
inappropriate for modern conditions (its reliance on slave labour, for example).    
However, while Schiller uses the ideal of antiquity as a standard from which 
to criticise the present, he does not think the Greek model can provide a serious 
solution to the problems of his own age. To illustrate this point, Schiller gives a 
historical account of the dissolution of the Greek world, which ultimately, if not at 
first sight, prepares the ground for a higher form of self and society.7 For Schiller, 
Greek society was a high point of human culture, a model of individual wholeness 
and social unity. But it was a high point that could not be sustained or taken further. 
Society, Schiller tells us, could only progress by leaving the beauty of Greek life 
behind, surrendering wholeness and unity, and ‘pursuing truth along separate paths’,8 
that is, by specialising. This brought individual fragmentation, as we have seen. Yet 
Schiller also points out that that it made possible tremendous development for the 
species as a whole. Society made great progress by the specialisation of its functions: 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
Durkheim’s and Hegel’s views on this matter, see Robert Stern, ‘Unity and Difference in 
Hegel’s Political Philosophy’, Ratio, 2:1, (1989).  
6 For scepticism on this front, see G.E.M de Ste Croix, The Class Struggle in the Ancient 
Greek World: From the Archaic Age to the Arab Conquests (New York: Cornell Press, 
1981).   7 Thus, Schiller asks: 
‘Are not those stages which we can distinguish in all empirical knowledge likely to hold 
approximately for the general development of human culture?  
(1) The object stands before us as a whole, but confused and fluid. 
(2) We separate particular characteristics and distinguish; our knowledge is now 
distinct, but isolated and limited. 
(3) We unite what we have separated, and the whole stands before us again, no 
longer confused, however, but all illuminated from all sides.  
The Greeks found themselves in the first of these phases. We find ourselves in the second. 
The third, therefore, we may still hope for, and when it comes we shall no longer yearn for 
the Greeks to return’ (Schiller, Aesthetic Education, p.21). 	  
8 Schiller, Aesthetic Education, p.41. 
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collectively modern society had achieved wonders far surpassing anything produced 
in antiquity. But at the same time these developments had crippled rather than 
enriched the individual. As J.S. Mill would similarly lament: ‘the greatness of 
England is now all collective; individually small, we only appear capable of anything 
great by our habit of combining.’9   
The nature of the modern social world was thus deeply contradictory. On the 
one hand, the intensification of the division of labour had created a society of stunted 
individuals. On the other hand, however, the intense specialisation of human labour 
had ultimately been progressive, at least for the species considered as a whole. 
Individual stultification and social progress had come hand-in-hand. For Schiller, the 
contradictory nature of the modern social world gave rise to an imperative. This 
centred on the deep need to recapture the individual wholeness that had characterised 
the Greek world in a higher form, that is, in a way that does not forsake the gains 
made by specialism. The imperative, in other words, was to preserve the positives of 
the division of labour while concurrently eliminating its stultifying effects.10  
 
(ii) Marx 
 
Although there is scarce reference to Schiller in Marx’s writings, there can be little 
doubting Schiller’s influence on Marx’s thought on these matters.11 Marx shares 
Schiller’s concern over the impact of the division of labour on the individual, and 
agrees that the imperative is to restore individual wholeness in a way that is 
compatible with the gains made by specialism. But Marx’s thought goes beyond 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
9 J.S.Mill, On Liberty, in On Liberty and Other Writings, edited by John Gray (Oxford: 
Oxford University Press, 2008), p.78. 
10 Schiller is sharper at diagnosing the problems of his age than prescribing remedies, but 
recent literature on this topic has argued that Schiller seeks to accommodate the division of 
labour rather than abolish it. For discussion see Douglas Moggach, ‘Schiller’s Aesthetic 
Republicanism’, History of Political Thought, 28:3, (2007). 
11 This may seem surprising, not least because the young Engels draws an unfavourable 
comparison between Goethe and Schiller, crediting the former with the sharper insight into 
German political life, and faulting the latter for seeking refuge from the ‘wretchedness’ of 
German social conditions in the ‘Kantian ideal’ (Engels, ‘German Socialism in Verse and 
Prose’, MECW, volume 6 (London: Lawrence and Wishart, 1976), p.259). However, Marx 
does not criticise Schiller in this way, and while there is little explicit reference to Schiller in 
Marx’s texts, some of his phrases – including the famous distinction in the third volume of 
Capital between the ‘realm of freedom’ and the ‘realm of necessity’ – have a distinctly 
Schillerian ring to them. I return to Schiller’s influence on Marx in Chapter 4, §5.   
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Schiller’s in important ways. For Marx gives a more nuanced answer as to why a 
model from the past could not serve as a model for the present, and offers a more 
radical solution to the problem of fragmentation: one that seeks to abolish specialism 
rather than mitigate its harshest effects.  
Like Schiller, Marx also – though less frequently – draws on the ancient world 
as a standard from which to criticise the present. Thus, in the Poverty of Philosophy, 
for instance, Marx quotes the lawyer and historian, Pierre-Édouard Lémontey, with 
approval: 
 
‘We are struck with admiration…when we see among the Ancients the same 
person distinguishing himself to a high degree as philosopher, poet orator, 
historian, priest, administrator, general of an army. Our souls are appalled at 
the sight of so vast a domain. Each one of us plants his hedge and shuts 
himself up in his enclosure. I do not know whether by this parcellation the 
field is enlarged, but I do know that man is belittled.’12 
 
However, while Marx is not immune to the allure to the Greek ideal, on the whole his 
writings are generally more positive than Schiller’s about modernity and its 
prospects. Thus, while he admits that ‘the old view according to which man always 
appears…as the end of production, seems very exalted when set against the modern 
world, in which production is the end of man’, he quickly goes on to question 
whether antiquity really does represent a superior mode of life. After all, asks Marx: 
 
‘…what is wealth if not the universality of the individual’s needs, capacities, 
enjoyments, productive forces etc., produced in universal exchange; what is it 
if not full development of human control over the forces of nature – over the 
forces of so-called Nature as well as of those of his own nature? What is 
wealth if not the absolute unfolding of man’s creative abilities, without any 
precondition other than the preceding historic development, which makes the 
totality of this development – i.e. the development of all human powers as 
such, not as measured by any previously given yardstick – an end-in-itself.’13  
 
In this way, Marx gives a more sophisticated answer than Schiller as to why ancient 
Greece could not represent a serious model for modern industrial society. It is Marx’s 
idea that human powers and needs multiply in the course of history: man produces in 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
12 Marx, The Poverty of Philosophy, MECW, volume 6, (London: Lawrence and Wishart, 
1976), p.190. 
13 Marx, Grundrisse I, MECW, volume 28 (London: Lawrence and Wishart, 1987), pp. 411-
412.	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order to satisfy his needs, but the satisfaction of basic needs gives rise to new needs 
of a more developed kind, which in turn spur on the development of further 
productive powers. 
 Thus, in antiquity, the powers and capacities of the species were only 
developed in a partial and embryonic way. While individuals in ancient Greece 
developed their powers to a high level, as a social whole it was limited and 
underdeveloped. In the modern world, by contrast, the powers and needs of the 
species are richer and more developed. In industry, human productive powers reach 
new heights of development, and human needs multiply and become more refined. 
Under capitalism, however, all of this develops in an estranged way, for the rich 
development of the powers and capacities of the species occurs in sharp contrast to 
the impoverishment of the powers and capacities of the individual. Thus, while the 
Greek world was characterised by rich individual development but only a basic 
development of the social whole, in the modern world, by contrast, the social whole is 
richly developed, whereas the individual only develops his manifold powers in an 
extremely limited and one-sided way: 
 
‘In the bourgeois economy – and in the epoch of production to which it 
corresponds – this complete unfolding of man’s inner potentiality turns into a 
complete emptying-out of the individual. His universal objectification as total 
alienation, and the demolition of all determined one-sided aims becomes the 
sacrifice of the [human] end-in-itself to a wholly external purpose. That is 
why, on the one hand, the childish world of antiquity appears as something 
superior.’14  
 
Here, then, we find Marx’s response to Schiller’s question: ‘whence this disadvantage 
among individuals when the species as a whole is at such an advantage?’15 It is 
Marx’s idea that while ancient Greece exhibited a high degree of individual 
development, it was a basic, underdeveloped social whole. The powers and capacities 
of the species were at a childlike stage. The intensification of the division of labour 
under capitalism ‘raises the productive power of labour and increases the wealth and 
refinement of society’, yet it simultaneously ‘impoverishes the worker and reduces 
him to a machine’16 As F.H Bradley glossed this view (which he did not share), ‘the 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
14 Marx, Grundrisse I, p.412. 
15 Schiller, Aesthetic Education, p.41. 
16 Marx, Economical and Philosophical Manuscripts of 1844, MECW, volume 3 (London: 
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higher the organism the more are its functions specified, and hence narrowed…and, 
though the world grows the individual withers.’17  
From the perspective of Marx’s ethical individualism, however, the growth of 
the world is no compensation for the withering of the individual. Yet, as for Schiller, 
Marx also thinks that a return to a simpler way of life is neither possible nor 
desirable. In this way, Marx shares the same problem that animated the sixth letter of 
Schiller’s Aesthetic Education of Man, of how to recapture the individual wholeness 
that had characterised the ancient Greece in a higher form, in a way that was 
compatible with the gains made by the modern economy. In other words, the 
imperative facing both Marx and Schiller centred on the need to preserve the division 
of labour’s productive achievements but eliminate its stultifying effects. It is to 
Marx’s solution to this problem that we now turn.  
 
2.2. The ‘Hunt in the Morning’ Passage 
 
In this section, I consider Terrell Carver’s attempt to undermine the reliability of 
Marx’s most famous pronouncement on the fate of the division of labour under 
communism, and argue that his interpretation fails. While my aim is primarily 
negative, to show how Carver’s attempt is mistaken, I will conclude the section by 
sketching an alternative reading of the passage.  
 In The German Ideology, Marx and Engels make one of their most notorious 
remarks about communism and the future of the division of labour under it: 
 
‘…as soon as the distribution of labour comes into being, each man has a 
particular, exclusive sphere of activity, which is forced upon him, and from 
which he cannot escape. He is a hunter, a fisherman, a shepherd, or a critical 
critic, and must remain so if he does not want to lose his means of livelihood; 
whereas in communist society, where nobody has one sphere of activity but 
each can become accomplished in any branch he wishes, society regulates the 
general production and thus makes it possible for me to do one thing today 
and another tomorrow, to hunt in the morning, fish in the afternoon, rear cattle 
in the evening, criticise after dinner, just as I have a mind, without ever 
becoming a hunter, fisherman, shepherd, or critic. ’18 
 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
Lawrence and Wishart, 1975), p.240. 
17 F.H. Bradley, Ethical Studies (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1876), p.188.	  
18 Marx and Engels, The German Ideology, p.47. 
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This passage has provoked a huge amount of comment and criticism, and 
understandably so: for as we have seen Marx’s claim is that communism will 
recapture the individual wholeness of antiquity in a higher form, that is, in a way that 
will preserve and build on capitalism’s productive achievements. Yet in this passage 
Marx’s examples of the activity of individuals are, with the exception of criticising, 
all typical of pre-industrial societies. Can we take the passage seriously? Did its 
authors even intend it to be taken seriously?  
One important contribution to this debate comes from Terrell Carver, who has 
questioned this passage’s reliability as a source of Marx’s ideas.19 Carver makes use 
of some philological work by Japanese scholars that shows that this passage was 
mostly written in Engels’s hand, except for a few insertions that were added to the 
draft by Marx; specifically, ‘critical critic’, ‘criticise after dinner’ and ‘or critic’.20 
Carver argues that Marx’s insertions were written ‘humorously in order to send it up, 
and thus reject it as a serious draft.’21 For Engels’s depiction of communist society 
was ‘reminiscent of the very pre-industrial Utopias that Marx despised’, and thus ‘fit 
only for critical critics.’22 According to Carver, then, Marx’s insertions into the text 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
19 Terrell Carver, The Postmodern Marx (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1998), 
Chapter 5. 
20 However, the most recent philological studies of the text show that Marx also inserted the 
examples of ‘hunt’ and ‘fish’ into the text. The first draft of the passage – all written in 
Engels’s hand – read as follows: 
‘As soon as the distribution of labour comes into being, each man has a particular, 
exclusive sphere of activity, which is forced upon him, and from which he cannot 
escape. He is a hunter, a fisherman, or a shepherd, and must remain so if he does not 
want to lose his means of livelihood; while in communist society, where nobody has 
one sphere of activity but each can become accomplished in any branch he wishes, 
society regulates the general production and thus makes it possible for me to do one 
thing today and another tomorrow, to be a show-maker in the morning, gardener in 
the afternoon, an actor in the evening, just as I have a mind.’ 
 Crucially, as well as listing a different set of occupations, the first draft of the passage ends 
with a full stop after ‘just as I have a mind’, and makes no claim about an abolition of social 
roles. That is, the communist described in the first version of the passage occupies multiple 
roles – they are successively ‘a shoemaker, a gardener and actor’ – whereas in the second 
version of the draft communist man is said to ‘hunt’, ‘fish’, ‘rear cattle’ and  ‘criticise’ 
‘without ever becoming a hunter, fisherman, shepherd, or critic’. In other words, they are not 
even successively a ‘hunter, fisherman, shepherd, or critic’, even though they do hunt, fish, 
shepherd and criticise. I examine Marx’s hostility towards social roles in Chapter 3. For the 
most recent discussion of the text’s composition see James Furner, ‘Marx’s Sketch of 
Communist Society in The German Ideology and the Problems of Occupational Confinement 
and Occupational Identity’, in Philosophy and Social Criticism, 37:2, (2011).  
21 Carver, The Postmodern Marx, p.107. 
22 Carver, The Postmodern Marx, p.107. 
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were designed to ridicule Engels’s depiction of communism, for that depiction 
sounded to Marx’s ears very much like Fourier’s utopian plans for a future society. 
When read in this light, Carver argues, ‘the relevance of this passage to the issue of a 
communist division of labour – however it is to be conceived – is now thoroughly 
compromised.’23 
All of this may seem to fatally undermine the passage as a source of Marx’s 
ideas about the division of labour and the nature of work a future society. Plausible as 
this may sound, however, Carver’s interpretation is not without its problems, and two 
points in particular undermine his argument.  
 The first problem concerns Marx’s relationship with utopian socialism. 
According to Carver, Marx’s insertions in the passage ‘show Marx sharply rebuking 
Engels for straying, perhaps, momentarily, from the serious work of undercutting the 
fantasies of Utopian Socialists.’24 In this way, Carver follows what we might call the  
‘standard story’, according to which Marx was a relentless and unqualified critic of 
utopian socialism.25 This characterisation of Marx’s attitude toward the utopian 
socialists is oversimplified and misleading, however.26 Far from being an unqualified 
critic of these thinkers, Marx often credits the utopian socialists, and Fourier in 
particular, with important insights.27 For instance, the early Marx claims that it is 
Fourier’s ‘great merit’ to have revealed ‘the contradictions and unnaturalness of 
modern life’,28 while later on in the Grundrisse he commends Fourier for showing 
that the ‘ultimate object is the raising of the mode of production itself, not that of 
distribution, to a higher form’.29 To be sure, Marx does not accept the writings of the 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
23 Carver, The Postmodern Marx, p.107. 
24 Carver, The Postmodern Marx, p.107. 
25 For a presentation of this ‘standard story’, see Darren Webb, Marx, Marxism and Utopia 
(London: Ashgate, 2000).  
26 In a recent study of the early Marx, David Leopold has convincingly argued that Marx’s 
assessment of utopianism was far more complex and positive than is commonly supposed 
(Leopold, The Young Karl Marx, Chapter 5).  
27  In a recent paper, Hans-Christoph Schmidt am Busch has defended the view that Marx was 
deeply influenced by Fourier’s social theory (Schmidt am Busch, ‘”The Egg of Columbus”? 
How Fourier’s Social Theory Exerted a Significant (and Problematic) Influence on the 
Formation of Marx’s Anthropology and Social Critique’, British Journal for the History of 
Philosophy, forthcoming).  
28 Quoted from Leopold, The Young Karl Marx, p.283 
29 Marx, Grundrisse Volume II, MECW, volume 29 (London: Lawrence and Wishart, 1987), 
p.97.  
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utopian socialists in every detail. For instance, he rejects the view – common to both 
Fourier and Owen – that future communities should be small in scale. Yet what is 
striking is how respectful Marx is of their shortcomings. In dealing with these writers, 
Marx consistently makes the point that they cannot be held culpable for their errors, 
for they simply reflect the limitations of their age. Thus, referring to Fourier, Owen 
and Saint-Simon, Marx claims that ‘since social conditions were not sufficiently 
developed to allow the working class to constitute itself as a militant class, [they] 
were necessarily obliged to limit themselves to dreams about the model society of the 
future’, before going on to add that ‘we cannot repudiate these patriarchs of socialism 
just as chemists cannot repudiate their forebears the alchemists.’30  
In this way, Carver’s reproduction of the ‘standard story’ that Marx expressed 
nothing but hostility towards the utopian socialists seems hard to square with the texts 
themselves, where a closer reading suggests that Marx’s attitude towards the utopian 
socialism is more complex and positive that is typically supposed. This presents 
Carver with a problem, for it is not clear that Marx would want to ‘send up’ the 
utopian socialists in the way he suggests. 
The main point that undermines Carver’s argument, however, is that the 
passage in question contains ideas that recur throughout Marx’s writings, both in the 
remainder of The German Ideology and beyond it. Thus, the idea that the division of 
labour is an evil that must be overcome is a theme that Marx returns to on numerous 
occasions. For instance, in the Economic and Philosophical Manuscripts, Marx says 
that as a consequence of the division of labour man is reduced ‘intellectually and 
physically to the level of a machine, and from being a man becomes an abstract 
activity and a stomach.’31 Similarly, in The Communist Manifesto, Marx says that 
‘owing to the extensive use of machinery and to division of labour, the work of the 
proletarians has lost all individual character, and, consequently, all charm for the 
workman. He becomes an appendage of the machine, and it is only the most simple, 
most monotonous, and most easily acquired knack, that is required of him.’32 
Likewise, in Capital, Marx claims that the division of labour ‘seizes upon, not only 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
30 Marx, ‘Political Indifferentism’, MECW, volume 23 (London: Lawrence and Wishart, 
1988), p.394. 
31 Marx, Economical and Philosophical Manuscripts of 1844, p.240. 
32 Marx and Engels, The Communist Manifesto, MECW, volume 6 (London: Lawrence and 
Wishart, 1976), pp.490-191. 
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the economic, but every other sphere of society, and everywhere lays the foundation 
for that all engrossing system of specialising and sorting men, that development in a 
man of one single faculty at the expense of all other faculties.’33 (Incidentally, this 
view also remained also central to Engels’s later outlook. In Anti-Dühring, Engels 
envisions a future society where ‘there will be no professional porters or architects.’ 
In this society, ‘the man who for half an hour gives instructions as an architect will 
also act as a porter for a period, until his activity as an architect is once again 
required.’34). 
In the same way, the positive counterpart to the critique of the division of 
labour – the humanist ideal of the many-sided individual – is also central to Marx’s 
philosophy as a whole; indeed, it is its chief value. Thus, elsewhere in The German 
Ideology, Marx writes that communism will enable individual development ‘in all 
directions’,35 and claims that it is the only form of society where the ‘genuine and 
free development of individuals ceases to be a mere phrase’.36 Much later in Capital, 
we find the same emphasis on many-sidedness, where Marx looks forward to a 
society ‘in which the full and free development of every individual forms the ruling 
principle.’37 Moreover, as in ‘hunt in the morning’ passage, Marx continues to link 
the ideal of all-round development to the overcoming of the division of labour. In the 
footnotes of Capital, Marx quotes approvingly the experience of a French worker 
who has recently returned from San Francisco:    
 
‘I never could have believed, that I was capable of working at the various 
occupations I was employed on in California. I was firmly convinced that I 
was fit for nothing but letter-press printing.... Once in the midst of this world 
of adventurers, who change their occupation as often as they do their shirt, 
egad, I did as the others. As mining did not turn out remunerative enough, I 
left it for the town, where in succession I became typographer, slater, 
plumber, etc. In consequence of thus finding out that I am fit to any sort of 
work, I feel less of a mollusc and more of a man.’38  
 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
33 Marx, Capital I, p.359. 
34 Engels, Anti-Dühring, MECW, volume 25 (London: Lawrence and Wishart, 1987), p.186. 
35 Marx and Engels, The German Ideology, p.78. 
36 Marx and Engels, The German Ideology, p.439. 
37 Marx, Capital I, p.588. 
38 Marx, Capital I, p.490. 
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For far from being uncharacteristic, then, the ‘hunt in the morning’ passage develops 
ideas about the division of labour and the nature of self-realisation which recur in 
Marx’s critique of capitalism and vision of a future society. In this way, Carver’s 
attempt to dismiss the ‘hunt in the morning’ passage as a humorous send-up is 
problematic, for it fails to account for the continual recurrence of its central themes at 
various other points in Marx’s writings.   
Nevertheless, this leaves us with a puzzle, for if this passage was intended 
seriously, a possibility it is difficult to discount, it is unclear how the passage could 
possibly serve as a model for mass society. Of course, any answer to this problem 
must be somewhat speculative, for Marx gives us no clues as to why he took hunting, 
fishing, farming, and criticising as paradigms of communist activity. But let me make 
some tentative remarks, which may, I hope, shed some light on this matter.  
Note, first of all, that it is unclear whether the variegated activity described by 
Marx serves economic ends, that is, whether it constitutes a description of labour of 
leisure. Evidence for the latter (leisure) view would come from the claim that ‘society 
regulates the general production’, which suggests, perhaps, that society will regulate 
social labour, leaving individuals ‘to do one thing today and another tomorrow’ in 
their free time. On this reading, communist man hunts in the morning, fishes in the 
afternoon, and criticises after dinner once the necessary work is done. Note that this 
would make the passage more plausible: since hunting, fishing and criticising are 
descriptions of leisure rather than labour, one does not have to try and explain how 
such activities are supposed to yield the level of productivity necessary to sustain 
modern society.  
If, on the other hand, the variegated activities Marx describes do serve 
economic ends, note that, with the exception of criticising, the activities Marx lists 
are all ones that are both socially necessary and intrinsically enjoyable, such that it is 
relatively easy to think of individuals engaging in them, not just because they have to, 
but because the find the activity at hand intrinsically satisfying. Conversely, had 
Marx said that communist man will maintain a sewer in the morning, clean the streets 
in the afternoon, then wash dishes in a restaurant after dinner, his account may have 
been more representative of the range of work within modern society, but it would 
have made it incredibly hard to envision people engaging in them ‘just as they have a 
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mind’.39 In this way, the activities listed by Marx and Engels are all well-suited to a 
different argument, namely, that communist society will overcome the distinction 
between work and leisure, in the sense that under communism one’s work will be 
enjoyable and thus carried out for its own sake rather than because it is socially 
necessary.  
In this regard, it is interesting to note that Adam Smith had also drawn on 
hunting and fishing as examples of intrinsically satisfying work, which bridge the 
work-leisure divide. In a passage from the Wealth of Nations (which Marx was surely 
familiar with), Smith claims that ‘hunting and fishing, the most important 
employments of mankind in a rude state of society, become in its advanced state their 
most agreeable amusements, and they pursue for pleasure what they once followed 
from necessity.’40 It would seem plausible that Marx choose the activities in question 
precisely for the reason that Smith highlights: namely, that being both socially useful 
and intrinsically enjoyable they provide a good example of the kind of necessary 
labour that individuals could, plausibly, freely choose to perform.  
More could be said on these issues. However, having shown that we have 
good reason to take the underlying themes of the passage seriously, I now turn my 
attention away from questions about the reliability of the passage, and towards the 
issues it raises with regards to individual self-realisation. 
 
2.3. Free Self-Realisation 
 
In the ‘hunt in the morning’ passage, Marx draws a contrast between capitalist 
society, where workers are chained to an exclusive sphere of activity, and develop 
only a fragment of their creative potentials, with a future communist society, in which 
individuals have the opportunity to freely choose the work they do, and develop their 
creative powers in an all-round way. Thus, for Marx, individual self-realisation has 
two aspects: the free and full self-realisation of the individual.41 In what follows, I 
briefly consider the idea of free self-realisation (an idea which I return to, and deal 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
39 Of course, this provides no defence of Marx. The fact that it is incredibly hard to see how 
these counter-examples could be ones that individuals would willingly perform undermines 
the claim that the distinction between labour and leisure is one that can be fully overcome.  
40 A. Smith, The Wealth of Nations (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1975), Book 1, Chapter 
10, p.229. 
41 Jon Elster, ‘Self-Realisation in Work and Politics’, p.131. 
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with more fully, in Chapters 3 and 4), before returning to the central theme of the 
chapter, the idea of full self-realisation or all-round development. 
First, then, concerning free self-realisation, the contrast is between the 
unfreedom of the present-day capitalism, where each individual has an ‘activity, 
which is forced upon him and from which he cannot escape’, with the freedom of a 
future communist society, where ‘each can become accomplished in any branch he 
wishes’.42 Note that Marx’s complaint here is not directed at specialism as such, but 
at forced job specialism: the complaint, to reiterate, it that the worker has an activity 
‘forced upon him’. To be sure, Marx’s claim is not that workers under capitalism 
literally have work forced upon them, in the way, for example, that a slave has work 
forced upon him by his master. For, as Marx recognises, individuals under capitalism 
have the formal freedom to become capitalists or not to work at all. Rather, Marx’s 
claim is that, having nothing to sell but their own labour-power, workers have no 
reasonable alternative but to work for a capitalist.43 Hence, the worker is, as Marx 
puts it in Capital, ‘compelled to sell himself of his own free-will.’44 The contrast is to 
a society of the future in which individuals are not so forced, and have the freedom to 
choose and change their activities as they please. 
While Marx’s commentators have been critical of the ideal of all-round 
development, they have generally been more sympathetic to the idea of free self-
realisation. For instance, Jon Elster argues that ‘even though an individual cannot 
develop all his abilities, he ought to be free to develop any of them…the individual 
should be free to choose which of his many powers to develop’.45 Likewise, the idea 
that workers being able to freely choose the activities they pursue has also been 
emphasised in Kantian accounts of meaningful work.46  
The idea of free self-realisation seems to me problematic, however. For taken 
to the extreme, as it is by Marx, it raises problems of economic coordination. If we all 
choose work ‘just as we have a mind’, then how can we ensure that all necessary 
work gets done? This problem over production leads to a problem over distribution: if 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
42 Marx and Engels, The German Ideology, p.47. 
43 The idea of ‘reasonable alternatives’ comes from G.A.Cohen, ‘The Structure of Proletarian 
Freedom’, History, Labour and Freedom (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1998). 
44 Marx, Capital I, p.753. 
45 Jon Elster, ‘Self-Realisation in Work and Politics’, p.132.  
46 See, for example, Norman E. Bowie, ‘A Kantian Theory of Meaningful Work’, Journal of 
Business Ethics, 17:9, (1998).   
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we produce as we please how can we ensure we generate the right mix of products to 
satisfy society’s most elementary needs? Then there is the problem of mundane work: 
some forms of work are socially important but they are not ones that the individual 
would freely perform, on account of their being hazardous, fatiguing and mind-
numbingly dull, and so on. How can these problems be overcome?   
In his rudimentary account of the division of labour, Plato suggested that there 
is a natural distribution of talents and abilities across society, such that as long as 
every individual fulfils their natural ‘function’ all social needs would be met.47 
Plato’s belief that the function of individuals and needs of society perfectly align is 
surely too optimistic. A more Marxist solution is to say that machines will do the 
‘dirty work’ leaving people free to engage in more creative activities. Marxian 
predictions about mechanisation have not been completely wrong, but they have 
certainly been a little optimistic: mechanisation has reduced the amount of mundane 
work in society, but it cannot eradicate it completely. The mechanisation of the 
productive process itself generates mundane work (machines must be cleaned), and 
even the most creative pursuits contain some routine tasks (for example, writers must 
read proofs). Regrettably, mundane work is part and parcel of human existence. 
The greater problem, however, is not with mundane work but with the belief 
that individuals can exercise complete freedom to do ‘one thing today and another 
tomorrow’. For in reality individuals cannot exercise a completely untrammelled 
choice over the work they do. The range of work open to the individual is always 
constrained by the requirements of society (that is, by the fields that need ploughing), 
and the individual’s aptitude (some individuals will be ill-suited to performing certain 
tasks). No doubt, Marx may be right that under capitalism individuals do not have as 
much freedom at work as would be desirable (they may, for example, lack the 
educational opportunities to change their specialism). But the problem with Marx’s 
position in The German Ideology is that he does not say that workers should enjoy 
greater freedom over their specialism, but that they will enjoy the complete freedom 
to choose their specialism on a daily, or even hourly, basis. Such freedom is 
incompatible with work in modern society. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
47 Plato, The Republic, translated by H.D.P. Lee, 2nd Edition (Harmondworth: Penguin, 1987). 
Book III.  
	   46	  
What are the implications of these constraints for Marx’s vision of the good 
life? Clearly, it undermines the model of communism put forward in The German 
Ideology, at least insofar as that passage is interpreted as saying that individuals can 
exercise a complete freedom ‘to do one thing today and another tomorrow.’48 But 
although it undermines the picture of the good life Marx develops in The German 
Ideology, Marx does have two of lines of response at his disposal. I give a fuller 
treatment of these issues in Chapter 4, but let me briefly preface them here. 
The first reply would be to accept that work will always be determined by 
social need, and to look for real freedom and self-realisation outside the working-day, 
in leisure. This is the option Marx takes in the third volume of Capital (hereafter 
Capital III), where he describes work as permanently belonging to a ‘realm of 
necessity’, and contrasts it with the ‘true realm of freedom’, which exists beyond it in 
leisure.49 To be sure, work directed at needs under communism is much less alienated 
than work directed at needs under capitalism, but real freedom – the all-round 
development of the individual – is enjoyed in leisure when the necessary work is 
done.  
The second, more ambitious, reply would be to accept that work is determined 
by social need, but to deny that this precludes self-realisation. This is the option Marx 
takes in the Comments, where I am said to gain fulfilment both from the engagement 
of my powers and capacities in my labour, but also from ‘having satisfied a human 
need by my work, that is, of having objectified man’s essential nature [Wesen], and of 
having thus created an object corresponding to the needs of another man’s essential 
nature.’50 Note that in this passage, as in Capital III, Marx recognises that work will 
always be a matter of necessity; here, however, Marx considers the necessity of work 
to be a source of its attraction.  
Both of these models of communist society have their respective merits and 
shortcomings. The view espoused in Capital III would seem to present us with a 
realistic alternative to capitalism. Work is not ‘life’s prime want’ on this account, but 
it is rationally planned in a way that overcomes the worst aspects of alienation 
suffered under capitalism. At the same time, however, this model abandons the 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
48 As stated in the previous section, however, this is not the only possible reading of this 
passage.  
49 Marx, Capital III, p.807. 
50 Marx, ‘Comments on James Mill’, p.227. 
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central premise of the Marxist vision of the good life, namely, that labour is the prime 
locus of individual self-realisation. In Chapter 4 we shall consider whether Marx’s 
abandonment of labour as the realm of self-realisation is justified. 
The view espoused in the Comments, on the other hand, would seem to 
present us with the more distinctive and philosophically interesting conception of the 
good life, where it is labour – production for others – that is the activity of self-
realisation. But despite the undoubted potency of its central themes, there are serious 
questions about whether the model instantiated in the Comments could be organised 
on a society-wide basis. I return to this issue in Chapter 5.   
 
2.4. All-Round Development and its Critics 
 
Having considered the idea that individuals will be free to choose their activities, I 
now return to the central theme of the chapter, the ideal of all-round development. In 
this section, I defend all-round development from its critics, before going on to 
question (in §5) whether all-round development really does require an abolition of the 
division of labour, as Marx himself suggests.  
The second part of this contrast in the ‘hunt in the morning’ passage brings us 
back to Schiller’s theme of wholeness and Marx’s humanist ideal of man as a being 
who most fully expresses and realises his nature by cultivating his powers in an all-
round way. In a communist society, we are told, ‘nobody has one sphere of activity’. 
Rather, each becomes accomplished in a range of activities. The communist worker 
of the future, like the ancient Greek of the past, will exhibit a degree of wholeness 
that is utterly absent from the modern world.   
The idea of all-round development has been heavily criticised. For instance, 
Jon Elster and G.A. Cohen have argued that it represents an implausible and not 
necessarily attractive ideal of self-realisation. While both Elster and Cohen agree that 
the emphasis on self-realisation through labour is a valuable aspect of Marx’s 
philosophical inheritance, they argue that the ideal of all-round development 
represents an ‘extremely utopian’ and ‘quite implausible’,51 ‘unrealizable’ and ‘not 
even desirable’,52 ideal of individual self-realisation. 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
51 Elster, Making Sense of Marx, p, 521. 
52 G.A. Cohen, ‘Reconsidering Historical Materialism’, pp. 142 – 144. 
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 What exactly is wrong with Marx’s ideal of all-round development? Taken 
together Elster and Cohen make three criticisms: first, it denies individual differences 
in ability; second, it requires an impossibly total development of one’s powers and 
capacities; third, it promotes mediocrity and dilettantism. I consider each in turn.  
First, Elster argues that Marx’s idea of ‘full self-realisation…implies that the 
individual – each individual – has all the capacities that any other has.’53 This is a 
proposition that denies ‘genetically determined differences in ability.’54 As a 
consequence, it is ‘extremely Utopian.’55  
Does Marx think that each individual has all the powers any other has? Does he 
deny differences in ability? He certainly thinks that such differences are exaggerated 
under capitalism. Against Plato and Aristotle, Marx endorses Adam Smith’s view that 
differences in ability are more an effect than a cause of the division of labour: ‘a 
porter differs less from a philosopher than a mastiff from a greyhound. It is the 
division of labour which has set the gulf between them’.56 Yet I can find no evidence 
that Marx believes that individuals share the same potentials or that he denies innate 
differences in ability.57 On the contrary, in The German Ideology Marx accepts that 
there will be limits to individual development under communism: not everyone, he 
says, will be able to do the work of Raphael. The point, rather, is that ‘anyone in 
whom there is a potential Raphael should be able to develop without hindrance’.58 In 
other words, communism will promote equality of opportunity, but there will be 
limits to what individuals can achieve even in a future society. Likewise, in the 
‘Critique of the Gotha Programme’, Marx criticises Ferdinand Lassalle’s demand that 
workers should receive back the undiminished proceeds of their labour for the way 
that it permits inequality that results from ‘unequal natural endowment’. Lassalle’s 
demand, says Marx: 
 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
53 Elster, Making Sense of Marx, p.522. 
54 Elster, Making Sense of Marx, p.522. 
55 Elster, Making Sense of Marx, p.522. 56	  Marx, The Poverty of Philosophy, p.180.	  
57 Elster is unsure about whether Marx is committed to this view, but concludes that this idea 
is implicit in Marx’s idea of all-round development, and is the most natural way to read 
Marx’s corpus as a whole, ‘which never…. refers to differences in natural talents.’ (Elster, 
Making Sense of Marx, p.88). 
58 Marx and Engels, The German Ideology, p.393.  
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…recognises no class differences, because everyone is only a worker like 
everyone else; but it tacitly recognises unequal individual endowment, and thus 
productive capacity of workers as natural privileges. It is, therefore, a right of 
inequality, in its content, like every right. Right by its nature can consist only in 
the application of an equal standard; but unequal individuals (and they would not 
be different individuals if they were not unequal) are measurable by an equal 
standard only insofar as they are subject to an equal criterion’.59  
 
In claiming that Lassalle’s principle ‘recognises unequal natural endowment’, Marx is 
not denying unequal endowments between individuals. Rather, he is saying that while 
Lassalle’s principle does not permit material inequalities that flow from one’s class, it 
does tacitly permit inequalities that flow from one’s natural talents, whereas a more 
advanced principle of distribution – specifically, ‘from each according to his abilities, 
to each according to his needs’ – would not permit ‘natural’ inequalities either. Thus, 
Marx was a critic of principles of distribution that failed to counteract natural 
differences in ability; and he was a critic of such theories precisely because he 
recognised that there will be differences in abilities in all times and places.  
Let us turn to the second and, I think, more serious criticism of Marx’s position, 
that the ideal of all-round development is unrealistic, because it requires what G.A. 
Cohen calls an ‘impossibly total development of the individual.’60 According to 
Cohen, ‘Marx wanted the full gamut of each person’s talents to be realised.’61 
Regardless of whether that ideal is desirable, ‘it is certainly unrealizable, as you will 
see if you imagine someone trying to realise it, in a single lifetime.’62  
Now, Cohen argues that the ideal of all-round development is unrealizable, 
‘because there will never be people of that level of ability.’63 It is an ideal to which 
the great mass of humanity simply cannot aspire. He claims that the implicit 
paradigm of Marx’s ideal all-round development is Leonardo da Vinci, an individual 
capable of excelling in many activities and moving effortlessly between them. But 
must we interpret the idea of all-round development in that over-ambitious fashion? 
The key idea of all-round development is that self-realisation consists in the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
59 Marx, ‘Critique of the Gotha Programme’, MECW, volume 24 (London: Lawrence and 
Wishart, 1989), pp.86-87.  
60 Cohen, ‘Reconsidering Historical Materialism’, p.142. 
61 Cohen, ‘Reconsidering Historical Materialism’, p.142. 
62 Cohen, ‘Reconsidering Historical Materialism’, p.142. 
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development of a range of powers and capacities rather than the full development of 
one or very few. Thus, the idea of all-round development does not demand 
individuals to achieve greatly in all of their abilities. Rather, it suffices that they 
develop a range of abilities. By interpreting the idea of all-round development in this 
over-ambitious way, Cohen overlooks the fact that a degree of well-roundedness is 
possible in all human lives. For, as Hurka argues, we can all ‘spread our activities 
between different goods rather than aiming at a narrow specialisation. Even if our 
specific achievements are not great, their proportion can mirror that of Renaissance 
lives’.64  
In reply, however, Cohen could accept that a degree of well-roundedness is 
possible in all human lives, but question whether the aspiration towards all-
roundedness is actually desirable. In particular, he could point out that by attempting 
to achieve a wide cultivation of one’s talents and abilities over the development of 
one or very few, the individual, or at least most individuals, will not achieve much in 
any. This is the crux of the third criticism, that all-round development is undesirable, 
because it would stifle genuine achievement and promote mediocrity and dilettantism. 
There is, Elster says, a ‘trade-off between depth and breadth of achievement’, 
between being ‘a jack of several trades and master of (at most) one’. He continues: 
 
‘Activities of self-realisation are subject to increasing marginal utility: They 
become more enjoyable the more one has already engaged in them… 
Diversity…is an obstacle to successful self-realisation, as it prevents one from 
getting into the later and more rewarding stages.’65 
 
While I agree with Elster that too much diversity is a threat to self-realisation, I am 
not persuaded by the unqualified charge that ‘diversity…is an obstacle to successful 
self-realisation’. True, diversity can be an obstacle to self-realisation: that will be the 
case when it prevents one from acquiring the fundamentals necessary to participate in 
activity (to play chess, for instance, one needs a basic grasp of the rules of the game, 
how the pieces move, etc.). But a moderate degree of diversity can be beneficial for 
self-realisation. Firstly, and most obviously, variety and time spent away from one’s 
primary specialism can be invigorating. As Marx writes, ‘free time – which is both 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
64 Thomas Hurka, ‘The Well-Rounded Life’, Journal of Philosophy, 84:12, (1987), p.732. 
65 Jon Elster, An Introduction to Karl Marx (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1986), 
p.45. 
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leisure as well as time for higher activity – naturally transforms its possessor into 
another person; and it is then this person that enters into the process of production.’66 
Secondly, the development of a wider range of talents and capacities can often 
enhance rather than diminish one’s primary specialism: contra Elster, breadth can 
contribute to depth. That will be the case with so-called ‘interaction effects’, which 
occur when insights from one field are applied to another (think, for example, of how 
the discipline of philosophy has been enriched by insights from the natural and social 
sciences, religious thought, the arts, political practice and so on).   
Moreover, while it is true to a degree those activities ‘become more enjoyable 
the more one has already engaged in them’, it is not the case that full-time 
specialisation on one activity is always a recommendable recipe for self-realisation. 
People who focus on one activity at the expense of everything else can become bored 
or fatigued. At high levels of specialism activities are often subject to a law of 
diminishing returns. For example, a historian who spends an hour or two a day on 
history may easily add another of without negative effect. But it is at least debatable 
whether a historian who already spends eight hours a day on history would benefit 
from an extra hour. Arguably, they would be better off doing something else.67  
  
2.5. All-Round Development and the Abolition of the Division of Labour 
 
Now, having argued that the ideal of all-round development can be defended from its 
critics, I want to question Marx’s claim that all-round development requires an 
abolition of the division of labour. I will argue that it does not: all-round development 
can be realised by preserving rather than abolishing the division of labour.  
Marx, we have seen, thinks that realising the ideal of all-round development 
requires an abolition of the division of labour. For ‘as soon as the distribution of 
labour comes into being, each man has a particular, exclusive sphere of activity’, 
which means that they cannot develop anything more than a fragment of their many-
sided potentials. But what exactly does an abolition of the division of labour mean in 
practice? Unfortunately, Marx never presents us with a fully worked-out view. But it 
is clear is that he is not proposing a return to a simpler division of labour, in which a 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
66 Marx, Grundrisse II, p.97. 
67 I borrow this example from Hurka, ‘The Well-Rounded Life’, p.730. 
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worker makes a product from start to finish. In fact, this was a solution to the problem 
of the division of labour to which Marx was hostile, as is evident from the following 
critique of Proudhon: 
‘M. Proudhon…takes a step backward and proposes to the worker that he 
make not only the 12th part of a pin, but successively all 12 parts of it. The 
worker would thus come to know and realise the pin….M. Proudhon…can 
think of nothing better than to take us back to the journeyman or, at most, to 
the master craftsman of the Middle Ages.’68 
What this seems to suggest is that the Marxian solution will not involve any kind of 
return to a simpler, pre-industrial way of life. Communist society will be highly 
productive, perhaps even more so than capitalism; and yet there will be no limitation 
of individuals to specific lines of activity. 
Some commentators have argued that what Marx is essentially proposing is a 
system of ‘job rotation’.69 According to this view, a division of tasks remains in the 
sense that the making of a single product is divided into a number of distinct 
operations, but task-specialism, in the sense of full-time concentration on one 
activity, is abolished. Highly specialised tasks remain, then, but no one is fixed to the 
performance of one single activity.  
Marx’s proposal could work in a factory where most of the work is relatively 
simple and requires little expertise. In the factory I am imagining, it seems plausible 
to think that moving between basic tasks – turning screws, hammering rivets, pulling 
levers – may be preferable to full-time concentration on just one activity: moving 
between tasks may partially alleviate the boredom of doing the same thing over and 
over. In addition, it does not seem implausible to think that a factory that retained a 
division of tasks but eliminated task-specialism could replicate, or at least come close 
to replicating, the high level of productivity associated with the division of labour.70  
Whilst rotating between tasks may be a feasible solution in a factory where 
most of the work is simple, however, it is not a feasible solution in every sphere of 
the economy, where work often requires a great deal of skill and expertise. Consider 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
68 Marx, The Poverty of Philosophy, p.192.  
69 Sean Sayers, Marx and Alienation: Essays on Hegelian Themes (Houndmills: Palgrave 
Macmillan, 2011), p.141.   
70 For a brief discussion of the merits and shortcomings of job rotation, see Elster, ‘Self-
Realisation in Work and Politics’, pp.144-145.  
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the division of labour in a hospital or an airport, for example. Taken literally, Marx’s 
solution would see workers move from one task in the morning, to another in the 
afternoon, to another after dinner, and so on. Now, putting aside whether this kind of 
extreme generalism is desirable, it is plainly not feasible given the level of expertise 
that is required to, say, practice neurosurgery or pilot a plane. A system of job 
rotation is not a workable proposal in every sphere of the economy because some 
tasks require high levels of specialisation. 
Putting aside the issue of feasibility, however, I think we can also question 
whether abolishing the division of labour is even required for the all-round 
development of individuals. Marx thinks that all-round development requires the 
individual to engage in numerous activities. Yet engaging in numerous activities 
provides no guarantee of all-round development. For the mere fact that a worker 
moves from one job to another does not ensure that they will develop a wider-range 
of skills. As Plamenatz argues, ‘the worker may move often from factory to factory, 
from town to town, from one branch of industry to another, and yet find himself 
doing much the same type of work everywhere.’71  
Conversely, the idea that all-round development requires engaging in 
numerous activities overlooks the extent to which complex activities often require the 
development and successful integration of a wide-range of talents and abilities. To be 
a doctor, for example, one obviously needs to master a body of knowledge and a 
range of technical skills; but one also needs to develop certain social and personal 
qualities to deal effectively with one’s patients and get along with one’s colleagues. 
Even activities that are often thought to require a very high development of one skill 
will typically require the development and integration of several: sports, for example, 
not only require the development of certain athletic abilities, they also require players 
to solve tactical problems.  
What Marx’s position overlooks, then, is the fact that ‘specialised labour’ 
varies greatly in kind: some is simple and requires little skill or expertise, other types 
are more complex and require the development and integration of an array of talents 
and abilities. Someone who turned screws in the morning, hammered rivets in the 
afternoon, and pulled a lever after dinner would have developed fewer talents and 
abilities than someone who was a mere ‘specialist’ in a moderately interesting job. 	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This is not to assert the general superiority of specialism over generalism. It is to 
merely question the Marxian solution to the problem of the division of labour by 
pointing out that someone who specialises in one or very few complex activities may 
achieve an impressive degree of well-roundedness, whereas someone who engages in 
numerous tasks may not be an all-round man. 
However, even the work of the generalist will typically depend upon on a 
division of labour in a way that Marx failed to recognise. For even those who do not 
concentrate on a very detailed task will rely on the specialised labour of others. 
Think, for example, of a historian writing a history of Europe from the fall of Rome 
to the present-day, and how their project will rely on a huge degree of intellectual 
specialisation, on others concentrating on, and finding insights in, their own particular 
area of expertise. The problem with Marx’s formulation in The German Ideology is 
not just that he lauds the general superiority of generalism over specialism without 
good reason for doing so, but that he also envisions a society in which we are all 
generalists – a point that overlooks the fact that generalism is itself parasitic upon a 
division of labour.  
I have argued that the ideal of all-round development does not require an 
abolition of the division of labour. But we should also note, if only briefly, that 
abolishing the division of labour could also threaten other values, like community. As 
Hegel argued, the division of labour can be a solidarity-producing process. In the 
division of labour, individuals particularise themselves, that is, focus on some lines of 
activity over others, where this particularisation brings them into contact with others 
who ply the same trade and consequently share a similar way of life.72 It is hard to see 
how the Marxian solution to the problem of the division of labour could replicate this 
form of solidarity. For someone who did ‘one thing today and another tomorrow’ in a 
system of job rotation would lack the settled pattern of life that is necessary for the 
formation of working relationships. Thus, as Cohen puts it, Marx’s out and out 
hostility towards the division of labour ‘reflects a failure to see how the very 
constraints of a role can help link a person to others in satisfying community.’73  
  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  72	  This is central to Hegel’s idea of the ‘corporation’ (Hegel, Elements of the Philosophy of 
Right, translated by H.B. Nisbet, edited by A.W. Wood (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
1991), §250-§256, pp.270-274). 	  73	  Cohen, ‘Reconsidering Historical Materialism’, p.137.	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2.6. Conclusion  
 
In the present chapter, I have been concerned with Marx’s ideal of all-round 
development, and his claim that the realisation of that ideal entails an abolition of the 
division of labour. I have examined these ideas in Marx’s most famous description of 
communism, the so-called ‘hunt in the morning’ passage from The German Ideology.  
As we have seen, the ideal of the fully developed individual has been 
criticised by some of Marx’s commentators, who have argued that it is an unrealistic 
and not necessarily attractive ideal of individual self-realisation. However, while 
these critics undoubtedly raise some important objections to the ideal of all-round 
development, for reasons given I do not think that they undermine that ideal. Whilst I 
have defended the ideal of all-round development, however, the last section of the 
chapter has argued that Marx’s out and out hostility to the division of labour is 
misguided. For I have argued that the ideal of all-round development is only not 
compatible with the division of labour, but that there are reasons for thinking that the 
all-round development of individuals may itself rely on a division of labour.  
Although the concluding parts of this chapter have been critical, however, the 
overall message of the chapter is a positive one. Since its inception, Marx’s vision of 
the good life has been hampered by the idea that its implementation requires a 
complete abolition of the division of labour. Indeed, it is this idea as much as any 
other that has prevented Marx’s vision of the good life from being taken seriously. 
But, if the arguments of this chapter have been correct, then it would seem possible 
for us to retain a commitment to the humanist ideal of all-round development without 
making unrealistic demands about the abolition of the division of labour. 
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CHAPTER 3 
 
THE ABOLITION OF SOCIAL ROLES 
 
In the previous chapter, we examined Marx’s claim that communist man will ‘hunt in 
the morning, fish in the afternoon, rear cattle in the evening, criticise after 
dinner…without ever becoming a hunter, fisherman, shepherd, or critic’.1 I said that 
this passage reveals a hope that communist society would overcome the division of 
labour, and give individuals the opportunity to develop their powers in an all-round 
way. But I now want to suggest that this passage also grasps at a different idea, 
namely, that communist society will be free, not only of specialism, but also of social 
roles. That is to say, there will be no ‘hunters’ not simply because no one will spend 
all their time hunting, but also because no one will occupy the role of ‘hunter’. This is 
something that would hold true even if future individuals eschewed varied activities 
in favour of specialism (something that Marx certainly did not expect): even if one 
hunted all the time the role of ‘hunter’ would not be assumed.2  
Now, Marx’s vision of the good life has been interpreted – by followers and 
critics – in a strongly communitarian light. Thus, for example, Steven Lukes has 
claimed that Marx’s envisioned communism as a society in which ‘communal 
relations undercut rather than override individual interests’ making a ‘harmony of 
social (and personal) interests possible at last’.3 In a similar vein, the Soviet Jurist, 
E.B. Pashukanis, has argued that Marx believed that communist society would be 
inhabited by a new man, who ‘submerges his ego in the collective and finds the 
greatest satisfaction and the meaning of life in this act’.4 Others have gone as far as to 
suggest that Marx’s vision of a future communist society permits, and maybe even 
necessitates, the sacrifice of the individual to the community. According to Nicholas 
Churchich, for example, Marx ‘starts with individualism’, but ‘ends with the sacrifice 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1 Marx and Engels, The German Ideology, p.47. 
2 For two other accounts of the abolition of roles in Marx, see G.A.Cohen, ‘Marx’s Dialectic 
of Labour’, pp.205 – 206; and Kymlicka, Liberalism, Community and Culture, Chapter 6.  
3 Steven Lukes, Marxism and Morality, pp.97-98.  
4 E.B.Pashukanis, The General Theory of Law and Marxism (New Brunswick: Pluto, 1983), 
p.160. 
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of the individual to the collective and of private interests to the interests of the 
whole’.5  
 It is the primary aim of this chapter to show that these srongly communitarian 
interpretations of Marx’s vision of the good life are mistaken, and that, on the 
contrary, Marx’s vision is individualistic. To make this claim, I examine Marx’s aim 
to abolish social roles, and show how such an aim is incompatible with 
communitarian accounts of the good life. Having shown that Marx rejects 
communitarianism, the chapter moves on to consider how Marx did envision a 
reconciliation of self-realisation and community under communism. Here, it is argued 
that there are two models of individual self-realisation and community in Marx: an 
individualistic model, according to which individuals achieve self-realisation through 
the development of their powers, and only value community instrumentally, as a 
means for the development of those powers; and a second model, which is neither 
individualistic nor communitarian, according to which individuals achieve self-
realisation by engaging their powers for the good of others, and value community 
intrinsically, as a constitutive aspect of their good. The chapter ends by considering a 
communitarian critique of Marx’s position on these matters from Charles Taylor and 
G.A. Cohen, who both argue that Marx’s vision of the good life is excessively 
individualistic. To anticipate my conclusion, I will concede that Taylor and Cohen 
raise some important worries about the individualistic model of the good life, but 
argue that the second model has more resources with which to respond to their 
objections.  
I begin (in §3.1) by providing a taxonomy of different ways of reconciling 
self-realisation and community, before going on to show how Marx’s desire to 
abolish roles precludes the communitarian model (§3.2). In the following section 
(§3.3), I argue that there are two models of individual and community in Marx. Next 
(in §3.4), I compare Marx’s models of individual and community to Hegel’s and J.S. 
Mill’s, before going on to consider (in §3.5) a communitarian critique of Marx from 
Charles Taylor and G.A. Cohen.  
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3.1. Individual Self-Realisation and Community 
 
(i) The Problem of Individual Self-Realisation and Community 
 
Two values are often thought to be central to Marx’s vision of the good life. First, 
Marx’s vision puts an extraordinary emphasis on the notion of individual self-
realisation, which as we have seen in the foregoing chapter is typically defined as the 
all-round development of the individual’s powers and capacities. Thus, Marx says 
that it every person’s ‘vocation, designation, task’ to ‘achieve all-round development 
of all his abilities’.6  Second, Marx vision is also said to stress the value of 
community. Thus, as Steven Lukes has put this view, Marx’s description of 
communism sees individuals ‘finding their fulfilment in reciprocity and solidarity 
rather than competition and self-assertion, and in mutual identification in common 
activities and the pursuit of common purposes’.7  
Now, it is clear that Marx thinks that these values – self-realisation and 
community – are not antithetical but deeply complementary. Let us quote three 
passages in which Marx puts forward this view, to which we shall return. The first is 
from the 1845 The German Ideology, the second is from the 1848 The Communist 
Manifesto (hereafter the Manifesto), and the third is from the 1844 ‘Comments on 
James Mill’ (hereafter the Comments):  
 
‘Only within community has each individual the means of cultivating his gifts 
in all directions; hence personal freedom becomes possible only within the 
community…In the real community the individuals obtain their freedom in 
and through their association.’8  
 
‘In place of the old bourgeois society, with its classes and class antagonisms, 
we shall have an association, in which the free development of each is the 
condition for the free development of all.’9 
 
‘…in the individual expression of my life I would have directly created your 
expression of your life, and therefore in my individual activity I would have 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
6 Marx and Engels, The German Ideology, p.292.  
7 Lukes, Marxism and Morality, p.97. 
8 Marx and Engels, The German Ideology, p.78. 
9 Marx and Engels, The Communist Manifesto, p.506. 
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directly confirmed and realised…my human nature, my communal nature’’10
  
 
Self-realisation and community are attractive ideals. The idea that they can be 
integrated is a potent one. But is this possible? Is it even desirable?  
Insofar as Marx promises a reconciliation of individual self-realisation and 
community he runs up against one of Isaiah Berlin’s themes: the incompatibility of 
values. For Berlin, there is simply no warrant in the belief that all values can coexist 
in perfect harmony. Conflict of values is simply an intrinsic aspect of human life:  
 
‘The notion of the perfect whole, the ultimate solution, in which all good 
things coexist, seems to me to be not merely unattainable—that is a truism—
but conceptually incoherent; I do not know what is meant by a harmony of 
this kind. Some of the Great Goods cannot live together. That is a conceptual 
truth. We are doomed to choose, and every choice may entail an irreparable 
loss.’11 
 
For Berlin, therefore, we are faced with the difficult prospect of choosing between 
values, where the achievement of some necessarily involves the sacrifice of others. 
Any argument to the contrary is incoherent, since human goods are plural and 
incompatible. But it is also dangerous, since once we believe in the idea of a perfect 
future then any sacrifice, however grave, is justified in bringing it about. Thus, on 
Berlin’s view, the task of political philosophy is not to uncover the idea of the perfect 
whole, which can bring contrasting values into harmonious alignment. Rather, it is 
the more modest aim of balancing the competing claims of different values in a 
stable, though always uneasy, equilibrium.  
 As the three quotations above indicate, Marx disagrees. In a future communist 
society, individuals will realise themselves in community with others. But what 
exactly is the relation between individual self-realisation and community, on the 
communist view? How are these values reconciled? Isn’t Berlin right to think that 
there is a tension, or perhaps even a contradiction, between the values of self-
realisation and community?  
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11 I. Berlin, The Crooked Timber of Humanity: Chapters in the History of Ideas (London: 
Pimlico, 1990), p.13. 
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(ii) Three Models of Self-Realisation and Community 
 
Before we turn to Marx’s response to these difficult questions, however, it will be 
useful to distinguish some of the ways in which self-realisation and community could 
be reconciled. This will help us get a clearer sense of the way in which Marx 
envisions a reconciliation of self-realisation and community under communism, and 
how this differentiates him from the models we find in the writings of Hegel and 
Mill. 
In broad terms there are three ways in which self-realisation and community 
can be reconciled. The first model starts with the claim that man is an essentially 
social being, and goes on to claim that individuals are realised by fulfilling the goals 
that are set for them by the social roles they inhabit (for example, by fulfilling the 
duties of citizenship within the state).12 Let us call this the communitarian solution to 
the self-realisation and community problem.  
The second model can accept the communitarian claim that man is a social 
being, who is born into a community with a web of pre-existing roles. But it will 
argue that individuals have the capacity to question and even reject those roles. 
Indeed, this model will emphasise that one of the central capacities of human beings 
is the capacity to develop and pursue their own goals and projects.13 On this model, 
individuals are realised, not by fulfilling the goals that are set for them by their social 
position, but by striving after goals they freely choose for themselves. Let us call this 
the individualist solution to the individuality and community problem.   
Note that in the very broad way I have described these positions here, there is 
considerable scope for disagreement within both the communitarian and individualist 
schools. Amongst communitarians there will be disagreement about which 
community – family, church, state, etc. – is preeminently important, and about 
whether social roles can simply be allotted to individuals (as, for example, in Plato’s 
Republic), or whether, by contrast, roles must be ones that the individual can 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
12 Thus, for example, Alasdair MacIntyre writes that: ‘I am someone's son or daughter, 
someone else's cousin or uncle; I am a citizen of this or that city, a member of this or that 
guild or profession; I belong to this clan, that tribe, this nation…what is good for me has to 
be the good for one who inhabits these roles.’ (Alasdair MacIntyre, After Virtue, 3rd edition 
(London: Duckworth, 1981), p.220). 
13 This idea – that individuals should be able to pursue their own good in their own way – is 
often described in Rawls’s language that individuals have the capacity ‘to form, to revise, and 
rationally to pursue’ a conception of the good (Rawls, A Theory of Justice, p.525). 
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reflectively identify and endorse.14 The same scope for disagreement also exists 
amongst individualists. But the key thought for our purposes is that communitarians 
think that individual are realised by fulfilling the goals that are set for them by the 
roles they inhabit, whereas individualists, by contrast, think that individuals are 
realised by fulfilling goals they choose for themselves.   
Second, note that communitarians and individualists can endorse the same set 
of values. For instance, a communitarian ethics can recognise and affirm the value of 
individual self-realisation. What separates the communitarian from the individualist is 
not that the latter values self-realisation whereas the former values something else 
altogether. Rather, it is that the individualists believe that individuals are realised by 
striving after goals they freely choose for themselves, whereas communitarians, by 
contrast, argue that individuals are realised by fulfilling the goals that are set for them 
by their social role. Likewise, individualists need not deny the claim that individual 
self-realisation can only take place in the community; few, in fact, will do.15 But the 
individualist will typically see the value of community in instrumental terms, as a 
means for the achievement of further valuable ends (self-development or autonomy, 
for example), whereas communitarians will argue that living in community with 
others has intrinsic value. To put the same point another way, for the individualist 
living in community is a means for the pursuit of the good life, whereas for the 
communitarian living in community with others is constitutive of the good life itself.  
Now, on top of these two positions, there is another model of self-realisation 
and community, which does not fit straightforwardly into either the individualist or 
the communitarian category. This is the idea that self-realisation and community 
could be integrated without either value being pre-eminent. One way in which this 
could be achieved would be to scale back the claims of both self-realisation and 
community until the claims of each value coheres with the other. This model gets its 
plausibility from the thought that while strong conceptions of self-realisation and 
community may pull against one another, diluted versions of these ideals may hang 
together more easily. But we can also imagine a more uncompromising variant of this 
solution, which also attempts to integrate self-realisation and community, but without 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
14 For the idea of ‘reflective identification’, see Michael Hardimon, ‘Role Obligations’, 
Journal of Philosophy, 91:7, (1994), pp.333-363.  
15 Rawls, for example, says it is ‘utterly trivial interpretation of human sociability’ that we 
must live in community to achieve our individual good.’ (Rawls, Justice as Fairness, p.143).  
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any dilution of either value. The idea would have to be that in realising oneself as an 
individual one could also realise oneself as a communal being. More would need to 
be said, however, about the overall coherence of these ideals – strong self-realisation 
and strong community – at a deeper level.  
In this section, we have distinguished three ways in which a reconciliation of 
individuality and community might be conceived: first, a communitarian model, 
according to which individual are realised by fulfilling the goals set for them by their 
social role; second, an individualist model, according to which individuals are 
realised by fulfilling the goals they set for themselves; and finally, a third model, 
which is neither individualist nor communitarian, but instead aims to reconcile self-
realisation and community without either value being pre-eminent. Of course, these 
distinctions are far from exhaustive, and matters will become more complex when we 
look at Marx, Hegel and Mill. But it at least gives us something of a starting point, 
and with that we can turn to Marx.  
 
3.2.The Abolition of Social Roles 
 
Where does Marx fit in this taxonomy? As we have seen, Marx is often interpreted as 
a communitarian. In this section, however, I show how Marx’s desire to abolish 
social roles is incompatible with communitarian accounts of the good life. 
 As we have seen, communitarians argue that self-realisation can only occur in 
community, because individuals are realised by fulfilling the goals that are given to 
them in virtue of the social roles they inhabit. Now, as the three passages I quoted at 
the outset of this chapter made clear, Marx also thinks that individual self-realisation 
can only be achieved in community. But this basic point of agreement with 
communitarianism obscures a more fundamental difference. For whereas 
communitarians argue that individuals are realised by fulfilling the goals that are set 
for them by their social role, Marx makes it clear that a future communist society will 
have overcome roles altogether. For as long as individual activity is set by their social 
role, says Marx, ‘man’s own deed becomes an alien power opposed to him, which 
enslaves him instead of being controlled by him. For as soon as the distribution of 
labour comes into being, each man has a particular, exclusive sphere of activity, 
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which is forced upon him, and from which he cannot escape’.16 Communism ends 
this ‘fixation of social activity’, this ‘consolidation of what we ourselves produce into 
an objective power above us’.17 In a communist society, rather than having my 
activity set for me by social role, I can ‘do one thing today and another tomorrow’.18 
Thus, as Marx puts this point: ‘In a communist society there are no painters but only 
people who engage in painting among other activities’19 That is to say, people paint, 
but no one occupies the social position of “painter”, which carries with it its own set 
of goals and expectations to which its occupant must conform.  
 Why does an abolition of roles reveal that Marx rejected the communitarian 
solution to the problem of reconciliation? The answer is not that communitarians 
deny the value of creative activity, for communitarians can recognise that value.20 
Neither is it that Marx stresses the need for varied activities, whereas 
communitarians, following Hegel, stress the need for social particularisation and the 
virtue of a life devoted to one or very few activities.21 No doubt, Marx would think 
there is something odd and incomplete about a life of Gauguin-like devotion to one 
craft. But that is not the central issue. For the central issue is not about how many 
activities we pursue, but whether, as Kymlicka puts it, our activities are ones that are 
‘given to us in virtue of our being embedded in certain communal roles, or whether, 
in contrast, our activities and projects are to be unconstrained by the existence of such 
roles’.22 For Marx, the communitarian idea that our activities should be set for us 
represents an unacceptable constraint on individual activity. It is Marx’s idea that 
roles always come from outside and free individuals should not be bound by them. 
While the idea of an abolition of social roles provides a reply to the objection 
that Marx’s vision of the future society looks to subsume the individual in society, 
however, the proposed abolition of roles is clearly open to doubt. For it is one thing to 
affirm the right of individuals to question and even reject their roles, quite another to 
look to abolish roles altogether. I have no space to consider the many lines of 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
16 Marx and Engels, The German Ideology, p.47. 
17 Marx and Engels, The German Ideology, p.47. 
18 Marx and Engels, The German Ideology, p.47. 
19 Marx and Engels, The German Ideology, p.394. 
20 For instance, MacIntyre has stressed the value of creative activity (see his concept of a 
‘practice’, After Virtue, Chapter 14). 
21 I discuss Hegel on the need for social particularisation in §3 of this chapter.  
22 Kymlicka, Liberalism, Community and Culture, p.102. 
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response a defender of social roles could press against Marx,23 but one obvious 
problem with is that it is just incredibly hard to envision how a society without roles 
could even function. If individual activity is not set by one’s social position but freely 
chosen, then how would social coordination be possible? How could we ensure that 
all necessary work gets done? How, in a society where people paint but there is no 
painters, would people be inculcated in painting and other social practices? 
Commenting on Marx’s proposal to abolish roles, G.A. Cohen says that it is ‘no great 
exaggeration’ to say that that Marx’s ‘freely associated individuals’ constitute ‘an 
alternative to, not a form of, society’.24 Unfortunately, however, Marx never 
considered how a ‘free association of individuals’ could coordinate their social 
existence without a structure of social roles. As a consequence, Marx’s abolition of 
roles remains an intriguing but inadequately thought-out ideal.  
  
3.3. Two Models of Community in Marx 
 
Having seen that Marx’s desire to abolish roles excludes the communitarian solution 
to the problem of reconciliation, I will now examine in some detail how Marx did 
envision a reconciliation of individual self-realisation and community under 
communism. I will argue that we can find two different answers in Marx’s texts.  
 
(i) Self-Realisation and Community in The German Ideology and The 
Communist Manifesto 
 
 Let us begin by reviewing the passage from The German Ideology, this time in its 
entirety: 
 
‘The transformation…of personal powers into material powers, cannot be 
dispelled by dismissing the general idea of it from one's mind, but can only be 
abolished by the individuals again subjecting these material powers to 
themselves and abolishing the division of labour. This is not possible without 
the community. Only within community has each individual the means of 
cultivating his gifts in all directions; hence personal freedom becomes 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
23 For a defence of roles from individualistic objections – including some quasi-Marxist ones 
– see Hardimon, ‘Role Obligations’, and Stefan Sciaraffa, ‘Identification, Meaning and the 
Normativity of Social Roles’, European Journal of Philosophy, 19:1, (2011). 
24 Cohen, ‘The Dialectic of Labour in Marx’, p.206. 
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possible only within the community…In the real community the individuals 
obtain their freedom in and through their association.’25 
 
The passage begins by rejecting the idea – a leitmotif of the young Hegelians – that 
all that is required to overcome alienation and be at home in the world is a 
transformation of human consciousness. In response, Marx claims that the 
overcoming of alienation requires a thoroughgoing transformation of the social world 
itself, specifically, an abolition of the division of labour. This, Marx says, ‘is not 
possible without the community’. The idea here, surely, is that individuals are 
incapable of achieving this on their own, that some degree of cooperation is necessary 
if individuals are to abolish specialism. Individual self-realisation requires 
community, first of all, in that it is only in community with others that individuals can 
liberate themselves from the enslaving features of capitalism. 
Now, having given one reason why individuality requires community in the 
transition to communism, Marx then goes on to say that individuality also requires 
community under communism: ‘only in community [with others has each] individual 
the means of cultivating his gifts in all directions’. Marx does not provide an 
argument for this view. But notice that Marx describes community, not as 
intrinsically valuable, but as a ‘means’ to a further valuable end of individual self-
development. In other words, Marx’s idea does not seem to be that the maintenance 
of our communal bonds has value. Rather, it seems to be that living in community 
with others provides the individual with the various means for what is of real value, 
which is the all-round development of individuals (or, as he puts it here, the 
cultivation of one’s gifts ‘in all directions’). 
Let us now turn to the second famous quotation, this time from the Manifesto: 
 
‘In place of the old bourgeois society, with its classes and class antagonisms, 
we shall have an association, in which the free development of each is the 
condition for the free development of all.’26 
 
G.A. Cohen has suggested that one way of picturing life under communism, as Marx 
conceived it in the above passage, is to imagine a jazz band in which each player 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
25 Marx and Engels, The German Ideology, p.78. 
26 Marx and Engels, The Communist Manifesto, p.506. 
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seeks his own self-realisation as a musician.27 Cohen writes: ‘Though motivated to 
secure his own fulfilment, as opposed to that of the band as a whole, or of his fellow 
musicians taken severally, he nevertheless fulfils himself maximally to the extent that 
each of the others also does so, and the same hold for each of them’. Cohen 
concludes: ‘So, as I understand Marx’s communism, it is a concert of mutually 
supporting self-fulfilments, in which no one takes promoting the fulfilment of others 
as any kind of obligation. I do not say that no one cares about the musical fulfilment 
of the others…But no concern for others is demanded’.28  
 On the model provided here, individuals need the community to provide them 
with the appropriate context for their self-realisation. To refer back to the jazz band 
analogy, each musician is dependent on their band mates to create the appropriate 
context for their own performance. Thus, communist society is characterised by an 
interdependence of human flourishing, where the self-realisation of others creates the 
conditions for my self-realisation, just as my self-realisation creates the conditions for 
the self-realisation of others. Yet, as Brudney notes, ‘no value is placed on creating 
and maintaining those conditions or on agents’ reciprocal relations.’29  
Furthermore, the model of community in the Manifesto is entirely compatible 
with egoism, in the specific sense that jazz musicians could be wholly concerned with 
their own self-realisation, and not at all with that of their band mates (at least in so far 
as their egoism does not undermine the good of the band). Jazz musicians, or 
members of a team sport, need not have the good of others as part of their own end in 
acting, in order for their band or team to flourish. Rather, they simply need to 
recognise the fact that their own self-realisation as an individual is bound up with the 
self-realisation of others. Perhaps surprisingly, an overcoming of egoism is not a 
stipulation of Marxian community.30  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
27 G.A. Cohen, Self–Ownership, Freedom and Equality (Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, 1995), p.122.  
28 Cohen, Self–Ownership, Freedom and Equality, p.122.  
29 Daniel Brudney, Marx’s Attempt to Leave Philosophy (Cambridge Mass: Harvard 
University Press, 1998), p.311. 
30 Some have wondered whether a jazz band is an entirely apt analogy for what Cohen has in 
mind. Keith Graham, for instance, has suggested that ‘a more apt analogy might be that of an 
original New Orleans jazz band, where there are no solos and all playing is ensemble. If I 
want to play jazz, then my goal is necessarily a shared one, collective in character, like that of 
winning in a team sport’. (Graham, ‘Self-Ownership, Communism and Equality’, 
Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, 64, (1990), p.53).  
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Where would the Marx of The German Ideology and the Manifesto fit into the 
taxonomy we provided in 3.2? Marx has a strong notion of individual self-realisation. 
For Marx, individuals are realised by developing their powers and capacities in a free 
and all-round way. But the ideal of community in The German Ideology and the 
Manifesto is a thin one in three respects. First, these visions of communist society are 
compatible with a purely instrumental view of community, according to which 
community is valued only as a means for individual self-development. Second, these 
two passages emphasise self-realisation with others. Our self-realisation takes place 
with others in that we rely on others to create the appropriate context for our self-
realisation. But we need not do anything specifically for others. Third, these 
snapshots of communist society are compatible with egoism: individuals must 
recognise that their self-realisation is bound up with others, but they need not care 
about others – have the good of others as part of their own end in acting – in order to 
flourish.  
 
(ii) Self-Realisation and Community in the 1844 Comments 
 
 Let us now turn to the concluding passage to the Comments, where Marx invites us 
to imagine that we had produced as ‘human beings’. In that event, writes Marx: 
 
1) ‘In my production [I would have] enjoyed not only an individual 
manifestation of my life during the activity, but also when looking at 
the object I would have the individual pleasure of knowing my 
personality to be objective, visible to the senses and hence a power 
beyond all doubt.’ 
 
2) ‘In your enjoyment or use of my product I would have the direct 
enjoyment both of being conscious of having satisfied a human need 
by my work…of having thus created an object corresponding to the 
needs of another man’s essential nature.’ 
 
3) ‘I would have been for you the mediator [der Mittler] between you 
and the species, and therefore would become recognised and felt by 
you yourself as a completion [Ergänzung] of your own essential 
nature and as a necessary part of yourself, and consequently would 
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know myself to be confirmed both in your thought and your love’.31
  
How does this conception of a future society compare with the descriptions in The 
German Ideology and the Manifesto? This passage retains the focus on labour as an 
activity of individual self-realisation; here labour is described as an enjoyable activity 
(‘I would have enjoyed not only an individual manifestation of my life during the 
activity…’), and as an activity through which one manifests one’s individuality 
(‘when looking at the object I would have the individual pleasure of knowing my 
personality to be objective, visible to the senses…’). But the passage contains a 
different conception of community. First, in contrast to The German Ideology and the 
Manifesto, where Marx describes community as instrumentally valuable – a ‘means’ 
to the further valuable end of self-development – in the Comments Marx adopts a 
non-instrumental model of community. In the Comments, intrinsic value is placed on 
creating and maintaining our social bonds, on producing a product that corresponds 
‘to the needs of another man’s essential nature’. Thus, to put the contrast between 
Marx’s different models of a future communist society another way: in The German 
Ideology and the Manifesto living in community with others provides the individual 
with the means for the good life, whereas in the Comments living in community with 
others – producing things that other human beings need – is constitutive of the good 
life itself.  
Second, while The German Ideology and Manifesto emphasise self-realisation 
with others (for example, a jazz musician and their band mates), the Marx of the 
Comments emphasises self-realisation for others (for example, A cooking B a meal). 
In other words, the Marx of the Comments stresses the fulfilment that comes from the 
service aspect of work, from the knowledge ‘of having satisfied a human need’, 
whereas the Marx of The German Ideology and Manifesto stresses the fulfilment that 
comes from developing one’s powers and capacities alongside (but not specifically 
for) others. Indeed, the theme that is stressed so strongly in the Comments – the 
fulfilment that comes from serving others’ needs – is strikingly absent from the 
descriptions of a future communist society in both The German Ideology and the 
Manifesto.  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
31 Marx, ‘Comments on James Mill’, p.228. Note that I have provided three excerpts from 
this passage here, but that the numbering is Marx’s own. The passage is given in full in 
Chapter 5 §2. 
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Finally, while the conception of community in both The German Ideology and 
the Manifesto are compatible with egoism, in the specific sense that individuals could 
be wholly concerned with their own self-realisation, and not at all with that of their 
fellows, the Marx of the Comments rejects that view. In the Comments, Marx 
describes a future society as one in which people produce for others, where part of the 
producer’s end is to provide others with the products or services they need. In other 
words, the individuals described in the Comments take others’ ends as part of their 
own ends in producing. This is a feature of communist production that is neither 
mentioned nor required by the models of community in The German Ideology and the 
Manifesto. 
Where would the Marx of the Comments fit into the taxonomy that we 
provided in 3.2? What is so interesting about Marx’s position in the Comments is that 
it contains both strongly individualistic and communitarian aspects. Thus, on the one 
hand, Marx emphasises the fulfilment that comes from individual achievement, from 
developing one’s talents and producing a product that manifests them. Yet, on the 
other hand, Marx emphasises the fulfilment that comes from serving others, from 
producing a product that satisfies another’s need. In this way, the vision of the good 
life in the Comments attempts to reconcile a very strong ideal of individual self-
realisation with a very strong ideal of community without any kind of compromise of 
either value. This mix of individualist and communitarian strands makes Marx’s 
position a potent one. Yet it also makes Marx’s position especially vulnerable to 
Berlinian objections about compatibility of values.  
A final point: although I draw a contrast between a text that is falls into 
Marx’s ‘early’ period (the 1844 Comments), and two texts that are commonly thought 
to fall into Marx’s transitional or ‘mature’ writings (the 1845-1846 The German 
Ideology, and the 1848 Manifesto)32 I do not argue that Marx shifts from an early, 
more communitarian position to a later, more individualistic one. In Chapter 4, I will 
argue that Marx not only changes his mind on the issue of whether labour or leisure 
will be the primary site of individual self-realisation under communism, but that he 
oscillates between these positions throughout his lifetime. Although the exegetical 
evidence for a concurrent oscillation on these two different models of socialist 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
32 The German Ideology is often taken as the text that signals a break between Marx’s early 
and later writings, because it is the text that Marx first provides an outline of his theory of 
history.  
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community is less strong, I suspect that Marx’s thought is characterised by a similar 
life-long oscillation on this issue.33 
 
3.4. Marx and Other Theorists Compared 
 
I now want to try and bring out the distinctiveness of Marx’s two models of 
individual self-realisation and community by comparing and contrasting his thought 
on these matters to Hegel and J.S.Mill. 
 
(i) Hegel and Marx 
 
On the face of it there are some striking similarities between Hegel and Marx’s 
ideas on these issues. Like Marx, Hegel also emphasises the importance of 
individual self-realisation. Thus, as Allen Wood puts it, while Hegel’s position is 
initially difficult to place in the major traditions in ethics, at its core it is ‘based on a 
conception of individual human beings and their self-actualization’.34 And for 
Hegel, as for Marx, individuals can only achieve true self-realisation in community, 
for as Hegel puts this view in the Differenzschrift: ‘The community of a person with 
others must not be regarded as a limitation of the true freedom of the individual but 
essentially as its enlargement. Highest community is highest freedom’.35 Like Marx 
once more, Hegel also argues that the achievement of individual self-realisation is a 
historical accomplishment, one that could only be achieved after a fall from an 
exquisite but ultimately underdeveloped stage of unity into a long but ultimately 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
33 There is some exegetical evidence that the thick notion of community of the Comments 
endures in some of Marx’s later works. For example, some of the themes that Marx 
emphasises in the Comments return in the 1857-1858 Grundrisse. There, Marx writes that: 
‘The fact that this need on the part of one can be satisfied by the product of the other, 
and vice versa, and that the one is capable of producing the object of the need for the 
need of the other, and that each confronts the other as owner of the object of the 
other’s need, this proves that each of them reaches beyond the owner’s particular 
need, etc., as a human being [als Mensch], and that they relate to one another as 
human beings [als Menschen]; that their common species-being is acknowledged by 
all’. (Marx, Grundrisse II, p.243) 
34 Allen W. Wood, Hegel’s Ethical Thought (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1990), 
p.21.  
35 G.W.F. Hegel, The Difference Between Fichte’s and Schelling’s System of Philosophy, 
translated by H.S. Harris and W. Cerf (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1977), p.145. 
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progressive period of alienation and estrangement.36 Not surprisingly, these points 
of convergence have led some commentators to claim that Marx’s ideas about self-
realisation and community are essentially Hegelian in origin.37 Whilst it is true that 
Marx is indebted to Hegel in a number of respects, however, I believe that the 
differences between these two thinkers on the issue of self-realisation and 
community are more significant (though no less interesting or illuminating for that).  
The first of these differences is well-known: whilst Hegel thinks self-
realisation is achievable in the modern social world, Marx thinks that self-realisation 
requires fundamental social and political change. This point must be made with care, 
however. Hegel does not think that individual self-realisation is possible in just any 
social world. On the contrary, it is Hegel’s idea that self-realisation can only be 
achieved once the necessary social and political conditions are in place. On this issue, 
he and Marx actually agree. Neither is it to say that Hegel uncritically endorses the 
social and political arrangements of his day, for the conception of the rational state in 
the Philosophy of Right is by no means identical to that of nineteenth century 
Prussia.38 Yet while it would be a mistake to portray Hegel as an apologist for the 
actually existing Prussian state, it is true that he believes that he is living at a time of 
rational social and political institutions, which may be marred by contingent 
imperfections, but are essentially good and hence worthy of acceptance.39  
However, this well-known point – that for Marx self-realisation can only be 
had in a future communist society, whereas for Hegel it is possible in the here and 
now – conceals deeper philosophical differences. Most importantly, while self-	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
36 Of course, it should also be pointed out that this historical account of individual – where 
history is said to pass through three major stages of undifferentiated unity, differentiated 
disunity and differentiated unity – pre-dates Hegel. See Chapter 2, §1.  
37 For two examples of this tendency to Hegelianise Marx’s ideas about self-realisation and 
community, see Sean Sayers Marx and Alienation: Essays on Hegelian Themes  
(Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2011); and Carol Gould, Marx’s Social Ontology: 
Individuality and Community in Marx’s Theory of Social Reality (Cambridge, Mass: MIT 
Press, 1980).  
38 Thus, for example, in contrast to the Prussian state of his day, Hegel’s conception of the 
rational state contains a constitutional monarchy, a representative assembly, public trials, and 
trial by jury. For more on this issue, see Michael Hardimon, Hegel’s Social Philosophy: The 
Project of Reconciliation (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1994), p.24-37.  
39 Thus, Hegel famously declares that ‘the state is not a work of art; it exists in the world, and 
hence in the sphere of arbitrariness, contingency, and error and bad behaviour may disfigure 
it in many respects.’ (Hegel, Philosophy of Right, §258, p.279). But this does not cancel 
Hegel’s view that he is living under a time of mature ethical institutions that are worthy of 
reconciliation and allegiance.  
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realisation is central to Hegel’s ethics and political philosophy, he is not attracted to 
the ideal of individual self-realisation that features so heavily in Marx’s vision of 
communism: the ideal of the fully developed individual, who has transcended the 
division of labour and its social roles, to develop his powers and capacities in an all-
round way. In fact, Hegel would think that the Marxian aspiration towards all-round 
development is based on a completely wrongheaded understanding of self-realisation 
and its requirements. Hegel’s reason for rejecting that ideal are set out in section §13 
of the Introduction to the Philosophy of Right: 
 
‘A will which resolves on nothing is not an actual will; the characterless man 
can never resolve on anything…Such a disposition [Gemüt] is dead, even if its 
aspiration is to be beautiful. “Whoever aspires to great things” says Goethe, 
“must be able to limit himself”. Only by making resolutions can the human 
being enter actuality, however painful the process may be; for inertia would 
rather not emerge from that inward brooding in which it reserves a universal 
possibility for itself. But possibility is not yet actuality. The will which is sure 
of itself does not therefore lose itself in what it determines’.40 
 
The philosophical claim underpinning this passage is one that Hegel makes on a 
number of occasions, for example, in his discussion of the emptiness of the Kantian 
moral will,41 and, as in the above passage, in the discussion of the Romantic 
complaint against the specialism of modern life. The underlying point is that freedom 
or self-realisation is not incompatible with ‘particularity’ or ‘determinacy’, the 
commitment on the part of the individual to specific actions, projects and goals. On 
the contrary, Hegel maintains, it is only by resolving on something particular, that is, 
by focusing on some things rather than others in their life, that individuals can take on 
a meaningful existence at all. To the objection that limiting oneself in this way 
represents an unfortunate loss of freedom or wholeness, Hegel’s reply is that the 
individual need not experience this as a limitation, because their projects and goals 
are ones with which they can identify. His example is friendship and love. In 
friendship and love, the individual commits to a specific other but does not 
experience their commitment as a limitation, because they remain ‘with oneself’ [bei 
sich] in their determinacy.42 Freedom is not diminished but enriched in this process.  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
40 Hegel, Philosophy of Right, §13, p.47. 
41 Hegel, Philosophy of Right, §5, p.37-39. 
42 Hegel, Philosophy of Right, §7, p.42	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Whilst Hegel does not base his political philosophy on love, which remains he 
says at the level of feeling [Empfindung], the idea that individual self-realisation 
requires ‘particularisation’ is also at the heart of his understanding of how the 
individual is reconciled to the modern social world. Thus, as Hegel puts it in his 
account of civil society: 
 
‘The individual attains actuality only by entering into existence [Dasein] in 
general, and hence into determinate particularity; he must accordingly limit 
himself to one of the particular spheres of need…. Initially – i.e. especially in 
youth – the individual balks at the notion [Vorstellung] of committing himself 
to a particular estate, and regards this as a limitation imposed on his universal 
determination and as a purely external necessity. This is a consequence of 
abstract thinking, which stops short at the universal and so does not reach 
actuality; it does not recognise that the concept in order to exist, must first of 
all enter into…determinacy and particularity.’43 
 
We can, therefore, see how Hegel would view Marx’s aspiration towards all-round 
development as yet another example of ‘abstract thinking’ which views ‘determinacy’ 
and ‘particularity’ as something which is to be resisted or overcome. It will be 
remembered that Marx looked to liberate the individual from the confines of social 
roles, so that they can do ‘one thing today and another tomorrow’. But Hegel’s reply 
is that this is a mistaken view of self-realisation. Self-realisation is not, on Hegel’s 
view, achieved by resisting the constraints of a role, but by fulfilling the duties that 
flow from the roles one occupies within the three major institutions of modern 
society: the family, civil society and the state. Within those social roles, individuals 
have space for their particular concerns and interests, but they can also see those 
concerns and interests as having a more universal meaning, because of the way in 
which they contribute towards the common good. Consequently, Hegel’s conception 
of self-realisation is compatible with precisely those features of modern society that 
Marx looked to eliminate. For whereas Marx viewed the division of labour and social 
roles as unacceptable constraints on the free and full development of individuals, 
Hegel saw them as enabling conditions for self-realisation, the very vehicles through 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
43	   Hegel, Philosophy of Right, §207, pp.238-239. 
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which individuals give content to their abstract universality and ‘enter into 
existence’.44  
What about Hegel and Marx’s respective ideal of community? A comparison 
between Hegel and Marx on community is more difficult, for whereas Marx offers 
only the briefest of glimpses of a future communist society, Hegel’s Philosophy of 
Right presents a systematic account of the rational state. However, it would not distort 
matters too much to see Hegel’s conception of community as something of a middle-
way between the rather thin conception of community in The German Ideology and 
the Manifesto, and the rather thick conception of community in the Comments. Thus, 
on the one hand, Hegel would reject the purely instrumental model of community that 
Marx tilts towards in The German Ideology and the Manifesto. This much is clear 
from Hegel’s hostility towards the social contract tradition, and its claim that the state 
is merely an association for serving individual interests.45 In this regard, Hegel would 
agree with Marx’s view in the Comments that membership in a community is not 
merely instrumentally valuable but a constitutive aspect of the human good. While 
Hegel shares a non-instrumental view of community with the Comments, however, he 
would object to the demandingness of the notion of community in that text. For 
although Hegel believes the ‘highest community is highest freedom’, he denies that 
the individual need make ‘extraordinary sacrifices’ for the sake of the community.46 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
44 This point must be made with care, however, for Hegel denies that individuals can simply 
be allotted a social or economic role, an idea he associates with Plato and the Indian caste-
system (Hegel, Philosophy of Right, §206, pp.238). On the contrary, Hegel asserts the modern 
principle of ‘subjective freedom’, the right of individuals to choose their social and economic 
activities and roles. Yet we should not overstate what ‘subjective freedom’ requires. For, as 
Allen Wood writes, ‘Hegel does not sympathize with Mill’s notion that society should 
encourage individuals to engage in all sorts of eccentric experiments with their 
lives…[Rather] he thinks their choices must be between recognised ways of life, 
systematically integrated into the organic system of modern ethical life’ (Allen W. Wood, 
‘Editor’s Introduction’, Philosophy of Right, p.xx). Once one’s social role has been chosen, 
Hegel claims, the individual ‘must simply do what is prescribed, expressly stated, and known to 
him within his situation’; here, the appropriate attitude is one of ‘rectitude’ (Hegel, Philosophy of 
Right, §150, p193).  
45 ‘If the state is confused with civil society and its determination is equated with the security 
and protection of property and personal freedom, the interest of individuals [der Einzelnen] 
as such becomes the ultimate end for which they are united; it also follows from this that 
membership of the state is an optional matter. – But the relationship of the state to the 
individual [Individuum] is of a quite different kind. Since the state is objective spirit, it is 
only through being a member of the state that the individual [Individuum] has objectivity, 
truth, and ethical life’ (Hegel, Philosophy of Right. §258, p276).   
46 Hegel, Philosophy of Right, §268, pp.288-289. An exception is war. 
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The ideal of individual sacrifice for the greater good is one Hegel associates with the 
states of antiquity. While one can find a residual trace of nostalgia for those states in 
Hegel’s writings, his considered view is that they represent an unsuitable model of 
community for modern individuals and mass society. His own view, by contrast, is 
that individuals can serve the community in a sufficiently full way by fulfilling the 
duties that flow from their social role. In this way, then, Hegel would reject as 
extreme both the individualism of The German Ideology and the Manifesto and the 
communitarianism of the Comments.   
 Where would Hegel fit into the taxonomy that we provided in §3.2 of this 
chapter? Hegel’s position is moderately communitarian. In comparison to Marx, 
Hegel has a rather thin notion of individual self-realisation. Hegel rejects the 
association of self-realisation with strenuous self-development, originality, or 
eccentricity. Rather, he sees individuals as being realised in and through their social 
roles. Hegel’s view is moderately communitarian because while he sees the attraction 
of the communitarian ideal of service for others, he is more wary than Marx (in the 
Comments) of the strenuous demands that such an ideal could potentially place on the 
individual.  
 
(ii) Mill and Marx 
 
Despite their major political and philosophical differences, and general disinterest in 
one another’s work, Marx’s ideal of individual self-realisation has more in common 
with Mill’s than Hegel’s.47 Like Marx, and unlike Hegel, Mill thinks that self-
realisation consists in self-development; and, like Marx once more, Mill think this 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
47 Surprisingly, given their huge historical and cultural significance, there has not been that 
much written on Marx and Mill. For a good discussion of their social theories, see Graeme 
Duncan’s Marx and Mill: Two Visions of Social Conflict and Social Harmony (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 1973). For a comparison of Mill and Marx’s attitudes towards 
socialism and the human good, see John Skorupski, Why Read Mill Today? (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 2006), pp.79-86.  
For a brief but illuminating discussion of Hegel and Mill on individuality, see Allen W. 
Wood, Hegel’s Ethical Thought, pp. 200-202. Nicholas Capaldi’s biography examines Mill’s 
relationship to Romanticism and German Idealism in more detail, though I think he rather 
over-emphasises the influence of those traditions on Mill’s thought (Nicholas Capaldi, John 
Stuart Mill: A Biography (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2004).  
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requires development ‘in all directions’ – a turn of phrase both thinkers employ.48 In 
On Liberty, Mill quotes Willhelm von Humboldt approvingly: 
 
‘The end of man, or that which is prescribed by the eternal or immutable 
dictates of reason, and not suggested by vague and intransient desires, is the 
highest and most harmonious development of his powers to a complete and 
consistent whole.’ 49 
 
Not only do Mill and Marx share an ideal of self-development; they also share a 
remarkably similar assessment of the fortune of that ideal in their own age. Both 
believe that theirs is a time of enormous social and economic development. Yet it is 
also a time where the individuality they prize is stultified and in decline. Differences 
between individuals have become less and less pronounced, they claim, so that 
society resembles an undifferentiated heap. Thus, Marx says of Victorian England 
that: ‘Intense class development, extreme division of labour and what is called 
“public opinion”…[have] produced a monotony of character that would it make it 
impossible for a Shakespeare, for example, to recognise his own countrymen’. In his 
‘everyday life’, we are told, one “respectable” Englishman is so like another that even 
Leibniz could hardly discover a difference, a differentia specifica, between them.’50 
Likewise, Mill says that while the ‘European family of nations’ has historically 
enjoyed a ‘remarkable diversity of character and culture’, it now has this diversity to 
a ‘considerably less degree’. Instead, ‘it is decidedly advancing towards the Chinese 
ideal of making people more alike’.51 The Frenchmen of the present day resemble one 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
48 As already quoted, Marx says that is ‘only in community has each individual the means of 
cultivating his gifts in all directions’, where Mill talks of ‘bold, free expansion in all 
directions’. (Quoted from Daniel Brudney, ‘Grand Ideals: Mill’s Two Perfectionisms’, 
History of Political Thought, 29:3, (2008), p.594).  
49 Quoted from Mill, On Liberty, in On Liberty And Other Writings, edited by John Gray 
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2008), p.64.  
This is not to say that Mill’s notion of individuality is identical with Marx’s in every detail, 
however. For Mill, the development of the individual’s powers to a ‘complete and consistent 
whole’ is not only a plea for the cultivation of a wider-range of powers and capacities (as it is 
in Marx), but also – in more Schillerian vein – for a harmonious balancing between the 
rational and emotional aspects of human nature.  
50 Marx, ‘The English’, MECW, volume 19 (London: Lawrence and Wishart, 1984), p.163.  
51 As this quote of Mill’s indicates, both these thinkers also share a rather Eurocentric view of 
history and progress. Compare Mill’s remarks above on China with Marx’s on the British 
Rule in India and the Asiatic mode of production.  
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another more than those of the last generation, Mill claims, and the ‘same remark 
might be made of an Englishmen in a far greater degree’.52  
Whilst both Mill and Marx share this pessimism over the present, both are 
optimistic that a higher level of self-development is attainable. For Mill, as is well-
known, the solution for the achievement of self-development is liberty, where this 
includes both negative liberty from physical inference but also positive liberty as 
autonomy or ‘self-government’, the capacity to follow one’s own plan of life. In 
Mill’s hands, therefore, self-development refers not to the development of the self 
according to a pre-existing template, but, as John Skorupski puts it, the ‘development 
of the self, by the self’.53 Once more, however, Mill sees his own age as one in which 
conformity to custom rather than autonomous development reigns: 
 
‘In our times…everyone lives under the eye of a hostile and dreaded 
censorship. Not only in what concerns others, but in what concerns only 
themselves, the individual and the family do not ask themselves – what do I 
prefer? or, what would suit my character or disposition? or, what would allow 
the best and highest in me to have fair play, and enable it to grow and thrive? 
They ask themselves, what is suitable to my position? What is usually done by 
persons of my station and pecuniary circumstances?’ 54  
 
And yet, while Mill is wary of the threat posed to individual self-development by 
conformity to communal values, he denies that achieving individuality requires a 
complete overcoming of custom or indeed an abolition of social roles. Mill is more 
moderate than Marx in this respect:  ‘It would be absurd’, he claims, ‘to pretend that 
people ought to live as if nothing whatever had been known in the world before they 
came into it; as if experience had as yet done nothing showing that one mode of 
existence, or of conduct, is preferable to another.’55 While Mill is not entirely clear 
about the relation between individual self-realisation and social roles, it is not too 
difficult to see what his ideal would be: it would be one in which roles remain, but 
where none would be uncritically adopted, and where people could follow or depart 
from them as they so wish. This presents us with a sensible middle-way between 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
52 Mill, On Liberty, pp.80-81. 
53 John Skorupski, John Stuart Mill: Arguments of the Philosophers (London: Routledge, 
1989), p.269.	  
54 Mill, On Liberty, p.68. 
55 Mill, On Liberty, p.64. 
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Hegel’s rather conformist talk of ‘rectitude’, and his concurrent disparaging of the 
individual’s desire to be ‘something special’ [Besonderes],56 and Marx’s attempt to 
completely overcome the given.     
If Marx’s notion of self-realisation is broadly consonant with Mill’s ideal of 
individuality, how do their respective ideals of community compare? The more 
interesting contrast in this regard is between Mill and the Marx of the Comments, that 
is, the Marx who argues that individuals are realised by developing their individuality 
in a way that simultaneously serves the common good. Now, Mill is not immune to 
the allure of communitarian ideals of the sort Marx puts forward in the Comments. In 
Utilitarianism, for instance, Mill recognises the ‘powerful natural sentiment’ in 
human nature, ‘the desire to be in unity with our fellow creatures’.57 Yet Mill quickly 
goes on to register about that ideal. The worry is not (the more familiar one) that the 
communitarian ideal is not suitable for, or realisable under, modern conditions, but 
that its cultivation could become ‘so excessive as to interfere unduly with human 
freedom and individuality’.58 Thus, whilst Marx is untroubled about the compatibility 
of individual self-realisation and communal service, Mill is more wary – in good 
liberal spirit – of the potential for conflict between values. Moreover, when 
individuality and community do conflict, Mill’s view is that the former trumps the 
latter: ‘I fully admit that the cultivation of an ideal of nobleness of will and conduct 
should be to individual human beings an end, to which the specific pursuit either of 
their own happiness or of that of others…should, in any case of conflict, give way’.59 
In fact, although Mill is attracted to the communitarian ideal, it is hard to say whether 
it finds a place in his final system.   
Where would Mill fit into the taxonomy that we provided in §2? Mill’s 
position is individualistic. Like Marx, his conception of self-realisation consists in 
autonomous self-development. But unlike the Marx of the Comments, Mill worries 
about compatibility of autonomous self-development with the ideal of communal 
service, and so the latter ideal gives way to the former.  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
56 Hegel, Philosophy of Right. §150, p.193. 
57 Mill, Utilitarianism, in On Liberty and Other Essays, edited by John Gray (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 2008), p.164. For a focus on the communitarian side of Mill’s thought, see 
Brudney, ‘Grand Ideals: Mill’s Two Perfectionisms’. 
58 Mill, Utilitarianism, p.166. 
59 Quoted from Brudney, ‘Grand Ideals: Mill’s Two Perfectionisms’, p.505. 
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3.5. The Communitarian Critique of Marx 
 
In the foregoing sections, I have argued that the communitarian interpretation of 
Marx is mistaken, and that, on the contrary, Marx’s vision of the good life is quite 
individualistic. Whilst this provides a response to the charge that Marx seeks to 
subsume the individual in society, however, it also leaves Marx vision of the good 
society vulnerable to a rather different series of objections: namely, that in its extreme 
emphasis on individual self-development, it concurrently neglects more 
communitarian insights. In this section, I consider two criticism of this kind, one from 
Charles Taylor and another from G.A. Cohen.  
 
(i) Charles Taylor on Marxian Freedom 
 
In Hegel and Modern Society, Charles Taylor argues that Marx held a deeply 
unrealistic conception of freedom.60 To make this claim, Taylor draws a parallel 
between Marx and Kant’s view of freedom. According to Taylor, both Marx and Kant 
conceived of freedom as antithetical to the dictates of nature or one’s social role. 
Truly free activity, for Marx and Kant, was undetermined by natural and social 
constraints. In this way, neither Marx nor Kant accepted the communitarian idea that 
we must accept the position that our natural or social position gives to us. Rather, 
Taylor claims, both ‘wanted to overcome the given altogether’.61  
 Now, following Hegel, Taylor argues that this conception of freedom is 
ultimately  ‘empty’: ‘complete freedom would be a void in which nothing would be 
worth doing, nothing would deserve to count for anything. The self which has arrived 
at freedom by setting aside all external obstacles and impingements is…without 
defined purpose’.62 Complete freedom would be empty, Taylor argues, for it cannot 
determine what projects we should pursue or why those projects have value: ‘[such 
freedom] cannot specify any content to our action outside of a situation which sets 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
60 Charles Taylor, Hegel and Modern Society (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press), 
1979. 
61 Taylor, Hegel and Modern Society, p.156. 
62 Taylor, Hegel and Modern Society, p.157. 
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goals for us, which thus imparts a shape to our rationality and provides an inspiration 
for creativity’.63   
 Instead, Taylor argues, true freedom must be ‘situated’.64 What individuals 
need is a ‘determinate task’ that tells them what to create and why it is worth creating 
it. Taylor claims that this can only be achieved by treating our social roles as ‘pre-
existing horizons of significance’, for it is a feature of such roles that they ‘set goals 
for us’.65 We must accept the goals that our roles set for us, Taylor argues, for if we 
do not then we will come to see our natural and social position as unacceptable 
constraints on the freedom of the will which must be resisted or overcome.66 
Now, there are passages in which the freedom that Marx looks forward to in a 
future communist society does look vulnerable to Taylor’s objection. One such 
passage is the one we have considered in some detail in the last two chapters, the so-
called ‘hunt in the morning’ passage in The German Ideology. There, it will be 
remembered that Marx talks of future individuals enjoying the complete freedom to 
‘do one thing another tomorrow’, to hunt in the morning, fish in the afternoon, and so 
on. Yet Taylor might argue that this freedom to do what we please is ultimately 
empty. For having the complete freedom to do as they please, future individuals lack 
the kind of ‘definite task’ which tells them what it is they should do and why it is 
worth doing it: that is, future individuals lack guidance about whether they should 
hunt or fish or rear cattle, and why, if they choose to hunt or fish or rear cattle, those 
activities have value. In this way, Taylor’s objection seems plausible.67 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
63 Taylor, Hegel and Modern Society, p.157. 
64 Taylor, Hegel and Modern Society, pp. 155-156. 
65 Charles Taylor, The Ethics of Authenticity (Cambridge, Mass: Harvard University Press, 
1991), p.38. 
66 In this way, Taylor argues that the drive towards complete freedom will ultimately end in 
Nietzschean nihilism, the elimination of all constraints as arbitrary impositions on the will. 
MacIntyre arrives at a similar conclusion, where he suggests that we face a choice between 
‘Nietzsche or Aristotle’, that is, between nihilism or a life of communally defined virtue 
(MacIntyre, After Virtue, Chapter 9). 
67Another passage of Marx’s which might be thought to be vulnerable to Taylor objection is 
the so-called ‘freedom and necessity’ passage in the third volume of Capital, where Marx 
describes work as inescapably belonging to a ‘realm of necessity’, and looks forward to the 
expansion of the true ‘realm of freedom’ which lies beyond it, in leisure. The very idea of a 
‘realm of freedom’, in which people produce as they please in a leisure society that is 
unburdened with the struggle with economic necessity, may also seem empty. I deal with this 
passage in some detail in Chapter 4.   
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Whilst Taylor’s objection might seem to apply to Marx’s position in The 
German Ideology, however, it is less obvious that it applies to his position in the 
Comments. For the future individuals described by Marx in the Comments do have a 
very ‘definite task’, namely, to engage and develop their talents to satisfy others’ 
needs (think, for example, of a doctor who engages and develops their medical talents 
in order to treat and cure their patients’ ailments). On the face of it, it is a task that 
does provide an account of what individuals should do (serve the needs of others) and 
why that activity has value (because it contributes to the fulfilment of others’ ends, 
while also developing one’s individuality). 
In response, however, Taylor might accept that Marx’s position in the 
Comments does provide individuals with something of a ‘task’, yet still press the 
point that it is hard to see what that task could actually amount to outside of a society 
structured by social roles. In particular, Taylor could point out that the instruction 
‘provide a service to society’ is still fundamentally indeterminate (that is, it does not 
help us determine what to do) and socially unrealisable (that is, it provides us with a 
duty to others that one cannot fully discharge). Once more, Taylor might claim, these 
problems can only be overcome by accepting a structure of social roles. For it is a 
feature of social roles that they delimit one’s responsibility (a doctor, for example, is 
only responsible for his or her patients’ medical needs), in a way that allows us to 
both determine and discharge our duties to others. Thus, Taylor might argue, the only 
plausible way in which the ideal of the good life in the Comments could be realised is 
in a society that is structured by social roles.  
In response, I think we should concede that the discussion in the concluding 
paragraphs of the Comments is a snapshot of the good life rather than a systematic 
account of a good society. Neither in this text, nor in any other, does Marx make any 
attempt to think about how the ideal of the good life described in that text could be 
organised on a society-wide basis. Had Marx thought about that critical issue, he 
would, for reasons Taylor cites, have been forced to accept the need for roles in a 
future communist society. 
 
(ii) G.A. Cohen on Marxian Community  
 
Let us now turn to a second criticism. In a paper in which he reconsiders his earlier 
defence of Marx’s theory of history, G.A. Cohen argues that Marx’s philosophical 
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anthropology suffers ‘severely from one-sidedness’.68 Specifically, Cohen claims that 
with its extraordinary emphasis on the creative aspect of human nature, Marx’s 
philosophical anthropology concurrently neglects ‘a whole domain of human need 
and aspiration’ which features prominently in Hegel’s political philosophy.69 More 
precisely, Cohen claims that Marx overlooks the need for unhyphenated ‘self 
definition’: the deep human need to be defined by something larger than oneself 
which is not of one’s own making. This is a need that has historically been fulfilled 
by religion or nationalism or some amalgam thereof. Crucially, Cohen claims that the 
need for self definition is not met by Marx’s Aristotelian emphasis on the 
development of human powers and capacities, for although such capacity-
development is a good, it cannot generate an adequate sense of self: ‘even if a person 
does gain an understanding of himself through creative activity, because…he 
recognises himself in what he has made, he typically understand himself as possessed 
of a certain kind of capacity: he is not necessarily able to locate himself as a member 
of a particular human community’.70 
 Now, Cohen argues that the defects of Marx’s philosophical anthropology – 
its neglect of the need for self definition – seeps into Marx’s vision of a future society 
in two ways.71 First, Cohen claims that the philosophical anthropology’s extreme 
emphasis on the creative side of human nature manifests itself the vision of the 
future’s ideal of individual self-realisation, that is, the idea that self-realisation 
consists in the all-round development of the individual.72 It will be remembered from 
the previous chapter that Cohen thinks that the ideal of all-round development is 
wildly implausible and not necessarily attractive. However, for reasons given, I have 
argued that we need not interpret Marx’s idea of all-round development in that over-
ambitious way. Second, and more importantly for the theme pursued here, Cohen 
claims that the philosophical anthropology’s neglect of the need for self definition 
manifests itself in the vision of the future society’s conception of community. Now, 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
68 G.A. Cohen, ‘Reconsidering Historical Materialism’, in History, Labour and Freedom: 
Themes from Marx  (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1988), p.137. 
69 Cohen, ‘Reconsidering Historical Materialism’, p.137. 
70 Cohen, ‘Reconsidering Historical Materialism’, pp.138-139. 
71 Cohen, ‘Reconsidering Historical Materialism’, p.137. 
72 As Cohen puts it: ‘the materialism [of the philosophical anthropology] encourages the wish 
to draw forth everything in the individual’ (Cohen, ‘Reconsidering Historical Materialism’, 
p.143). 
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Cohen is certainly aware of the passages we have been concerned with in the present 
chapter, in which Marx says, for example, that is ‘only within the community has 
each individual the means of cultivating his gifts in all directions’. But Cohen thinks 
that this reveals that for Marx community is only of instrumental value, a mere means 
for the development of individual powers and capacities: 
 
‘It is true that for Marx the liberation of the human material is possible only in 
community with others…but [for Marx] society is required…as a means, to an 
independently specified (and, I argued, absurd) goal. It is not required, less 
instrumentally, as a field for that self-identification the need for which is 
unnoticed in Marx’s vitalistic formulations’. 73 
 
Thus, on Cohen’s view, Marx’s extreme emphasis on the creative side of human 
nature gives rise to a deeply impoverished conception of community, where 
community is only valued instrumentally, as a means for the realisation of further 
valuable ends.  
Now, Cohen’s criticism has considerable force as a criticism of the model of 
the good life in The German Ideology, for in that text Marx does describe community 
as instrumentally valuable, a ‘means’ for the cultivation of human powers in ‘all 
directions’. Yet it has less force as a criticism of the Comments.74 For in that text 
Marx rails against capitalism precisely because it treats our production for others as a 
means to the realisation of further valuable ends. Under capitalism, says Marx, ‘I 
have produced for myself and not for you, just as you have produced for yourself and 
not for me…. That is to say, our production is not production by a human being for a 
human being as a human being, i.e., it is not social production.’75  Here, the fault of 
capitalism is not merely that it values the wrong end (namely, profit-making over 
individual self-development), but the deeper one that it treats what has intrinsic value 
– the maintenance of our communal life, our production for others – as a mere means 
to the realisation of further ends. The contrast is to a future communist society, in 
which I do not produce for others solely for some expected benefit that I hope to 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
73 Cohen, ‘Reconsidering Historical Materialism’, p.143. 
74 In fact, this is a possibility that Cohen acknowledges in a footnote, where he describes 
Marx as being ‘less guilty of that neglect [for self definition] in the ‘1844 Manuscripts’ and 
in the associated ‘Comments on James Mill’, where the need to affirm one’s identity is 
interpreted as a need for a fulfilling kind of social labour in community with others.’ (Cohen, 
‘Reconsidering Historical Materialism’, p.138). 
75 Marx, ‘Comments on James Mill’, p.225. 
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receive in return, but in part because I see my production for your needs as having 
intrinsic value. As Marx puts this point, having produced for you, I would have ‘the 
direct enjoyment both of being conscious of having satisfied a human need by my 
work… of having objectified man’s essential nature [Wesen], and of having thus 
created an object corresponding to the needs of another man’s essential nature.’76 In 
this way, then, Cohen’s charge that Marx has an impoverished, because instrumental, 
conception of community cannot be applied to the Marx of the Comments.  
 
3.6. Conclusion 
 
In this chapter, I have argued that communitarian interpretations of Marx’s vision of a 
future society are mistaken, and that, on the contrary, Marx’s vision of the good life 
is, in a certain sense, radically individualistic. To make this claim, I examined Marx’s 
aim to abolish social roles and showed how such an aim was incompatible with 
communitarian accounts of the good life. Having shown that Marx rejected 
communitarianism, the chapter argued that there are two models of future communist 
society in Marx’s texts: an individualistic model and a second one which is neither 
individualistic nor communitarian, and which was discussed in Marx’s 1844 
Comments. The chapter ended by considering a communitarian critique of Marx’s 
position on these matters from Charles Taylor and G.A. Cohen; here it was argued 
that while Taylor and Cohen raise some important worries about the individualistic 
model, the model in the Comments partly escapes their objections (though not, it 
should be said, without some important qualifications).  
In conclusion, however, it is worth mentioning that the position Marx adopts 
in the Comments also has problems of its own, which have not yet been considered. 
In particular, in the final section of the chapter it was argued that Cohen’s criticism 
that Marx has an impoverished conception of community cannot be applied to the 
description of the good life in the Comments. Yet although the Comments escapes this 
criticism, it does so at a price. For the Comments only escapes this criticism by 
invoking a very strenuous conception of community (where we produce out of a deep 
concern – and perhaps even love – for others), a conception which might seem 
unrealistic and not necessarily attractive as a template for modern society. Thus, 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
76 Marx, ‘Comments on James Mill’, p.277. 
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while the model of the good life developed in the Comments can respond to the set of 
communitarian objections we have been considering here, it might seem vulnerable to 
a rather different set of objections – commonly associated with Hume – about 
whether widespread fellow-feeling or (in Hume’s term) ‘love of humanity’ is really 
possible or even desirable in modern society. This is an issue to which we shall return
	   86	  
CHAPTER 4 
 
FREEDOM AND NECESSITY IN MARX’S VISION OF THE GOOD LIFE 
 
In the previous chapter, I argued that Marx gives different arguments in different 
texts as to why community is necessary for individual self-realisation. In this chapter, 
I will argue that there is a second, related tension in Marx’s vision of the good life. 
This tension centres on the issue of whether it will be labour or leisure that will 
constitute the realm of individual self-realisation under communism.  
Many commentators perceive a major shift in Marx’s account of communism: 
as Marx got older and learned more about economics, he dropped the vision of 
fulfilling labour that he spoke of in his early writings, and adopted a more pessimistic 
account of work in a future society, where self-realisation is achieved outside the 
working-day, in leisure.1 Other commentators, however, have questioned whether this 
is really the case: properly understood, they argue, there is no pessimistic shift in 
Marx’s views on this matter.2 They argue that Marx’s view, from his early more 
philosophical writings to his later economic works, is that labour will be radically 
transformed under communism so as to be a really free and fulfilling activity.  
In this chapter, I give an alternative reading of this debate. On my view, Marx 
moves between two ways of thinking about freedom and its relation to necessity, 
which, I shall argue, gives rise to two different models of unalienated labour. The first 
model states that ‘true’ freedom can be achieved in what Marx would later term the 
‘realm of necessity’, that is, in labour that satisfies social needs. The second model, 
by contrast, states that, while there can be a type or form of freedom in labour that 
satisfies social needs, ‘true’ freedom is to be achieved outside of this realm, in 
activities that are undetermined by social necessity. However, on my account, these 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1 See, for example, Herbert Marcuse, ‘The Realm of Freedom and the Realm of Necessity: A 
Reconsideration’, Praxis, 5, (1969); M.Maidan ‘Alienated Labour and Free Activity in 
Marx’s Thought’, Political Science, 41:1, (1999); R.N. Berki ‘On the Nature and Origins of 
Marx’s Concept of Labour’, Political Theory, 7:1, (1979); John Plamenatz, Karl Marx’s 
Philosophy of Man (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1975); G.A. Cohen, ‘Marx’s Dialectic of 
Labour’, Philosophy and Public Affairs, 3:3, (1974); William Adams, ‘Aesthetics: Liberating 
the Senses’, in T. Carver (ed) The Cambridge Companion to Marx, (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 1991). 
2 See, for example, Shlomo Avineri, The Social and Political Thought of Karl Marx, 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1986); James C. Klagge,  ‘Marx’s Realms of 
“Freedom” and “Necessity”’, Canadian Journal of Philosophy, 16:4, (1986); Sean Sayers, 
Marx and Alienation: Essays on Hegelian Themes (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2011).  
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two strands cannot be understood in terms of a simple pessimistic shift between 
Marx’s early optimistic writings and his later, supposedly less hopeful texts. Rather, I 
shall argue that Marx moves between these models throughout his works, never fully 
settling on one. It is an oscillation rather than a shift. 
I will begin (in §4.1) by briefly outlining how this debate has been conducted so 
far, and will then (in §4.2) give my own reading of the passage in Capital III where 
Marx describes work as inescapably belonging to a ‘realm of necessity’. In the 
following section (§4.3), I contrast this passage with the canonical account of non-
alienated labour from Marx’s early works, before going on to show (in §4.4) that 
Marx oscillates between these models throughout his lifetime. Once this interpretive 
claim is advanced, I then (in §4.5) situate Marx’s oscillation within two different lines 
of thought in the history of philosophy, before considering (in §4.6) some 
implications of Marx’s life-long oscillation between two different conceptions of the 
good life. 
 
4.1. The Debate So Far 
 
Many commentators perceive a major shift in Marx’s account of communism. In his 
early writings, Marx is optimistic that alienated labour can be fully overcome. In his 
later writings, however, Marx is often said to take a more pessimistic view of 
communist society, especially with regards to the role of labour in it. This change of 
views is said to have crystallised in the third volume of Capital (hereafter Capital 
III),3 where Marx is now said to present a rather gloomy view of labour in a future 
communist society: 
 
‘…the realm of freedom actually begins only where labour which is 
determined by necessity and mundane considerations ceases; thus in the very 
nature of things it lies beyond the sphere of actual material production. Just as 
the savage must wrestle with Nature to satisfy his wants, to maintain and 
reproduce life, so must civilized man, and he must do so in all social 
formations and under all possible modes of production. Just as the savage 
must wrestle with nature to satisfy his wants, to maintain and reproduce life, 
so must civilized man, and he must do so in all social formations and under all 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
3 Marx began the process of writing up Capital III in the summer of 1864. He completed a 
first draft by the end of 1867 but never finalised the manuscript. For a more detailed insight 
into the complex intellectual history of Capital III, see Engels’s Preface  (Marx, Capital III, 
p.5-23). 
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possible modes of production. With his development this realm of physical 
necessity expands as a result of his wants; but, at the same time, the forces of 
production which satisfy these wants also increase. Freedom in this field can 
only consist in socialized man, the associated producers, rationally regulating 
their interchange with nature, bringing it under their common control, instead 
of being ruled by it as by the blind forces of Nature; and achieving this with 
the least expenditure of energy and under conditions most favourable to, and 
worthy of, their human nature. But it none the less remains a realm of 
necessity [Reich der Notwendigkeit]. Beyond it begins that development of 
human energy which is an end in itself, the true realm of freedom [Reich der 
Freiheit], which, however, can blossom forth only with this realm of necessity 
as its basis. The shortening of the working-day is its basic prerequisite.’4 
 
This passage has seemed to many to provide undeniable proof that Marx did in fact 
change his views on communism, moving away from the youthful optimism of his 
early writings to adopt a ‘less hopeful and more realistic’5 account of labour in a 
future society in his mature works. Whilst Marx had previously stated that work itself 
would become a free, non-alienated activity under communism, he now seems to 
view productive activity as inescapably belonging to a ‘realm of alienation’6 
regardless of the mode of production in which it takes place. To be sure, labour in the 
‘realm of necessity’ is much less alienated than labour under capitalism, but there 
remains a degree of unfreedom even under socialism. For, Marx’s idea seems to be 
that ‘being a means of life…[labour] cannot be wanted, and will be replaced by 
desired activity as the working day contracts’.7 Given that Marx’s earlier writings had 
seemed to unambiguously suggest that labour would be a realm of freedom and 
fulfilment under communism, it seems right to conclude, as Plamenatz does, that 
while ‘it was not Marx’s habit to draw his readers attention to the fact that he changed 
his mind about a matter of cardinal importance in his theory…it can hardly be denied 
that he did so in the third volume of Capital’.8  
Now, while the above ‘pessimist’ reading of Marx’s mature view of communist 
society has generally held sway, other commentators have argued that this reading 
rests on mistaken reading of Marx’s mature views, and have put forward a more 
optimistic reading of the passage in question. When the passage is read in its proper 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  4	  Marx, Capital III, p.807.	  5	  Plamenatz, Karl Marx’s Philosophy of Man, p.171.	  6	  Marcuse, ‘The Realm of Freedom and the Realm of Necessity: A Reconsideration’, p.22.	  7	  Cohen, ‘Marx’s Dialectic of Labour’, p.261.	  8	  Plamenatz, Karl Marx’s Philosophy of Man, p.171.	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light, they suggest, it does not in fact reveal a pessimistic account of work in a future 
communist society. Crucial to their position is the argument that it is a ‘gratuitous 
inference’9 to infer that the realm of necessary labour is a realm of ‘alienation’ or 
‘unfreedom’. For Marx, they argue, never describes the realm of necessity in this 
way. On the contrary, in the very passage under discussion, Marx explicitly talks of 
freedom in the ‘realm of necessity’.  
By reading Marx’s position in Capital III in a more positive light, these 
commentators come to see a good deal of continuity between Marx’s youthful and 
mature accounts of unalienated labour under communism. On their view, Marx’s 
position in Capital III does ‘not contradict Marx’s earlier views on the subject’10. 
Rather, they should be seen as ‘an elaboration and extension’11 of his earlier views. 
Marx’s view, from the first to the last, is that labour will be radically transformed 
under communism to provide an immense source of enjoyment to the worker.  
How are we to make sense of this debate between those who see a pessimistic 
shift in Marx’s mature views and those who see an enduring optimism in the very 
same texts? In what follows, I argue that Marx’s views on labour do change 
significantly in his lifetime, though not in the way that is commonly supposed.  
   
4.2. Freedom and Necessity in Capital III 
 
Let us start by taking a closer look at Marx’s distinction of the ‘realm of freedom’ 
and the ‘realm of necessity’ in Capital III. What does Marx mean by these ideas; and 
what, exactly, is the contrast between the ‘realm of freedom’ and the ‘realm of 
necessity’? 
 
(i) Labour and Leisure 
 
Most straightforwardly, the ‘realm of necessity’ refers to work, while the ‘realm of 
freedom’ refers to time outside the working day, that is, to free time or leisure. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  9	  Klagge, ‘‘Marx’s Realms of “Freedom” and “Necessity”’, p.775.	  10	  Avineri, The Social and Political Thought of Karl Marx, p.237.	  11	  Klagge, ‘‘‘Marx’s Realms of “Freedom” and “Necessity”’, p.775.	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However, Marx’s use of these terms in this passage is different from the everyday 
meaning of these terms.   
While Marx often uses the concept of work or labour in a very broad way, to 
refer to a wide-range of creative human activities, here his idea of work or labour is 
narrow: the ‘realm of necessity’ refers to labour that is directed at satisfying at basic 
social needs. Such labour constitutes a ‘realm of necessity’ for the simple reason that 
it must be done if society is to sustain itself.  
Marx’s idea of ‘free time’ is, perhaps, more sharply at odds with the everyday 
meaning of ‘leisure’. In everyday use, leisure refers to time when one is not working, 
and from this it is easy to slide into conceiving leisure as a time of idleness and inertia 
or as time spent on hobbies and trivial pursuits. However, Marx takes a quite different 
view of leisure and its place in human life. For him, the deep-lying alienation of 
modern society manifests itself both in its estrangement of human labour and in its 
degradation of human leisure. With the overcoming of alienated labour, Marx 
correspondingly expects leisure to take on a very different form and role in human 
life. In a communist society, leisure will be a time of great exertion and creativity.  
In this way, then, the contrast between the realm of necessity and the realm of 
freedom is not a contrast between work and something trivial or inertial. On the 
contrary, Marx is clear that the ‘realm of freedom’, like the ‘realm of necessity’, will 
be a site of productive activity. Rather, the contrast is between labour that is directed 
at satisfying human needs and labour that is not so directed. 
 
(ii) Two Realms of Freedom 
 
Now, the really contentious issue here concerns whether, in describing work as 
belonging to a ‘realm of necessity’, and contrasting it with a ‘realm of freedom’ that 
lies outside of it, Marx was suggesting that work itself cannot be an activity of 
freedom and self-realisation.   
The natural temptation is to see the ‘realm of freedom’ and the ‘realm of 
necessity’ as being opposed to one another, so that the contrast is between a ‘realm of 
freedom’, that comprises all that is free, and a ‘realm of necessity’, comprising its 
opposite, namely, alienation, unfreedom and such like. As we have seen, this is the 
inference that has been drawn by a number of commentators who argue that the 
mature Marx became more pessimistic about the possibility of overcoming alienated 
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labour.12  However, this inference seems unwarranted. There is no exegetical 
evidence to suggest that that Marx did acquiesce in the permanence of human 
alienation, as is alleged. Moreover, a more careful reading of this passage reveals that 
Marx talks of freedom in the ‘realm of necessity’, and gives us a partial insight into 
its nature. Freedom in necessary labour, writes Marx, ‘can only consist in socialized 
man, the associated producers rationally regulating their interchange with nature, 
bringing it under their common control, instead of being ruled by it as by the blind 
forces of Nature’.13  
In this way, the contrast between the ‘realm of freedom’ and the ‘realm of 
necessity’ is not, as is it sometimes thought to be, a contrast between a realm of 
freedom and a realm of unfreedom. On the contrary, the contrast that Marx draws 
here is a more nuanced one. It is a contrast between two different types of freedom. In 
what follows, I want to suggest that this contrast between the two ‘realms’ of freedom 
is best understood as a contrast between freedom as collective self-determination, the 
collective determination of activity as opposed to rule by external forces, and freedom 
as self-realisation, the development of one’s distinctly human capacities and 
potentialities. Let us start by looking at freedom in the realm of necessity. 
For Marx, the freedom involved in necessary labour is a historical 
accomplishment in the sense that it has emerged slowly in the course of human 
history as human beings have attained more and more control over their interchange 
with the natural world. According to Marx, man’s natural condition in primitive 
societies is one of unfreedom. In this condition, man’s life is characterised by the 
perennial struggle to satisfy his most basic physical needs. Over time, man develops 
the means to satisfy such needs, but the satisfaction of man’s basic needs generates 
new needs of a more developed kind, which require more effective productive 
methods for their satisfaction. Again, man is forced to develop more dynamic 
productive techniques in order to satisfy his expanding needs. In doing so, however, 
he comes to achieve more and more freedom from the exigencies of his natural 
condition.  
Under capitalism productive power reaches unprecedented levels of 
development. With the advent of industry, and the introduction of automation into the 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
12 See footnote 1 for an extensive list. 13	  Marx, Capital III, p.807.	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process of production, the productive powers of society are higher than at any stage in 
human history. This should provide the means to humanise labour and reduce the 
working day. But under capitalism the rich development of the social production is in 
stark contrast to the stunted development of the individual, and while mankind’s 
mastery over the natural world is greater than at any point in history, man’s control 
over the social world is now at the mercy of the market economy. Thus, ‘in our days’, 
writes Marx, ‘everything seems pregnant with its contrary’: 
 
‘Machinery, gifted with wonderful power of shortening and fructifying human 
labour, we behold starving and overworking it. The new-fangled sources of 
wealth, by some weird spell, are turned into sources of want. The victories of 
art seem bought by the loss of character. At the same pace that mankind 
masters nature, man seems to become enslaved to other men.’14  
 
Communism transcends this condition. Under communism, capitalism’s positive 
characteristics are sustained but its alienating effects are eliminated. In a communist 
society the productive powers that have developed under capitalism are harnessed for 
the common good. 
Marx was unsure as to how far productive powers might develop in the future. 
In his less restrained and more utopian moments, he goes as far as suggesting that a 
post-capitalist society will see the total liberation of man from the demands of 
producing the material requirements of society, that is, he predicts the abolition of 
necessary labour itself: 
 
‘Labour does not seem any more to be part an essential part of the process of 
production. The human factor is restricted to watching and supervising the 
production process…The worker no longer inserts transformed natural objects 
[i.e. tools] as intermediaries between the material and himself; he now inserts 
the natural process that he has transformed into an industrial one between 
himself and inorganic nature. He is no longer the principal agent of the 
production process: he exists alongside it.’15 
 
In Capital III, however, Marx adopts a more restrained and realistic position. There, 
he has the good sense to argue that man must ‘wrestle’ with the nature in all forms of 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  14	  Marx, ‘Speech at the Anniversary of the People’s Paper’, MECW, volume 14  
(London: Lawrence and Wishart, 1980), p.655.	  
15 Marx, Grundrisse II, p.91. 
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social formation and under all modes of production. The introduction of machinery 
into the productive process aids and abets human labour, but it cannot eliminate it 
completely.  
What type of freedom is there within the ‘realm of necessity’? The concept of 
freedom that Marx has in mind here is one of collective self-determination, where 
socialised man exercises full, conscious control over his economic activity. Man, 
whose activity has historically been determined by the blind forces of nature, by other 
men and, under capitalism, by the dictates of the market economy, finally takes 
control of his life and labour.  
Having given his readers a glimpse of the type of freedom in unalienated 
labour, Marx then goes on to reiterate the point with which he started the passage – 
namely, that the ‘true realm of freedom actually begins only where labour which is 
determined by necessity and mundane considerations ceases.’16  
What does Marx mean by ‘true’ freedom? I think that the freedom Marx has 
in mind here is essentially one of individual self-realisation, the deployment and 
development of one’s distinctly human powers and capacities. This seems to be what 
Marx has in mind when he glosses the ‘realm of freedom’ as the sphere of life which 
comprises the ‘development of human energy which is an end in itself’.17 In this way, 
we might say that whilst the ‘realm of necessity’ is a realm of self-determination, 
where man exercises control over their economic activity, it is the ‘realm of freedom’ 
that is the realm of self-realisation, the sphere of life where individuals develop their 
distinctly human powers and capacities. 
Why is it time outside work that makes up the ‘true’ realm of freedom? Why 
can’t necessary labour also be an activity of self-realisation? Marx does not give us 
an answer to these questions. He seemed to think that the answer was self-evident, 
lying as he puts it ‘in the very nature of things.’18 Perhaps he accepted that modern 
industrial production only offers limited scope for the type of creative, varied and 
interesting work that lends itself to self-realisation. Or, maybe he thought that as 
labour is determined by what society needs it would rarely accord with what 
individuals would ideally want to do. Either way, what is apparent is that, in Capital 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  16	  Marx, Capital III, p.807.	  17 Marx, Capital III, p.807.	  18 Marx, Capital III, p.807.	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III at least, Marx looked to leisure as the sphere of life where the individual would do 
what they wanted to do, unconstrained by economic necessity. 
 
4.3. Freedom and Necessity in the Comments 
 
In this section, I will argue that Marx’s account of non-alienated labour in Capital III 
does represent a significant departure from the canonical account of unalienated 
labour in the 1844 writings. To make this claim, I will examine the young Marx’s 
fullest account of communist society, the concluding passage to his 1844 Comments.  
In this passage, Marx invites us to imagine that we had produced as ‘human 
beings’. In that event, writes Marx:  
 
1) ‘In my production [I would have] enjoyed not only an individual 
manifestation of my life during the activity, but also when looking at 
the object I would have the individual pleasure of knowing my 
personality to be objective, visible to the senses and hence a power 
beyond all doubt.’ 
 
2) ‘In your enjoyment or use of my product I would have the direct 
enjoyment both of being conscious of having satisfied a human need 
by my work…of having thus created an object corresponding to the 
needs of another man’s essential nature.’ 
 
3) ‘I would have been for you the mediator [der Mittler] between you 
and the species, and therefore would become recognised and felt by 
you yourself as a completion [Ergänzung] of your own essential 
nature and as a necessary part of yourself, and consequently would 
know myself to be confirmed both in your thought and your love’.19 
 
 
While this passage raises a number of issues, I want to specifically focus on whether, 
in drawing a distinction between the ‘realm of freedom’ and the ‘realm of necessity’, 
and arguing that ‘true’ freedom is to be found in the former ‘realm’, the Marx of 
Capital III moved away from the account of non-alienated labour that he had put 
forward in the Comments.  
The most immediately striking difference lies in their respective descriptions 
of labour. In the Comments, labour is the primary site of human self-realisation. 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
19 Marx, ‘Comments on James Mill’, p.228. Note that I have provided three excerpts from 
this passage here. The passage is given in full in Chapter 5 §2. 
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According to the Comments, individuals in a future society find fulfilment in the 
productive process, that is, in the activity of labour, and in their finalised product, the 
result of their labour, which serves as a manifestation of their individuality. In Capital 
III, Marx describes necessary labour in a future communist society as an activity that 
is free from alienation and exploitation, and carried out under humane conditions. Yet 
he stops short of describing necessary labour as fulfilling, still less an expressive 
enterprise which is pleasurable and enjoyable to the doer. In other words, he does not 
say that work is an enjoyable activity, which is experienced as a ‘pleasure’. Nor does 
he describe labour as an activity of ‘free expression’, in which one’s individuality is 
manifested in the products one make. Rather, he describes labour as being determined 
by necessity and mundane consideration, and looks to time outside the working-day 
to satisfy the deep human need for creative activity.  
This point must be made with care. To be sure, Marx never rejects the core 
thesis of his philosophical anthropology, that is, the view that creative activity is the 
defining feature of the human species, and a deeply meaningful and fulfilling activity. 
Rather, he argues that we cannot realise the inherent creativity of our nature by 
producing for others in a socialist economy. He looks to leisure, rather than labour, as 
the sphere of life in which human creativity is to be realised. In other words, Marx 
does not abandon his philosophical anthropology; he abandons the notion that 
necessary labour is the most suitable realm for its deployment.   
However, there is one crucial way in which Marx’s ideal of self-realisation 
changes. For, in the Comments, Marx not only recognises that labour will always be a 
matter of necessity; he considers the necessity of work – the fact that it is an activity 
that must be done to meet vital human needs – to be a source of labour’s attraction. 
Indeed, the Marx of the Comments argues that individuals can only achieve self-
realisation by producing for others’ needs.20 It is only by producing for others that I 
get the ‘direct enjoyment’ in knowing that I had helped another individual satisfy 
their needs, and it is only by producing for others that I would be ‘recognised and felt 
by you yourself as a completion of your own essential nature’. 
Now, it is worth noting that on the Comments account it is left open as to 
whether it is labour directed at physical needs or labour directed at non-physical 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
20 For a discussion of this aspect of the early Marx’s view, see Daniel Brudney, ‘Producing 
for Others’, in H.C. Schmidt am Busch and C.F. Zurn (ed), The Philosophy of Recognition, 
(Plymouth: Lexington, 2010). 
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needs that is the prime activity of self-realisation. I suspect that Marx’s silence on this 
issue is intended to emphasise the point that there is no significant difference between 
labour that satisfies basic needs and labour that satisfies social and cultural needs: that 
is, there is nothing fundamentally different in the production of the basic necessities 
of life from the production of art, books and plays. All of these types of production 
can be directed towards the needs of other individuals. Consequently, they all 
represent suitable vehicles for self-realisation. 
What would not lend itself to self-realisation, however, is an activity that does 
not satisfy anyone’s needs, an activity that is done for oneself. Of course, I might 
enjoy a particular activity that is done purely for myself. But I will only realise my 
true nature by producing for others, since it is only by doing so that I will achieve the 
goods of mutual production.  
On the Capital III account it is left open whether activity in the ‘realm of 
freedom’ is directed towards human needs or not. But the contrast between freedom 
and necessity, and the tone of the passage more generally, suggests that it is activities 
that are done for oneself that will primarily comprise the ‘realm’ where human beings 
achieve self-realisation. Marx implies this when he describes really free activity as 
activity that is not directed at further valuable ends (an ‘end in itself’), which suggests 
that the activities individuals pursue in the ‘realm of freedom’ will not be ones that 
are geared towards economic ends, that is, the needs of their fellows. 
The crux of issue here is how, and in what way, I achieve self-realisation. 
According to the Comments, I realise my true nature in labour that is directed at 
others’ needs. According to the Capital III account, by contrast, really free activity is 
done for its own sake, and not imposed by the exigencies of need.  
 
4.4. An Oscillation Rather Than A Shift 
 
In this section, I examine some of Marx’s most illuminating pronouncements on work 
and freedom under communism, and argue that they reveal that Marx’s intellectual 
development on this matter cannot be understood in terms of a simple shift from an 
early optimistic position to a later more pessimistic one. Rather, it is a life-oscillation 
between two different conceptions of the good life.  
Let me start with the young Marx’s 1844 writings. In the same year that Marx 
wrote the concluding passage to the Comments, in which necessary labour is central 
	   97	  
to the realisation of the self, he also developed a philosophical anthropology in the 
Manuscripts by drawing a number of contrasts between humans and animals. 
Particularly relevant to the theme pursued here is the contrast between the necessity 
of animal production and the potential freedom of its human counterpart: 
 
‘Admittedly animals also produce…[But]…only under the dominion of 
immediate physical need, whilst man produces even when he is free from 
physical need and only truly produces in freedom therefrom…Man therefore 
also forms objects in accordance with the laws of beauty.’ 21 
 
According to Marx, both animals and human beings are productive creatures in the 
sense that they must engage with the external world in order to satisfy their physical 
needs. But there is something fundamentally different about human production. For 
although animals and human beings produce, animals only do so when need compels 
them to, whereas humans can produce in freedom from their physical needs. As the 
reference to ‘the laws of beauty’ implies, the paradigm of ‘truly’ free activity is art: 
an activity that is undetermined by the pressures and considerations of physical 
necessity, an end in itself.   
The position that Marx outlines in the philosophical anthropology of the 
Manuscripts is at odds with the contemporaneous Comments, for in the latter text 
Marx explicitly denies that the necessity of labour precludes freedom. However, it fits 
perfectly with Marx’s position in Capital III, for on both accounts really free activity 
is activity that is free from the exigency of need. Of course, this casts serious doubt 
on whether we can view Marx’s intellectual trajectory in terms of a simple shift 
between an early optimism and later pessimism. For, in his insight into the 
unalienated essence of man in 1844, Marx makes the same argument that he would 
return to two decades later. In this way, the underlying tension between these two 
different conceptions of the good life, which many commentators have attributed to a 
distinction between the ‘early’ and ‘late’ Marx, seems to be simply implicit in Marx’s 
original position.22 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  21	  Marx, Economical and Philosophical Manuscripts of 1844, p.276.	  22	  Further evidence that the germ of the idea Marx expressed in Capital III can be traced back 
to the 1844 writings comes from the ‘Wage-Labour’ section of the Economical and 
Philosophical Manuscripts, where Marx quotes the German economist and radical democrat 
Willhelm Schulz approvingly. Schulz writes: ‘A nation which aims to develop its culture 
more freely can no longer remain the slave of its material needs…It needs above all leisure 
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Let us now turn our attention to the Grundrisse, the unpublished notebooks 
Marx kept between 1857-1858. There, we find the same oscillation between two 
different conceptions of the good life that was present in the 1844 writings. Thus, on 
the one hand, in a passage that is congruent with Capital III but at odds with the 
Comments, Marx asserts that the real aim of communist society is: 
 
‘…the free development of individualities, and hence not the reduction of 
necessary labour so as to posit surplus labour, but rather the reduction of the 
necessary labour of society to a minimum, which then corresponds to the 
artistic, scientific, etc. development of the individuals in the time set free.’23 
 
On this view, it is leisure rather than labour that is the sphere of life in which 
individuals realise themselves, and the value of communism lies in its shortening of 
the working-day. As Marx puts it at another point in the same text, ‘the saving of 
labour time is equivalent to the increase in free time, i.e. time for the free 
development of the individual.’24  
 And yet, the Grundrisse, like the 1844 writings, contains other lines of 
thought. For, in a passage that is at odds with Capital III but congruent with the 
Comments, Marx claims that while it is true that labour is ‘externally determined by 
the aim to be attained and the obstacles to its attainment’:  
 
‘…the overcoming of these obstacles is in itself a manifestation of freedom – 
and the external aims are stripped of their character as merely external natural 
necessity, and become posited as aims which only the individual himself 
posits, that they are therefore posited as self-realisation 
[Selbstverwirklichung], objectification of the object, and thus real freedom, 
whose action is precisely labour’.25 
 
Thus, the view that Marx expressed in the 1844 Comments, where labour is the 
central element in the realisation of the self, can at least be traced to the Grundrisse of 
1857-1858.    
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
time in which to produce and enjoy culture’ (Marx, Economical and Philosophical 
Manuscripts of 1844, p.245).   23	  Marx, Grundrisse II, p.593.	  24	  Marx, Grundrisse II, p.97	  25	  Marx, Grundrisse II, p.530.	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Perhaps, then, Marx oscillated in the 1844 writings, oscillated again in 
Grundrisse of 1857-1858, but then decisively settled on the so-called ‘pessimistic’ 
position we have been considering in Capital III of 1864-1867, where self-realisation 
is achieved after the necessary work is done. Certainly, this is the view Marx 
expressed in the 1862-1863 Theories of Surplus Value: 
 
‘Free time, disposable time, is wealth itself, partly for the enjoyment of the 
product, partly for the free activity which – unlike labour – is not dominated 
by the pressure of an extraneous purposes which must be fulfilled, and the 
fulfilment of which is regarded as a natural necessity or a social duty, 
according to one’s inclinations.’26 
 
However, the idea that Marx decisively settled on a ‘pessimistic’ appraisal of labour 
appears to be compromised by the famous passage from the ‘Critique of the Gotha 
Programme’ (hereafter the Critique). There, Marx had predicted that: 
 
‘In a higher phase of communist society, after the enslaving subordination of 
the individual to the division of labour, and therewith also the antithesis 
between mental and physical labour, has vanished; after labour has become 
not only a means of life, but life’s prime want; after the productive forces 
have also increased with the all-round development of the individual…only 
then can…society inscribe on its banners: from each according to his ability, 
to each according to his needs!’.27 
 
On this account, communist labour is both a ‘means of life’, a way of sustaining the 
species, and ‘life’s prime want’, a vehicle for human self-realisation. Under 
communism the realms of freedom and necessity are conjoined. Of course, this is the 
very idea that Marx excludes in Capital III, where he draws a firm line between the 
realms of work and leisure. But Marx penned the Critique in 1875, eleven years after 
Capital III. In this way, the idea that we can view Marx’s intellectual development in 
terms of a simple pessimistic shift between the youthful optimism of the early 
writings and the gloomy pessimism of his later works would appear to misconstrue 
the exegetical evidence. For, in this, one of his last works, Marx is optimistic that 
human needs can be met by self-realising labour, ‘life’s prime want’. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  26	  Marx, Theories of Surplus-Value, MECW, volume 32 (London: Lawrence and Wishart, 
1989), p.391. 27Marx, ‘Critique of the Gotha Programme’, p.87. 	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It might be argued, however, that while the Critique could be interpreted as a 
call back to Marx’s position in the Comments, it could also be interpreted as being 
congruent with Marx’s position in Capital III. For, the Critique might be interpreted 
as saying that labour will be desirable only in the sense that it will be elevated from 
its position as an activity of alienated toil under capitalism to that of a collectively 
affirmed necessity under communism. Communist labour would be desirable not 
because it is fully self-realising, but because in comparison with capitalist labour it 
offers an opportunity for collective self-determination.  
This interpretation cannot be sustained, however, for the labour described by 
Marx in the Critique is not only more desirable than capitalist labour but the 
preeminently desirable activity of communist society; indeed, it is ‘life’s prime want’. 
Accordingly, Marx does not postulate as the aim of communist society the reduction 
of labour to a minimum, for labour contains genuinely free and self-realising 
activity.28 
 
4.5. Situating the Oscillation Historically 
 
There is something intuitively plausible about the standard story of Marx’s 
intellectual development. According to the standard story, as Marx got older, he came 
to adopt a more sober and realistic account of communist society, especially with 
regards to the role of labour within it. The mature Marx, who was less romantic and 
more learned in economics, came to see that, while the burden of labour could be 
reduced, work could not be transformed into an activity of self-realisation. Plausible 
as the standard story is, however, as we have seen it cannot be squared with a careful 
reading of the texts, which reveals that Marx’s intellectual movement on this matter is 
less simple and more uneven than the standard story suggests.  
However, this leaves us with the difficult job of explaining how, and why, this 
oscillation took place. Of course, any answer to this question must be somewhat 
speculative; but let me make some tentative remarks, which may, I hope, shed some 
light on this matter.  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
28 A degree of ambiguity remains, however, since Marx does not specify in this passage why 
communist labour has become pre-eminently desirable, that is, why it is ‘life’s prime want’.  
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The prevailing view in the history of philosophy has seen necessary labour as 
antithetical to freedom and the good life for man. These ideas can be traced back to 
Plato and Aristotle, who both argue that the highest type of life for human beings is 
the contemplative life, and that this correspondingly requires leisure and exemption 
from necessary labour. Thus, in The Republic Plato argues that the philosopher-kings, 
who govern in virtue of their superior rational endowment, should be free from the 
performance of necessary labour so as to cultivate their rational capacities more 
perfectly.29 Similarly, Aristotle recognises that the maintenance of the polis relies 
upon labour, but he too considers such activity to be antithetical to a life of the 
highest form of ‘excellence’ [arete]. Thus, Aristotle cautions that citizens ‘must not 
lead the life of artisans for such a life is ignoble and inimical to excellence. Neither 
must they be farmers, since leisure is necessary both for the development of 
excellence and the performance of political duties.’30 
Philosophers in the Kantian tradition, though plainly very different in other 
respects, express similar views on labour. On Kant’s view, motivation by need is 
heteronomy; the free will determines itself in abstraction from all such motivations.31 
Labour, activity directed at needs, represents a form of unfreedom. Whilst post-
Kantians typically aimed to soften the austerity of the Kantian picture, they generally 
continued to define freedom in opposition to necessity. Schiller, for instance, 
contrasts really free activity, which he terms ‘play’ [spiel], with labour. ‘An animal’ 
Schiller says, ‘may be said to be at work, when the stimulus to activity is some need; 
it may be said to be at play, when the stimulus is the sheer plenitude of vitality, when 
superabundance of life is its own incentive to action.’32 Crucially, on Schiller’s view 
it is play rather than work that leads to self-realisation, since it is only in the former 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  29 Plato, The Republic, translated by H.D.P. Lee, 2nd Edition (Harmondworth: Penguin, 1987), 
p.369. 30Aristotle, The Politics, translated by Stephen Everson (Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, 1988), p.1328. 
31 For discussion of this aspect of Kant’s thought, see Allen Wood, Kant’s Ethical Thought 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999), chapter 8.  
32 Schiller, Aesthetic Education, p.207. It is also had to resist a comparison between Marx’s 
contrast between the ‘realm of necessity’ and the ‘realm of freedom’ with Schiller’s contrast 
between a ‘State of compulsion’ [Staat der Not] and a ‘State of freedom’ [Staat der 
Freiheit].’ (Schiller, Aesthetic Education, p.23).  
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activity that the individual engages the whole of their nature.33  Likewise, Fichte sees 
work as an externally imposed natural necessity, which he contrasts with leisure, 
defined as free time for ‘arbitrary ends’.34  For Fichte, the aim of society should be to 
reduce necessary labour to a minimum to correspondingly enlarge the realm of leisure 
that lies beyond it. The mechanisation and division of labour represent positive 
developments, on Fichte’s view, in so far as they contribute to this end.    
  Thus, for the prevailing view in the history of philosophy freedom from work 
is necessary if human beings are to develop the highest aspects of their nature. This 
view can, however, be contrasted with a second line of thought, which has seen 
necessary labour in a more positive light: not as precluding freedom but as potentially 
enhancing it.  
The key figure here is Hegel. Hegel’s most famous discussion of labour 
comes in the master-slave dialectic in the Phenomenology of Spirit, where he 
famously argues that it is the slave who works on the world rather than the master 
who merely consumes what has been made for him who realises the higher degree of 
freedom. By working to satisfy his master’s needs, Hegel argues, the slave comes to 
control his own desires, while also developing a sense of self by fashioning an object 
that is not immediately consumed but worked upon and transformed. ‘Through the 
rediscovery of himself by himself’, Hegel says, ‘the bondsman realises that it is 
precisely in his work wherein he seemed to have an alienated existence that he 
acquires a mind of his own.’35 
These themes are developed further in the discussion of social labour in The 
Philosophy of Right, where Hegel argues that although social labour is conditioned by 
needs it can nevertheless betoken freedom. Hegel emphasises the fact that in the 
modern world a worker’s product does not typically satisfy their own needs but is 
‘strictly adapted...to the enjoyment of others.’36 Far from seeing this as an unfree 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
33‘It is precisely play and play alone which of all man’s states and conditions is the one which 
makes him whole…man only plays when us is in the fullest sense of the word a human being, 
and he is only a human being when he plays.’ (Schiller, Aesthetic Education, p.105). 
34 Quoted from David James, ‘Conceptual Innovation in Fichte’s Theory of Property: The 
Genesis of Leisure as an Object of Distributive Justice’, European Journal of Philosophy, 
(forthcoming).	  
35 Hegel, Phenomenology of Spirit, translated by A.V.Miller (Oxford: Oxford University 
Press, 1977), pp.118-119. 36	  Hegel, Philosophy of Right, §199, p.233.	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aspect of modern labour, however, Hegel argues that working for others is potentially 
liberating. By working to satisfy the needs of others rather than merely consuming 
what is present in their immediate environment, the worker is liberated from the 
‘immediacy’ of his natural condition. Furthermore, by working to satisfy others’ 
needs, workers are forced out of his particular standpoint and made to adopt a more 
social outlook – one which takes into consideration not just their own needs but also 
those of others – in their productive activity. Crucially, Hegel thinks that it is only by 
adopting this more social outlook that individuals can overcome their alienation from 
the social world.37   
We can therefore distinguish two different lines of thought on work and 
freedom in the history of philosophy: the prevailing view which sees the best type of 
human life as being free from necessary labour, and an Hegelian view which sees 
necessary labour as potentially freedom-enhancing. What I now want to suggest is 
that we can situate Marx’s oscillation between two different conceptions of labour 
within these two traditions in his history of philosophy. 
In arguing, as he does in Capital III, that truly free activity can only take place 
outside of necessary labour, Marx put forward a thesis that was broadly congruent 
with the prevailing view in the history of philosophy. To be sure, the Marx of Capital 
III would reject aspects of that view. For instance, he would reject the idea – central 
to Plato and Aristotle – that the supreme human life is one of contemplation. Equally, 
he would reject the Kantian view that necessary labour – in so far as it constitutes 
motivation by needs – is completely lacking in freedom. For the Marx of Capital III, 
by contrast, the good life consists in creative activity and, although the ‘realm of 
necessity’ cannot be fully free, it can nevertheless contain a form of freedom. 
However, in putting forward the shortening of the working-day as the chief aspiration 
of communist society, as he did in the third volume of Capital, Marx accepted the key 
thought running through these otherwise disparate works in the history of philosophy 
– namely, that the highest aspects of our nature are developed outside the realm of 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
37Hegel, Philosophy of Right, §192, p.230. This point is made by Michael Hardimon, who 
emphasises the role of self-transformation in Hegel’s reconciliation of individual and society. 
Part of the process of reconciliation, Hardimon argues, involves a transformation of 
consciousness where one moves from an initial state in which one regards oneself as an 
‘atomic individual’ to a state in which one regards oneself as an ‘individual social member’. 
Social labour contributes towards that end (Michael Hardimon, Hegel’s Social Theory: The 
Project of Reconciliation, pp.140 -143).  
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necessary labour. To put things another way, while Marx disagreed with philosophers 
in the prevailing view about what the good life consisted in, he agreed that freedom 
from work was the condition most congenial to it. 
The conception of the good life in the Comments, by contrast, contains a more 
fundamental rejection of the prevailing view in the history of philosophy. For, in that 
text, Marx rejects the claim that it is life outside labour that is the true realm of 
freedom and fulfilment. On the contrary, it is labour that constitutes real freedom, the 
good life for man. This also constituted a more Hegelian position. For, in the master-
slave dialectic, and in the discussion of social labour in The Philosophy of Right, 
Hegel had argued that although labour is determined by social needs, it could 
nevertheless be a free and self-realising activity. This surely influenced Marx’s idea 
that though ‘the volume of labour itself appears to be externally determined by the 
aim to be attained…the overcoming of these obstacles is in itself a manifestation of 
freedom’ – not only freedom, we should add, but ‘real freedom’, ‘self-realisation’.38 
Indeed, Marx is quite explicit about his debt to Hegel in this regard. ‘The importance 
and final result of Hegel’s Phenomenology’, says Marx, ‘lies in the fact that it grasps 
the nature of labour’.39   
 My suggestion, then, as to why Marx oscillates between these two models of 
unalienated labour is that he was influenced by two different lines of thought in the 
history of philosophy. At times, he endorsed the Hegelian idea that though labour 
remains determined by social need, it can nevertheless constitute real freedom. At 
other times, however, Marx was less Hegelian and more conventional, that is, he put 
forward an account of self-realisation in leisure, an account that had much more in 
common with the prevailing view in the history of philosophy, which has seen life 
outside labour as the true realm of freedom and fulfilment.   
 
 
 
 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  38 Marx, Grundrisse I, p.530.	  
39 This is not to say that Marx accepts Hegel’s account of labour in every detail. For after 
crediting Hegel with understanding the nature of work, Marx quickly goes on to criticise 
Hegel for the way in which he ‘sees only the positive and not the negative side of labour’ 
(Marx, Economical and Philosophical Manuscripts of 1844, p.276).  
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4.6. Some Problems with Marx’s Two Models of the Good Life 
 
In this chapter, I have been concerned with the exegetical question of how, and in 
what way, Marx’s views on freedom and necessity change during the course of his 
lifetime. But Marx’s oscillation between two different conceptions of freedom and 
necessity also raises a number of non-exegetical questions, which are of interest in 
relation to his own philosophy but also more generally. These questions include 
which of the two accounts provides the more feasible and desirable foundation for a 
Marxist vision of the good life. They also include the question of whether the two 
visions of the good life could be brought together and harmonised. I return to some of 
these issues in Chapter 5, but allow me a brief comment on them here.  
 For some commentators, the vision of the good life Marx puts forward in 
Capital III represents a less utopian and more realistic account of communist society, 
where Marx finally comes to terms with what is actually possible within the confines 
of a modern economy.40 Work is not ‘life’s prime want’ on this model, but it is 
rationally planned, and it leaves plenty of time for us to pursue other activities, in 
leisure, which are more conducive to self-realisation. As a consequence, it provides a 
coherent and not overly utopian alternative to capitalism.   
Marx’s position in Capital III seems to me unsatisfactory, however. The first 
problem concerns the claim that work inescapably belongs to ‘realm of necessity’, 
which cannot, in consequence, be fully free. But why can’t necessary work be fully 
free and self-realising? As G.A. Cohen argues, there is no reason why an activity 
can’t be both necessary and fulfilling: eating can be enjoyable despite being 
necessary, and cooking can be extremely rewarding.41 To be sure, the ‘realm of 
necessity’ will be with us under all conditions and all social formations. But it does 
not follow that it will therefore never be really fulfilling. 
 Furthermore, I think we can also question the desirability of a ‘realm of 
freedom’, free from necessity and determination. One problem is motivational: why 
will communist workers strive to develop their powers in the realm of freedom? 
According to Marx’s theory of history, man has developed his powers in the struggle 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
40 For one such argument, see A. Gorz, Farewell to the Working Class: An Essay on Post-
Industrial Socialism (London: Pluto, 1997). 41Cohen, ‘Marx’s Dialectic of Labour’, p.261.	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with necessity, by striving to meet one another’s basic needs. Commentating on 
earlier phases of history, Marx had argued that, on those rare occasions when nature 
has provided man with the necessities of life, she [nature]: 
 
‘“keeps him [man] in hand, like a child in leading-strings”. She does not 
impose upon him any necessity to develop himself…It is the necessity of 
bringing a natural force under the control of society…that first plays the 
decisive part in the history of industry.’42  
 
Historically, Marx argues, man has developed his powers through the struggle with 
necessity. But as the communist working-day contracts, and the realm of leisurely 
abundance grows, what will provide man with the impetus to develop his powers in 
the future?  
Relatedly, I wonder whether there is not something rather empty and arbitrary 
about the untrammelled freedom that Marx looks forward to in Capital III, where we 
can produce as we please in a sphere of life that is completely undetermined by 
external pressures and considerations. I think that Marx was ultimately attracted to 
this conception of freedom because he thought that human creativity had always been 
determined by external circumstances: in pre-capitalist societies, man lived at the 
mercy of the blind forces of nature; in capitalist society man exerted greater control 
over the natural world, but lived at the mercy at the market. In Capital III, Marx 
looked forward to the enlargement of a sphere of life that was completely free of 
determinations of this sort, a sphere of life where human beings would enjoy ‘true’ 
freedom unhindered by any kind of external pressures, natural necessity or social 
duty. But what this argument overlooks, however, is Marx’s argument – made most 
cogently in the Comments, but recurring at various points – that the struggle to satisfy 
social needs may itself provide the ground for a more satisfying form of freedom. 
 If Marx’s position in Capital III is unduly pessimistic about what is attainable 
in necessary labour, Marx’s position in the Comments would, on the face of it at least, 
appear to suffer from the opposite shortcoming of being overly optimistic that all 
labour can be transformed into a fulfilling activity. For, in truth, necessary labour 
varies greatly in kind. Some is creative and intrinsically pleasurable, and thus it 
would be wrong to suggest, as Marx does in Capital III, that labour qua labour cannot 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  42	  Marx, Capital I, p.515.	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be intrinsically satisfying. Other forms of labour, however, seem to be inherently 
unattractive, on account of their being physically dangerous, fatiguing, mind-
numbingly dull and so on, and thus it would seem wrong to suggest, as Marx does in 
the Comments, that all work can give rise to a rich development of human powers.    
Whilst I shall give a fuller response to this worry in Chapter 5, it is worth 
noting, if only briefly, that the Marx of the Comments does have some lines of 
response at his disposal. For instance, he could point that even though the work itself 
may not be intrinsically pleasurable, the worker can enjoy the fulfilment that comes 
from the knowledge that they had provided a service to society, that is, from the 
knowledge that they ‘had satisfied a human need’ in their work. Alternatively, he 
could point out that unattractive labour will not be experienced as ‘alienation’ under 
communism, because it will be equitably distributed across society as a whole, so that 
no one individual has to spend their entire working life performing the same, soul-
destroying task.  
Let us briefly consider the final question, whether the two visions of the good 
life could be harmonised. One way in which this could be achieved would be to 
collapse the distinction – firmly recognised in the third volume of Capital  – between 
labour and leisure. Perhaps this is one of the things that Marx has in mind in when he 
says, as we saw in Chapter 2, that future individuals will ‘hunt in the morning, fish in 
the afternoon, rear cattle in the evening, criticise after dinner, just as I have a mind.’43 
Under communism, a gloss on this passage might run, individuals realise themselves 
in varied activities that are freely chosen, done for their own sake and in their own 
time.  
The problem with this solution is not that it is impossible to imagine how any 
forms of work could transcend the distinction between work and leisure; academia 
may provide a rough example of what Marx has in mind, in so far as academics find 
it hard to think of their research as fitting straightforwardly into the category of 
‘work’ or ‘leisure’. Rather, the problem is that it is incredibly hard to see how some 
forms of work (for example, the work done maintaining a sewer) could transcend the 
distinction between work and leisure in the way that Marx might be seen to suggest. 
For although such activities are socially important they are not ones that individuals 
would willingly or freely perform, for their own sake, and in their own time, on 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  43	  Marx and Engels, The German Ideology, p.47. 	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account of the horrible conditions in which they must be performed. The distinction 
between work and leisure therefore looks entrenched.   
What this does not rule out, however, is a more moderate reconciliation 
between these two visions of the good life, which would preserve the distinction 
between work and leisure, but see the good life as containing activities in both 
realms. On the view I am imagining, individuals could realise their social nature by 
fulfilling a worthwhile role for society in their labour, and supplement the rich 
development of their powers and capacities in their free time. Something along these 
lines would appear to represent a coherent middle-way between the two views on 
freedom and necessity that Marx oscillated between throughout his lifetime. 
 
4.7. Conclusion 
 
In this chapter, I have argued that there is an unresolved tension in Marx’s thought 
between two accounts of non-alienated labour. In Capital III Marx argues that, while 
there can be a type or form of freedom in the ‘realm of necessity’, ‘true’ freedom is to 
be achieved outside of this realm, in activities that are undetermined by the necessity 
of economic activity. In the Comments, by contrast, Marx argues that ‘true’ freedom 
can in fact be achieved in labour that satisfies our physical needs; and, indeed, he sees 
the necessity of labour as a source of its attraction. While this might suggest that 
Marx became more pessimistic about labour in his later years, I have argued that this 
is not so, and that the ‘standard story’ of Marx’s intellectual development 
misconstrues the exegetical evidence. Rather than a straightforward shift between two 
different positions, I have argued that Marx’s writings are characterised by a life-long 
oscillation between the two positions. Further, I have suggested a possible reason for 
this oscillation, namely, that the unresolved tension in Marx’s thought reflects a more 
general tension in the history of philosophy, which Marx failed to resolve.  
 Finally, I have given some reasons for thinking that Marx’s position in 
Capital III is inadequate. Marx’s argument that work inescapably belongs to a ‘realm 
of necessity’, and cannot therefore be fully self-realising, rests on the fallacious 
argument that activity that must be done cannot be fully fulfilling. But, for reasons 
given, I am also unconvinced about the very desirability of the idea of a ‘realm of 
freedom’, free from all necessity and determination. In the following chapter, I will 
argue that Marx’s position in the Comments provides us with a more desirable and 
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feasible account of freedom and its relation necessity than the position that Marx 
oscillated towards in the third volume of Capital.  
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CHAPTER 5 
 
‘LET US IMAGINE THAT WE HAD PRODUCED AS HUMAN BEINGS’ 
 
In the foregoing chapters, I have examined in some detail the major aspects of Marx’s 
vision of the good life. Through an examination of Marx’s ideas about the division of 
labour, social roles and freedom and necessity, I have provided an interpretation of 
Marx as an individualistic thinker, whose views about the good life under 
communism change in crucial respects throughout his lifetime.  
 As well as this interpretive thread, the foregoing chapters have also identified 
a family of problems that Marx’s vision of the good life run up against. Thus, I have 
argued that Marx provides an inadequate response to the problem of the division of 
labour (Chapter 2), an impoverished account of human community (Chapter 3), and 
an unsatisfactory argument for why leisure constitutes the true ‘realm of freedom’ 
(Chapter 4). In this chapter, I focus attention on the concluding passage to the 
Comments, the highly evocative but textually opaque passage in which the Marx 
invites us to imagine that we had ‘carried out our production as human beings’. 
There, I will argue, Marx puts forward a vision of the good life that contains more 
resources with which to respond to the family of problems facing Marx’s other 
conceptions of the good life under communism. 
After a brief review of the foregoing chapters (§5.1), I provide (in §5.2) a 
brief exegesis of the vision of the good life in the concluding passage of the 
Comments. Next (in §5.3), I focus on the issue of what is distinctive about that vision, 
before going on to show (in §5.4) how that vision has the resources to respond to the 
family of objections that have been shown to undermine Marx’s other accounts of 
communism. While the vision of the good life in the Comments has the resources to 
respond to these problems, however, it also encounters problems of its own. I 
consider these problems, and some lines of response at Marx’s disposal, before 
summarising the chapter’s core claims (§5.5).  
 
5.1. Review of Previous Chapters 
 
Before we look at the concluding passage to the Comments, it will be useful to 
provide a brief review of how the argument has developed in the foregoing chapters. 
In these chapters, I identified a family of problems that Marx’s vision of the good life 
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runs up against, and which, I now want to suggest, Marx’s position in the Comments 
can respond. 
What are these problems? After an introductory chapter, in which I looked at 
some of the larger problems that Marx’s vision of the good life runs up against, I 
started in Chapter 2 by examining Marx’s notorious claim in The German Ideology 
that communist man will ‘hunt in the morning, fish in the afternoon, rear cattle in the 
evening, criticise after dinner…without ever becoming a hunter, fisherman, shepherd, 
or critic’.1 I said that this passage reveals a hope that communist society would 
overcome the division of labour, freeing individuals from the constraints of 
specialisation, and giving them the opportunity to develop their powers in an all-
round way. 
Here, I was especially concerned with Marx’s idea of ‘all-round 
development’: the idea that self-realisation consists in the all-round development of 
the individual’s powers and capacities. I defended this ideal from some criticisms 
made by Jon Elster and G.A Cohen. While I defended the ideal of all-round 
development, however, I questioned the claim that all-round development requires an 
abolition of the division of labour. Contra Marx, I argued that moving between 
numerous activities does not ensure all-round development, whereas specialising on 
complex tasks often calls on a wide-range of talents and abilities. Ultimately, I argued 
that Marx’s out and out hostility to specialism was misguided, for the ideal of all-
round development does not require an abolition of the division of labour.  
Chapter 3 looked at Marx’s claim that: ‘In a communist society there are no 
painters but at most people who engage in painting among other activities’.2 I 
suggested that this claim goes beyond a hope that specialisation will be abolished, to 
suggest that social roles will also be overcome: that is, there will be no ‘painters’ in a 
communist society not simply because no one will spend all their time painting but 
also and more intriguingly because no one will occupy the social role of ‘painter’. 
In this chapter, I used the idea of an abolition of roles to focus attention on the 
individualist side of Marx’s thought – a side that has tended to be overlooked in the 
literature leading to some serious misinterpretations of Marx’s ideas about 
communism. At the heart of Marx’s vision of the good life, I argued, is a quite 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1 Marx and Engels, The German Ideology, p.47.  
2 Marx and Engels, The German Ideology, p.394. 
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extraordinary focus on the individual. However, while this provides a reply to the 
common charge that Marx’s vision of the future subsumes the individual within 
society, I argued that it also leaves Marx vulnerable to a potentially surprising 
objection: namely, that in its excessive concentration on the individual, Marx’s vision 
of the good life provides an impoverished account of human community. It was 
claimed by G.A. Cohen that such impoverishment manifested itself in the way that 
Marx only valued community instrumentally, as a mere means for the development of 
the individual’s talents and abilities. While I conceded that this criticism has 
considerable force as a criticism of the good life in The German Ideology and The 
Communist Manifesto, I argued that the same criticism does not have force as a 
criticism of the Comments, for in that text it is clear that Marx has a much richer, non-
instrumental conception of community in mind.  
Chapter 4 examined the well-known passage in the third volume of Capital 
where Marx describes work as belonging to a ‘realm of necessity’, and talks of the 
‘realm of freedom’ that exists beyond it, in leisure.3 At the interpretive level, I argued 
that the position Marx adopts in that text does indeed represent a significant departure 
from the position he occupies at other points, where it is labour rather than leisure 
that is the ‘realm’ in which individual’s achieve self-realisation. However, on my 
view, this is not a simple shift from an early, optimistic Marx to a later, more realistic 
one. Rather, it is a life-long oscillation between two different conceptions of the good 
life. 
In the critical comments at the end of Chapter 4, I suggested that Marx’s 
position in Capital III is deeply problematic, for it rests on the fallacious argument 
that activities that must be done cannot also be truly fulfilling. But I also suggested 
that the very desirability of a ‘realm of freedom’ is questionable. In particular, I 
argued that there was something rather empty and arbitrary about the ‘leisure’ view of 
freedom that Marx desires in Capital III, where we produce as we please in a sphere 
of life unconstrained by the external pressures of everyday life. I wondered whether 
one would strive to develop one’s powers, and be able to take on a meaningful 
existence, in the leisure society depicted by Marx. 
Put in somewhat schematic terms, then, we can say that a plausible and 
desirable conception of Marx’s vision of the good life would have to satisfy the 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
3 Marx, Capital III, p.807. 
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following desiderata – desiderata which some of Marx’s other accounts of communist 
society have failed to meet. First, it would have to be one that could accommodate the 
division of labour. Modern societies rely on an incredible degree of specialisation. A 
vision of a good of the life that is strictly opposed to the division of labour cannot 
serve as a serious model for modern society. Second, Marx’s vision of the good 
society needs a plausible non-instrumental conception of community. The 
instrumental conception of community of The German Ideology and The Communist 
Manifesto fails in that regard. Third, Marx’s vision of the good life needs to provide a 
plausible answer as to whether labour or leisure constitutes the ‘realm’ of individual 
self-realisation. Marx’s argument in Capital III does not meet this requirement, for it 
is based on the fallacious argument that necessary activities cannot be self-realising, 
and propounds as an ideal a leisure society which is both unfeasible and not 
necessarily attractive.  
On top of this, we can add two further desiderata, which were discussed in 
Chapter 1. These are, first, that a plausible perfectionism or theory of self-realisation 
should (in the words of Richard Arneson) be ‘unspecific or disjunctive in its 
content’,4 and, second, that while a vision of the good life can be utopian to a degree, 
it should pass a certain threshold of realism: it should be pitched at the level of what 
Rawls has called a ‘realistic utopia’.5  
Of course, a plausible and desirable conception of the good life would have to 
do more than satisfy these desiderata alone. However, these desiderata give us a 
starting point, and with that with we can turn to the concluding passage of the 
Comments.  
 
5.2. Production as Human Beings 
 
Towards the end of the Comments, Marx invites the reader to imagine that we had 
‘produced as human beings’. In that case, Marx says:  
 
‘Each of us would have in two ways affirmed himself and the other person. 1) 
In my production I would have objectified my individuality, its specific 
character, and therefore enjoyed not only an individual manifestation of my 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  4	  Arneson, ‘Meaningful Work and Market Socialism’, pp.524-525.	  5	  Rawls, Justice as Fairness, p.4.	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life during the activity, but also when looking at the object I would have the 
individual pleasure of knowing my personality to be objective, visible to the 
senses and hence a power beyond all doubt. 2) In your enjoyment or use of 
my product I would have the direct enjoyment both of being conscious of 
having satisfied a human need by my work, that is, of having objectified 
man’s essential nature [Wesen], and of having thus created an object 
corresponding to the needs of another man’s essential nature. 3) I would have 
been for you the mediator [der Mittler] between you and the species, and 
therefore would become recognised and felt by you yourself as a completion 
[Ergänzung] of your own essential nature and as a necessary part of yourself, 
and consequently would know myself to be confirmed both in your thought 
and your love. 4) In the individual expression of my life I would have directly 
created your expression of your life, and therefore in my individual activity I 
would have directly confirmed and realised my true nature, my human nature, 
my communal nature [mein wahres Wesen, mein menschliches, mein 
Gemeinwesen].’6 
 
It makes sense to read this passage as the positive counterpart to the account of 
alienated labour that Marx developed in the Economic and Philosophic Manuscripts, 
which were written during the same months of 1844.7 Like the alienated labour 
fragment, where the worker is described as suffering from four conditions of 
alienation, Marx’s account of unalienated labour also develops in four stages.8 
Unusually, the entire passage is written in the first-person.9 
The first condition concerns the fulfilment individuals receive in and through 
their labour. Marx makes two points. First, I would enjoy labour itself, the process of 
production. As Marx puts it, I would have ‘enjoyed’ an ‘individual manifestation of 
my life during the activity’. Of course, this is in marked contrast to alienated labour, 
where the worker was said to ‘not affirm himself but deny himself...not feel content, 
but unhappy…not develop freely his physical and mental energy but mortify his body 
and ruin his mind’.10 Second, Marx claims that in unalienated labour I would have 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
6 Marx, ‘Comments on James Mill’, pp.227-228. The numbering and italics in this passage is 
Marx’s own.  
 
7 Both the Economical and Philosophical Manuscripts and the ‘Comments on James Mill’ 
were notebooks Marx kept in Paris between April and August 1844. 	  
9 David Leopold speculates that the young Marx’s use of the first-person perhaps reflects a 
tendency on his part ‘to identify the potential fulfilment of productive activity with his own 
experience of the satisfactions of creative intellectual endeavour.’ (Leopold, The Young Karl 
Marx, p.233). 
10 Marx, Economical and Philosophical Manuscripts, p.274. 
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objectified ‘my individuality, its specific character’11 in my product. This idea – that 
labour is an activity through which the worker develops a sense of self – goes back to 
Hegel’s master-slave dialectic.12 There, Hegel had argued that by working an object 
that is not immediately consumed but worked upon and transformed the slave comes 
to recognise himself in what he has made. The same is true of Marx’s communists. In 
unalienated labour, my product would serve as a manifestation of my individuality. 
Again, this is in contrast to alienated labour, where workers were said to look at their 
product as they would an ‘alien object’.13  
Whilst the first condition is essentially concerned with the fulfilment 
individuals receive in the process and result of production, conditions 2 through to 4 
stress what we might call the social aspects of communist labour. The second 
condition seems straightforward: I produce a product that you need, and I would take 
pleasure in your use and enjoyment of my product. In your use of my product I would 
gain ‘immediate satisfaction’ from the knowledge that I had produced an object that 
satisfied ‘the needs of another human being’.14  
Straightforward though this seems, we need to be clear about the intended 
contrast with capitalism. An example might help. Consider two doctors, Smith and 
Jones. Smith is indifferent to his patients. He treats them all impersonally as ‘cases’. 
He is concerned to treat their various illnesses and ailments, but only because he 
wants to make money and a reputation. Jones is different. She cares about her patients 
and treats them all as individuals. She is deeply concerned to treat their various 
illnesses and ailments, and while she enjoys the money and reputation that comes 
with her role, her primary motivation for being a doctor is that she is eager to engage 
her talents for the good of others.  
Note that the two doctors, as I have described them, could be equally 
proficient at meeting their patients’ needs. No doubt, we will think that Smith is 
bound to be a worse doctor than Jones. We may think, for example, that Smith’s 
instrumental attitude towards his patients will manifest itself in an overly cool 
bedside manner, or that insofar as Smith is motivated by the goods of money and a 
reputation he will have no reason not to cheat and deceive his patients to attain his 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
11 Marx, ‘Comments on James Mill’, p.228. 
12 Hegel, Phenomenology of Spirit, p.118. 
13 Marx, Economical and Philosophical Manuscripts, p.272. 
14 Marx, ‘Comments on James Mill’, p.228. 
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ends.15 But the difference between the two doctors, as I have described them, is not 
between the quality of their practice, but their motivation to practice. For Smith the 
major motivation to practice is to realise the goods of money and reputation, whereas 
for Jones the major motivation is to use and develop her powers for the good of 
others.  
The contrast between these doctors is surely too schematic (surely not all 
workers under capitalism take a purely instrumental attitude to consumers?), but it 
neatly captures what Marx thinks will distinguish communism from capitalism. 
According to Marx, under capitalism individuals produce for one another not out of a 
commitment to their fellow human beings, but because they want to further their own 
egoistic ends: ‘I have produced for myself and not for you, just as you have produced 
for yourself and not for me…. That is, our production is not production by a human 
being for a human being as a human being, i.e., it is not social production.’16 Under 
communism things will be different. In communist society, individuals produce for 
others not because they want to further their our own egoistic ends, but because 
others need their service and they, in turn, want to provide it for them.17  
Note, then, that Marx’s objection to market exchange does not depend upon 
its economic consequences. For the eighteenth century political economists, the 
genius of the market was that it harnessed self-interest for the greater good. We 
produce out of self-interest and this provides benefits for all: ‘Private Vices, Public 
Virtues’, as Mandeville famously put it. For Marx, however, there is something 
wrong about a society in which we produce only for what we get in return, even if, as 
Mandeville had claimed, the end result is a boon for all involved. In a good society, 
Marx claims, we produce for others out of a commitment to our fellow human beings, 
not out of base self-interest.   
This last point should be made with care, however, for it would be wrong to 
suggest that the model Marx lauds in the Comments requires altruistically labouring 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
15 Alasdair MacIntyre makes this point (MacIntyre, After Virtue, p.188).  
16 Marx, ‘Comments on James Mill’, p.225. 
17 Marx’s idea has resurfaced in contemporary political philosophy in G.A. Cohen’s 
description of a camping trip that is organised on socialist principles. According to Cohen, 
participants on the camping trip adopt the ‘antimarket principle according to which I serve 
you not because of what I get in return by doing so but because you need or want my service, 
and you, for the same reason, serve me’ (G.A. Cohen, Why Not Socialism? (New Jersey: 
Princeton University Press, 2009), p.39).  
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for the common good. It is true Marx thinks that capitalist production is self-
interested, in that the primary goal of the capitalist producer is to make profit, and 
that communist production would be more altruistic in this regard, in that part of a 
communist’s motivation in producing would be to help others satisfy their needs. But 
it would be wrong to think that communism requires a complete overcoming of self-
interest in favour of altruism. For, on Marx’s view, communist production is 
motivated both by a desire to produce something that is useful to others, but also by a 
desire to deploy and develop one’s powers and capacities. To put things another way, 
my aim in producing is to realise myself as an individual by developing my creative 
powers, but also to realise myself as a communal being by engaging those powers for 
the good of others. It would be a mistake to see either one of these aspects – 
individuality or communality – as pre-eminently important for Marx.  
In conditions 3 through 4 matters get more complex. Marx talks of producers 
being ‘the mediator [der Mittler]’ between the consumer and the species, and of 
producers and consumers ‘completing’ one another in the consumer’s use of the 
producer’s product. Marx makes clear that under communism the producer-consumer 
relation will be a close one: having produced a product that satisfies your needs, I 
‘would know myself to be confirmed both in your thought and your love’.18  
While Marx’s ideas here are not fully transparent, the central idea seems to 
run as follows. Suppose that I am a producer and you are a consumer. As we have 
seen, one of my ends in producing is to produce in a fulfilling way. But another 
equally significant end of my production is to produce a product that satisfies 
another’s need. Since (according to Marx) producing for others is a deep human need, 
your use of my product to satisfy your needs would also satisfy one of my deepest 
needs. That is to say, because producing for others is not simply an end I have 
contingently but is rather an essential end for human beings, your use of my product 
would be the ‘completion’ of my essential nature. At the same time, as a dependent 
being incapable of meeting your needs on your own, you have a need to be produced 
for by others. Thus, by producing for you, I would have helped you attain your ends. 
In this respect, our ends as producers and consumers are not conflicting but deeply 
complementary and interlocking: I have a deep need to produce for you, and thus 
your use of my product helps me attain one of my ends; and you have a deep need to 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  18	  Marx, ‘Comments on Mill’, p.228.	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be produced for by me, and thus my production for you helps you attain one of your 
ends.  
Now, as our example of the two doctors attests, your needs could potentially be 
met by different producers with different intentions. But part of what makes our 
exchange especially fulfilling is that I have produced for you with the specific 
intention of meeting your needs, and that both you and I recognise and affirm this 
fact. Thus, you recognise that I have produced for you, that a major aim of my labour 
was to satisfy your needs. Knowing that I have produced for you provides you with a 
source of pleasure; and naturally enough, it makes you feel grateful towards me.19 
Finally, knowing that you appreciate what I have done for you provides me with an 
additional source of fulfilment. As Marx puts this point, having produced for you I 
am ‘felt by you yourself as a completion [Ergänzung] of your own essential nature’. 
Consequently, I ‘know myself to be confirmed both in your thought and your love’.20 
An example might help us get a fix on what Marx has in mind. Suppose I make 
gourmet sandwiches for my girlfriend to take to work.21 I do so not for what I expect 
in return, or because it is my duty as her lover, but because I know she needs some 
lunch and I want to provide it for her.22 On her side, the sandwiches satisfy her needs. 
Moreover, she enjoys the sandwiches more than the shop-bought ones she normally 
eats, not only because they taste better, but also because she recognises that they were 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
19 The idea that it is natural for us to feel gratitude to those who consciously benefit us has 
been emphasised by Rawls: ‘we acquire attachments to persons and institutions according to 
how we perceive our good to be affected by them...Because we recognise that they wish us 
well, we care for their well-being in return' (Rawls, A Theory of Justice, p.494).  
20 It is hard to resist a comparison with Hegel’s discussion of mutual recognition in the 
master-slave dialectic. There, Hegel had also described full recognition as a state in which 
subjects ‘recognise themselves as mutually recognizing one another’ (Hegel, The 
Phenomenology of Spirit, p.112). The same idea – that we must recognise others’ recognition 
of our productive activity – is central to Marx’s ideal of producing for another.  
21 As we have seen, it is central to Marx’s account that I really ‘put myself into my labour’ 
and express my individuality in my product. One may think that making sandwiches does not 
satisfy this aspect of the picture. Yet one can imagine a situation in which, for example, one 
bakes one’s own bread and grows one’s own ingredients, so that it does not seem implausible 
to say that the sandwich really does embody one’s individuality. Still, it is true that doing 
very simple and wholly unindividuated tasks for others (e.g. making a cup of instant coffee 
for a friend) would not satisfy the relevant criteria.  
22 It is worth stressing that this is not something that I merely happen to want to provide for 
you, in the way, for example, that I may have a passing impulse for ice cream. Rather, on 
Marx’s view, my motivation to produce for you runs deep.   
	   119	  
made for her.23 She feels grateful to me for having taken the time to prepare her 
favourite sandwiches, and knowing that she appreciates what I have done provides 
me with an additional source of fulfilment.  
While the above example is helpful in getting a fix on what Marx has in mind, 
however, it might not seem the best example to stress the realistic nature of the ideal 
of producing for others. For it might be pointed out that there are a number of special 
features of love that distinguish it from relations between producers and consumers in 
mass society (not least that lovers know one another personally and have deep 
affection for one another) that consequently cast doubt on the plausibility of the ideal 
as a template for modern society. Thus, even if the ideal of producing for another can 
illuminate acts of kindness and generosity amongst family and friends, we might 
nevertheless worry, as Jon Elster has done, that ‘it remains totally unclear…how this 
ideal can be carried out under conditions of large-scale industry’.24 
Of course, this worry would seem all the more pertinent given Marx’s striking 
invocation of love in the passage (…I would know myself to be confirmed both in 
your thought and your love’), which might appear to suggest that the ideal of 
producing for another really is based on love. This is a worry to which we shall return 
(in §4, iv). For the time being, however, let us bring the central features of producing 
for another together in a more schematic way: 
 
According to Marx, producers: 
1. Enjoy the process of production, the making of a product. 
2. See their finalised product as a manifestation of their individuality. 
3. Produce with the intention of satisfying another’s need, not as a means to 
some further valuable end (e.g. making a profit), but because they 
recognise that another needs their service. 
4. Derive pleasure from the knowledge that their labour has satisfied 
another’s need. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
23 Note that it is not enough that a producer makes a product specifically for someone else. 
For example, a stalker could make sandwiches specifically for my girlfriend, but that will be 
creepy rather mutually confirming. It is also important that the consumer wants to be 
produced for by the producer. 
24 Elster, Making Sense of Marx, p.454.	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5. Recognise that the consumer of their product appreciates what they have 
done for them. 
 
According to Marx, consumers: 
6. Are not self-sufficient, and hence need to be produced for by others. 
7. Recognise that others have produced for them, with the specific intention 
of satisfying their needs. 
8. Derive pleasure from the knowledge that they have been produced for by 
others.  
9. Feel grateful to the producer for having produced for them. 
 
On Marx’s view, one can only realise one’s nature if all these steps are met. 
Obviously enough, this means that one cannot achieve self-realisation by engaging in 
menial labour, for it would lack the requisite complexity to develop one’s powers and 
capacities. Neither could one cannot achieve self-realisation if one’s labour, however 
intrinsically satisfying, is not directed towards another’s essential need, for then one 
would not attain the satisfaction that comes from producing for others. But even if 
these necessary conditions are met, that is, even if one’s labour is creative and 
interesting and directed toward another’s need, one’s self-realisation as a producer is 
still not assured. For even if one produces for others, one’s self-realisation as a 
producer is still reliant on gaining appropriate recognition from others. Thus, as 
Brudney puts it, ‘not only must producers produce with particular intentions (to make 
something for others); consumers must consume with a particular set of beliefs (about 
the intentions of producers); and producers must have particular beliefs about 
consumers’ beliefs (about their, the producers’ intentions)’.25 Only then, Marx 
maintains, would one’s self-realisation be complete. 
Could the demanding model of producing for others be applied on a society-
side basis? We have already encountered Elster’s scepticism about this. But let us 
return to our example of the doctor. Jones enjoys the exercise of her talents and 
abilities in the practice of medicine. Although the role of ‘doctor’ is one she shares 
with others, she finds her own way of inhabiting the role, her own way of being a 
doctor. So as well as developing her talents and abilities, she also expresses her 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
25 Brudney, ‘Producing for Others’, p.152. 
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individuality in the particular way she practices medicine. While she enjoys these 
aspects of her job, however, another equally significant reason for her becoming a 
doctor was that she was eager to use her talents for the good of others. She derives 
great pleasure from meeting her patients’ medical needs, from treating their various 
illnesses and ailments. For the patient, their need is met by Jones’s labour. Now, the 
patient is aware that a number of doctors have the requisite aptitudes and abilities to 
meet their medical need. But part of what made the care they received better was the 
fact that Jones did not treat them impersonally as just another ‘case’, but seemed to 
care specifically for them. Consequently, they feel grateful to Jones not only for 
meeting their medical need but also for the highly individualised care she gave them. 
Finally, Jones recognises that her patient appreciates her care, and this appreciation 
provides her with an additional source of fulfilment.  
 What this shows is that some economic roles even under capitalism replicate 
the structure of producing for others that Marx instantiates in the Comments. The idea 
that people work not on the sole basis of cash reward, but because they want to 
develop their talents for the good of others; that producers derive fulfilment from 
meeting another’s need; that consumers feel grateful to producers for the fact that 
they have met their needs; and that both producers and consumers need to have their 
activities recognised and affirmed by each another: these ideas all seem plausible 
when applied to the doctor-patient relationship. The question, to which we shall 
return, is whether other economic roles can replicate, or be transformed so that they 
replicate, that structure.  
Having given a brief overview of its central features, we are now in a position to 
turn to the issues of how the vision of the good life in the Comments is, first, 
philosophically distinctive, and, second, able to respond to the family of objections 
that have been shown to undermine some of Marx’s other conceptions of the good 
life.  
 
5.3. The Distinctiveness of the Comments  
 
In this section, I argue that Marx’s vision of the good life in the Comments is 
distinctive in two ways: in its claim about the activity of human self-realisation and in 
its conception of human community. I consider each point in turn.  
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(i) Necessary Labour 
 
The first way in which the conception of the good life in the Comments is distinctive 
concerns its claim about the activity of self-realisation. What is that activity, exactly? 
Daniel Brudney says that for the 1844 Marx the activity is necessary labour. That 
seems right; but Brudney quickly goes on to attribute to Marx a rather limited 
conception of what counts as “necessary”: 
 
‘In 1844 Marx is clear that in a communist society individuals would produce 
with the intention to make products that would be useful for others. It is at 
least debatable whether nonnecessary labour has this structure. Arguably, an 
artist creates without regard to whether her product will satisfy anyone’s 
needs. Arguably, art is something one does for oneself.’26 
 
There are two claims at work in this passage: that art is an activity ‘one does for 
oneself’, and that art is an example of non-necessary labour. Both are open to doubt. 
First, the claim that an artist creates ‘without regard to whether her product will 
satisfy anyone’s needs’ seems ill-judged, given that many artists do claim to produce 
with an eye to satisfying cultural needs. At the very least, it is not necessarily the case 
that artists create for themselves. Second, the claim that art is non-necessary would 
seem to take a rather impoverished view of human needs. True, art is not strictly 
necessary for the survival of the human species in the way, for example, that farming 
or housing is. But, as Marx recognised, what counts as “necessary” is highly elastic.27 
In conditions of acute material scarcity, the ‘realm of necessity’ is limited to those 
activities strictly necessary for the survival of the species. But beyond such 
conditions, human needs are expansive, and products that were once a luxury become 
a necessity. Under communism, Marx envisions the expansion of human needs to be 
quite far-reaching: ‘In place of the wealth and poverty of political economy’, he says, 
will come ‘the rich human being and rich human need.’28  
It is important to note that this is not merely an exegetical issue; for how we 
interpret the idea of ‘necessary labour’ has implications for the scope of Marxian self-
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
26 Brudney, Marx’s Attempt to Leave Philosophy, p.163. 
27 As Marx writes, ‘with [mankind’s] development the realm of physical necessity expands as 
a result of his wants’ (Marx, Capital III, p.807). 
28 Marx, Economical and Philosophical Manuscripts of 1844, p.306. 
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realisation. For Brudney’s Marx, the human self-realisation activity is ‘labor that 
overcomes natural necessity, the labor that bends the natural world to the human will 
in order to ensure the species’ survival’.29 This is a very narrow conception of self-
realisation for modern society, where the majority of people are not directly involved 
in labour that ‘bends the natural world’ to meet physical needs. Such a view would 
illegitimately disqualify as vehicles for self-realisation labour that meets less basic 
social and cultural needs (teaching, for example). On my interpretation, however, 
labour that meets physical needs and labour that meets less basic social and cultural 
needs are all potential vehicles for self-realisation, for they are activities through 
which individuals can develop their individuality and satisfy the needs of others. This 
broadening of Marx’s notion of the self-realisation activity has important implications 
for the attractiveness of the vision of the good life in the Comments, as we shall see in 
the following section (§5.4).   
The idea that human beings realise themselves in necessary labour is 
distinctive. For, as we have seen in Chapter 4, the prevailing view in the history of 
philosophy has seen necessary labour as antithetical to the good life for man. These 
views were central to Plato and Aristotle, and philosophers in the Kantian tradition 
have expressed similar ideas, in that they have defined freedom in contrast to natural 
necessity. In Chapter 4, I argued that Marx himself provides a (less harsh and more 
nuanced) variant on this position when he describes work as inescapably belonging to 
a ‘realm of necessity’, and looks forward to the ‘true realm of freedom’ that lies 
beyond it, in leisure. The conception of the good life in the Comments, by contrast, 
contains a more fundamental rejection of the prevailing view in the history of 
philosophy. For, in that text, Marx rejects the claim that a leisure society represents 
an ideal for human self-realisation. On the contrary, necessary labour – activity that 
satisfies human needs – constitutes the realm of self-realisation.  
 
(ii) Community 
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
29 Brudney, Marx’s Attempt to Leave Philosophy, p.161. 
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The second way that the ideal of producing for others is distinctive concerns its 
conception of community.30 We can see this by comparing it to what I previously 
called (in Chapter 3) an individualist and a communitarian conception of community. 
The individualist view I am imagining sees humans as dependent beings that need 
one another’s products in order to flourish. Thus, the individualist position agrees 
with Marx that community is a necessary condition for individual self-realisation.31 
However, on the individualist view, no intrinsic value is placed on the establishment 
and maintenance of our communal bonds. Rather, individuals only require the 
community instrumentally, to provide them with the various means they need to 
achieve their self-realisation. Thus, if the various means provided for by community 
could be realised another way – if, for example, individuals had the good fortune to 
be genuinely self-sufficient – individuals would have not have lost anything of value. 
The contrast with the ideal instantiated in the Comments should be clear. For 
on the view Marx puts forward there, community is not just a necessary but 
ultimately contingent means to some further valuable end. Rather, community is 
intrinsically valuable, a constitutive aspect of the individual’s self-realisation. 
Production for others is constitutive of individual self-realisation in the sense that it is 
only by producing a product that satisfies another’s need that individuals can flourish. 
Hence, there is no way in which Marx’s communists can realise themselves outside 
the community. If future individuals somehow became self-sufficient their self-
realisation would be critically incomplete. 
In this way, the conception of community in the Comments has more in 
common with communitarian conceptions of community. Like the Marx of the 
Comments, communitarians have criticised individualists for the way in which they 
have only valued community instrumentally, as a means for the realisation of further 
valuable ends. Like Marx, they argue that this is a deeply impoverished conception of 
community. Like Marx once more, they argue that community is not only 
instrumentally but also intrinsically valuable. 
And yet, while the Marx of the Comments shares a thick, non-instrumental 
conception of community with communitarians, his conception of a future communist 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
30 In thinking through these issues, I have found Daniel Brudney’s work especially helpful. 
Daniel Brudney, Marx’s Attempt to Leave Philosophy, Chapter 5. 
31 Indeed, Rawls says it is ‘utterly trivial interpretation of human sociability’ that we must 
live in community to achieve our individual good’ (Rawls, Justice as Fairness, p.143).  
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society differs from that of communitarians in three important respects. First, it will 
be remembered from Chapter 3 that Marx rejects the communitarian idea that the way 
to overcome alienation and achieve self-realisation is by fulfilling the duties that flow 
from one’s social role. For Marx, by contrast, the value of communism partly lies in 
the fact that it liberates individuals from the web of roles thought of as constraining 
them. 
Second, while Marx and communitarians share a non-instrumental conception 
of community, Marx’s account of how communal bonds are generated is different 
from that of communitarians. Communitarians typically see individuals as being 
bound together by the fact that they share a substantive way of life that is given to 
them by their shared history and common culture. On Marx’s view, by contrast, 
individuals are bound together by what we earlier called their interlocking ends: that 
is, by the fact that qua producer I have an essential need to produce for you, and that 
qua consumer you have an essential need to be produced for by me, so that my 
production for you helps both you and I satisfy some of our deepest needs as human 
beings. Thus, whereas communitarians emphasise the importance of a shared history 
for generating social bonds, Marx puts the emphasis on reciprocal dependence in 
meeting one another’s essential needs and completing one another’s essential nature. 
A third difference concerns the structure of communal ties. Communitarians, 
we have seen, typically see individuals being bound together by the fact that they 
share a substantive way of life that is given to them by their shared history and 
common culture. Consequently, they typically see individuals as being bound 
together en masse, for example, as citizens of a state, followers of a religion, 
supporters of a political cause, members of a family, and so on. By contrast, the 
communal tie Marx lauds is one-on-one. Of course, Marx thinks that while I have 
produced for you, you will also produce for me (or at least someone), so that 
communist society would be bound together as a whole (perhaps this is what he 
means when he says that ‘this relation would be mutual: what applies to me would 
also apply to you’32). But even so, the specific bond Marx prizes is one-on-one. In 
this way, the conception of community in the Comments is closer – in structurally 
terms at least – to the ties of love and friendship than the ties typically favoured by 
communitarians.  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
32 Marx, ‘Comments on James Mill’, p.277. 
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So, in the Comments, Marx rejects the standard individualist view that 
community is only of instrumental value. But while Marx shares with 
communitarians the view that living in with community with others is constitutive of 
the good life, the conception of community in the Comments differs from the standard 
communitarian view in three important respects. In this way, Marx provides a rich, 
non-instrumental conception of community that is distinct from the two conceptions 
of community which have been salient in Anglophone political philosophy in the last 
thirty years or so.   
 
5.4.The Attractiveness of the Comments  
 
In this section, I argue that the model of producing for others that Marx puts forward 
in the Comments has the resources to respond to the family of problems that have 
been to shown to undermine some of Marx’s other accounts of communism (for 
example, the ‘hunt in the morning’ passage in The German Ideology, and the ‘realm 
of necessity’ passage in Capital III). Unsurprisingly, however, the model of 
producing for another encounters problems of its own. I also consider these problems 
and point to some lines of response at Marx’s disposal.  
 
(i) Perfectionism  
 
In Chapter 1, I quoted Richard Arneson’s claim that ‘to be remotely plausible any 
perfectionist doctrine would have to be very unspecific or disjunctive in its content: 
there are many human goods any of which could serve equally well to frame a 
rational plan of life.’33  
Now, I think that the model of producing for another in the Comments 
represents the richest and most plausible foundation for a Marxian perfectionism. In 
The German Ideology, Marx argues that individuals are realised by engaging in 
varied activities, that is, by hunting, fishing, rearing cattle, criticising, and so on. In 
Capital III, Marx argues that while individuals may attain a degree of fulfilment in 
the ‘realm of necessity’, self-realisation is to be had outside when the necessary work 
is done. These conceptions of the good life have their differences: the former 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
33 Arneson, ‘Meaningful Work and Market Socialism’, pp.524-525. 
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emphasises the need for varied activity, the latter the importance of non-necessary 
activity (i.e. leisure). But they share the more fundamental view that self-realisation 
consists in the development of creative powers and capacities.  
The conception of the good life in the Comments is different. On that view, 
part of what makes labour valuable is – as in The German Ideology and Capital III – 
that it is an activity through which we develop certain powers and capacities. But 
another equally significant part of what makes it valuable is that it is an activity 
through which we satisfy others’ needs. Neither the conception of the good life in The 
German Ideology nor the one in Capital III reserve any role for that type of 
fulfilment. In this way, the conception of the good life in the Comments takes a 
broader view of the different types of fulfilment than can be had though labour.34  
This has important implications for Marx’s ideal of self-realisation. Marxian 
perfectionism, we have seen, has been criticised for being insufficiently pluralistic, 
that is, grounded on a one-sided account of the human good. One important 
instantiation of this charge has come from feminist political philosophy. The charge is 
that Marx’s conception of good life, with its enormous emphasis on creativity, 
concurrently neglects more service-orientated work that has traditionally been done 
by women. Alison Jagger puts this point as follows:  
 
‘According to the Marxist conception of human nature, human beings create 
themselves and their world by labouring to transform nature to satisfy their 
needs. Although this account is apparently gender neutral, Marxists in fact 
have interpreted “labor” to mean primarily the production and exchange of 
objects – the kind of work they associate with men…they exclude much 
women’s work from the category of labour…So women are excluded from 
history and even from full humanity. The traditional Marxist account of 
human nature is in fact andocentric and constitutes the conceptual basis for a 
political theory that is profoundly gender-biased.’35   
 
Insofar as Marx associates the good life exclusively with the creative development of 
individuals, then he would illegitimately exclude ‘women’s work’ from a life of self-	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
34 In addition, it is also worth pointing out that the model of the good life in the Comments 
also recognises – in a way that Marx’s other descriptions of a future communist society do 
not – the fulfilment that stems, not from producing for others, but being produced for by 
others. That is, the fulfilment that comes from the recognition that others care about one’s 
well-being.  
35 A. Jagger, Feminist Politics and Human Nature (Oxford: Rowman and Littlefield, 1983), 
p.79. 
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realisation. That is not the case with the conception in the Comments, however. For, 
in that text, Marx argues that self-realisation consists in activity that calls on the 
development of certain powers and capacities but also serves the needs of others. This 
encompasses a wide-range of activities: the traditionally male-dominated ‘production 
and exchange of objects’, but also the more service-orientated work that has been 
traditionally been done by women. Indeed, one may think that the model of producing 
for another especially well with “women’s work”, for it has tended to have the done-
for-others structure that Marx lauds.  
 
 (ii) Utopianism 
 
In Chapter 1, I argued that while utopian political philosophy can provide us with 
some useful theoretical resources, and should not be dismissed out of hand, to be 
useful it would have to pass a threshold of realism: it would have to be what John 
Rawls has called a ‘realistic utopia’.   
Now, although the model of producing for another may look utopian in certain 
respects, there is one way in which it is less utopian and more realistic than the 
position that Marx would adopt in other works. Marx’s vision of a future communist 
society is often said to rely on a ‘technological fix’36 to overcome what Hume 
famously called the ‘circumstances of justice’, that is, circumstances of limited 
generosity and moderate scarcity. Thus, as Marx puts it, the full development of the 
productive forces is ‘an absolutely necessary practical premise’ for the realisation of 
communism, ‘because without it privation, want is merely made general, and with 
want the struggle for necessities would begin again, and all the old filthy business 
would necessarily be restored.’37 In this way, a full communist society is often said to 
be one that is ‘beyond justice’ in the sense that the circumstances that generate the 
need for justice are surpassed. 
Not surprisingly, Marx’s ideas about abundance have been criticised for being 
excessively utopian.38 Marx wrote as if the earth’s resources were inexhaustible but, 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
36 This phrase comes from G.A.Cohen, Self–Ownership, Freedom and Equality, pp.116-144.   
37 Marx and Engels, The German Ideology, p.49. 
38 Another line of criticism is that the achievement of abundance and the transcendence of 
justice are not only unrealistic but also undesirable. Thus, for example, Rawls writes: ‘The 
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as Cohen says, we can no longer sustain that ‘extravagant, pre-green, materialist 
optimism, because the planet earth rebels: its resources turn out to be not lavish 
enough for continuous growth.’39 This has important implications for Marx’s vision 
of a future communist society. Since, as Peter Singer puts it, ‘everything Marx says 
about communism is premised on material abundance’,40 our loss of faith in its 
attainment may appear to undermine everything he wrote about communism.  
The point I make here is not just that Marx makes no technologically utopian 
claims about abundance in the Comments, but that the model of producing for others 
actually presupposes conditions of moderate scarcity. According to the Comments, 
individuals realise themselves by producing things for the needs of other human 
beings. They could not realise themselves if God were to rain manna from heaven, for 
that would make production for others superfluous. In conditions of Elysian 
abundance, individuals would not experience the pleasure of satisfying another’s 
needs: they would feel themselves to be critically incomplete. It is only in conditions 
of moderate scarcity that individuals can achieve self-realisation, for it is only in such 
a world that human beings have needs that demand satisfaction. It is, in other words, 
in the ‘circumstances of justice’, and not in a world beyond them, that future 
individuals achieve self-realisation. In this respect, Marx’s position in the Comments 
puts forward a less utopian and more realistic vision of the good life than that which 
aspires towards in some of his other works.41   
While the model of producing for another may not be technologically utopian, 
however, there may be other ways in which it may appear to be more utopian than the 
visions of the good life that Marx tilts towards at other points in his life. In particular, 
one may think that its model of community relies on utopian claims about the 
perfectibility of human nature, not least because of Marx’s striking invocation of 
‘love’ to describe how consumers would feel towards producers. This is a question to 
which we shall return in a following sub-section (iv).  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
evanescence of justice, even of distributive justice, is not possible, nor, I think, is it 
desirable.’ (Rawls, Justice as Fairness, p.177).	  	  
39 Cohen, Self–Ownership, Freedom and Equality, pp.127-128. 
40 Peter Singer, Marx: A Very Short Introduction (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1980), 
p.84. 
41 This would also have implications for the issue of the evanescence of justice. Since the 
model of producing for another is one that presupposes circumstances of justice, one may 
also think that the value of justice itself must also be retained.  
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(iii) Division of Labour and Mass Production 
 
In Chapter 2, I argued that a plausible conception of the good life must be able to 
accommodate the division of labour. Modern societies rely on an unprecedented 
degree of specialisation. A vision of a good of the life that is strictly opposed to the 
division of labour cannot serve as a serious model for modern society.  
At issue is whether the vision of the good life in the Comments is compatible 
with a division of labour. Now, explicit discussion of the division of labour does not 
feature in the Comments. Unlike some of Marx’s other discussion of a future 
communist society, where the fate of the division of labour enjoys a salient role, the 
Comments are silent on this issue. So the question is whether a division of labour is 
incompatible with the central tenets of that vision. Now, the model of producing for 
others is not incompatible with a division of labour where the specialised labour is 
interesting and creative to the doer and also serves the needs of others; indeed, the 
discussion of the doctor in §5.2 provides an example of one such specialism that fits 
that model. Neither is it incompatible with a division of labour in which a worker 
does not fashion a product from start to finish, but plays a role working alongside 
many others in the creation of a product; for even if a worker only plays a small role 
in the creation of a single product, they may nevertheless be able to identify with the 
output of their fellow workers, and hence realise themselves through their co-
operative activity (think, for example, of a large team of research scientists all 
involved in finding a cure for cancer). But what the model of producing for others is 
incompatible with is the kind of division of labour characteristic of mass production – 
a division of labour that leads to high productivity but also de-skilling of the worker 
and the creation of entirely uniform products. This kind of mass production violates a 
number of aspects of our model: workers would not be able develop powers and 
capacities through their work, still less see their product as a manifestation of their 
‘individuality, its specific character’; consumers would not be able to recognise the 
fact that someone has produced specifically for them; and consequently neither 
producers nor consumers would be able to express the kind of recognition of the other 
that Marx thinks essential for communist self-realisation. We can therefore see that 
Elster’s worry that it is ‘unclear…how this ideal can be carried out under conditions 
of large-scale industry’ is not entirely wide of the mark.   
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 What does all of this imply for Marx’s vision of the good life? Marx described 
communism as a form of society which will be just as productive as capitalism, and 
perhaps even more so, but not suffer the alienated labour which the capitalist mode of 
production had forced upon its workforce. Communism will provide opportunities for 
interesting and creative forms of work, yet it will forego none of the benefits of 
advanced capitalism. But in reality it is clear that highly productive labour brings 
alienation in train, and that any attempt to implement the Marxian ideal of non-
alienated labour would come at a cost to economic efficiency. Is the conclusion to be 
drawn that Marx’s ideal of non-alienated labour should be jettisoned? Not 
necessarily. For, as Cohen argues, efficiency is ‘only one value, and it would show a 
lack of balance to insist that even small deficits in that value should be eliminated at 
whatever cost to [others]’. He continues: 
 
‘…efficiency, in the relevant sense, only means providing the goods and 
services that you want when you do not take into account (other aspects of) 
the quality of your life, and the quality of your relations to your fellow 
citizens. Why should we make no sacrifice of the former for the sake of the 
latter?’42  
 
(iv) The Conception of Community  
 
In Chapter 3, I examined a criticism from G.A. Cohen which said that in his extreme 
emphasis on the creative side of human nature, Marx concurrently failed to give due 
emphasis to the deep human need for non-instrumental community with others.  
Now, while I conceded that Cohen’s criticism had considerable force as a 
criticism of the vision of the good life in The German Ideology and Manifesto, I 
argued that the same criticism could not be made of Marx’s position in the 
Comments: for in that text Marx recognises the need for non-instrumental community 
with others. However, while the ideal in the Comments can answer this objection, it 
may appear vulnerable to a different one. For, in the Comments, Marx makes very 
strenuous assumptions about the kind of concern that future individuals will have for 
one another. For instance, Marx says that producers will want to produce things for 
others, that the needs of others will motivate their production, and that consumers will 
feel immense gratitude to producers for their products. At one point in the passage, 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
42 Cohen, Why Not Socialism? p.74. 
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Marx even invokes love to describe how consumers will feel towards producers. 
Knowing that consumers appreciate what producers have done for them, producers 
would know themselves to be ‘confirmed’ in the consumers’ ‘thoughts’ and ‘love’.  
Insofar as Marx thinks that love for others is possible amongst strangers in 
mass society, he runs up against one of Hume’s themes: the limits of benevolence. 
Hume claims that humans are benevolent creatures but that the capacity for 
benevolence is limited. On Hume’s view, the capacity is limited not in the sense that 
we can only act benevolently towards a certain number of people, but in the sense 
that we can only be genuinely benevolent towards those who we know personally. 
Thus, Hume claims, ‘in general it may be affirm’d, that there is no such passion in 
human minds, as the love of mankind, merely as such, independent of personal 
qualities, of services, or of relation to oneself’.43   
In a recent paper on this topic, Daniel Brudney has pressed this Humean point 
against Marx. Brudney claims that Marx’s idea that we can produce for strangers out 
of love involves a category mistake: ‘I can surely love my neighbor’, says Brudney, 
but ‘if the focus is my relation to billions of unknown, distant others, love seems to be 
in the wrong category.’44 This is because ‘love needs to latch onto something 
individuated’, and strangers, by definition, are wholly unindividuated.45 Hence, 
Marx’s idea that we will produce for distant, unknown others out of love is 
conceptually incoherent.46 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
43 David Hume, A Treatise on Human Nature, edited by David Fate Norton and Mary J. 
Norton (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 2007), p.309. 
44 Brudney, ‘Producing for Others’, p.161. 
45 Brudney, ‘Producing for Others’, p.161.	  
46 Note, however, that Brudney does not think that this is a devastating problem for Marx’s 
vision of the good life, nor for cosmopolitan visions of global community more generally, for 
such visions – of global community – can be rescued by substituting the concept of ‘love’ for 
that of ‘concern’. This is because while ‘love fits with a class of feelings that require 
individuated objects…concern is in a class that can also take unindividuated objects’. Hence, 
‘the best way to reconstruct Marx’s view here is in terms of concern rather than love’ 
(Brudney, ‘Producing for Others’, pp.161-162).  
In response, Heikki Ikaheimo has recently argued that Brudney’s substitution of love for 
concern is inadequate as a reconstruction of Marx but also on its own terms. It is inadequate 
as a reconstruction of Marx, because one could have concern for non-human objects (e.g. the 
rain forests of Sumatra), whereas Marx makes it clear that it is essential that individuals relate 
to one another as ‘human beings’. It is inadequate on its terms, because while ‘non-
personifying concern’ (Ikaheimo’s term) is better than mutual indifference, it has the 
potential to be ‘commonsensically insulting, often humiliating, and ethically deeply 
problematic’. Ikaheimo explains:  
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Now, I think that Marx’s idea in the Comments is not that future individuals 
will have the same depth of feeling that lovers have for one another, but that they will 
replicate the structure of loving relationships on a society-wide scale.47 As we have 
seen in §5.2 of this chapter, it is central to Marx’s vision of the good life in the 
Comments that producers and consumers have ends that are not antithetical but 
interlocking: as a producer, I have a deep need to produce for you, such that your use 
of my product can be said to ‘complete’ my essential nature; and as a consumer, you 
have a deep need to be produced for by me, such that your use of my product can be 
said to ‘complete’ your essential nature. To put the same point another way, then, we 
could say that it is central to Marx’s vision of the good life in the Comments that 
producers and consumers are reciprocally dependent on one another for the 
realisation of their essential nature. Love is often thought to share this structure of 
reciprocal dependence and mutual completion.48 It seems plausible to me to think that 
Marx’s invocation of love in the passage was intended to serve as an intuitive 
example of an already existing social relationship that fulfils the structure of 
producing for others.49   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
 
‘In being valued instrumentally or “intrinsically”, one is not thereby an object of 
personifying, unconditional concern for happiness or subjective well-being, nor is 
one thereby seen in light of any person-making significance either. Neither of these 
attitudes is as such a personifying attitude and neither of them necessarily implies the 
presence of personifying attitudes – or of recognition – that is. And to the extent that 
one is the object of attitude-complexes that lack the personifying attitudes of 
recognition, one is…being reified or thingified’ (Heikki Ikaheimo, ‘Globalising 
Love: On the Nature and Scope of Love as a Form of Recognition’, Res Publica, 
18:1, (2012), pp.21-22).  
47 David Leopold also suggests that we should not take Marx’s invocation of love entirely at 
face-value: ‘The picture’, he writes, ‘is probably best understood as one of mutuality rather 
than intimacy’ (Leopold, The Young Karl Marx, p.234).  
48 For instance, the idea that love involves some form of mutual completion goes back to 
Aristophanes’ famous speech in Plato’s Symposium. There, Aristophanes introduces the idea 
that human beings are half of what they used to be, and that each person is consequently 
searching for their ‘other half’ in order to be complete once more. (Plato, The Symposium, 
translated by W. Hamilton (Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1951), pp.58-65).  
49 It is worth pointing out that in the Philosophy of Right, a work that Marx studied in some 
detail in 1843, Hegel had also used the idea of love as an intuitive example of a relationship 
that manifests his preferred concept of self-realisation. Hegel writes: 
‘…we already possess this freedom in the form of feeling [Empfindung], for example 
in friendship and love. Here, we are not one-sidedly within ourselves, but willingly 
limit ourselves with reference to an other, even while knowing ourselves in this 
limitation as ourselves.’ (Hegel, Philosophy of Right. §7, p.42). 
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It is worth emphasising, however, that while the ideal of producing for others 
shares this structural similarity with love, it is quite different to love in other respects. 
One important difference concerns the degree of responsibility in romantic love and 
in producing for another. Romantic love is often thought to involve a special degree 
of responsibility for the other, namely, a responsibility for the whole person.50 As a 
lover one’s responsibility extends to the whole life of one’s partner. This is not the 
case in producing for another. In producing for another, the degree of one’s 
responsibility is more limited: as a producer, I am concerned, not with your life as a 
whole, but with the particular needs my production serves (for example, a chef’s 
responsibility does not extend beyond his diner’s culinary needs). A second important 
difference centres on the scope of one’s concern. The specific kind of responsibility 
instantiated in romantic love – the kind that takes on responsibility for the whole of 
the other’s life – is exclusive: a lover has the specific kind of responsibility they have 
for their loved one and no one else.51 By contrast, the specific kind of responsibility 
instantiated in producing for others – the kind that is limited to a specific subset of 
their producers needs – is more diffuse: potentially at least, one could be have this 
responsibility for many others.52 In these ways, then, the ideal of producing for 
another is less demanding – requires a more specialised but also less exclusive form 
of responsibility – than romantic love. 
So, as I see it, the vision of the good life in the Comments shares a structural 
similarity with friendship and love, but nothing more substantive than that. In 
particular, I do not think that Marx is committed to the implausible idea that 
communists will genuinely love one another. If my arguments for this are correct, 
then the right question is not Hume’s one of whether a ‘love of mankind’ is genuinely 
possible, but whether the structure that is associated with love can be applied on a 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
Admittedly, though, Hegel is much clearer than Marx that the ‘rational state’ cannot be based 
on love. 
50 For the claim that love involves this kind of holistic concern for the other, see Christopher 
Bennett, ‘Liberalism, Autonomy and Conjugal Love’, Res Publica, 9, (2003), pp.295-296. 
51 Bennett, ‘Liberalism, Autonomy and Conjugal Love’, p.296. 
52 The number of people one could potentially have this concern for would, however, be 
constrained by the highly individualised concern which Marx thinks will be a feature of 
communist production. For example, if a doctor is given too many patients, they may not be 
able to treat them in the individualised way Marx desires, and may revert to treating them 
more brusquely as just another ‘case’. Still, it is, I think, true that the kind of responsibility 
instantiated in producing for others is much more diffuse than the more exclusive 
responsibility that is characteristic of romantic love.	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society wide-basis. That is a significant qualification. Even so, it is undeniable that 
the ideal of community here is a demanding one.  
 
(v) Freedom and Necessity 
 
In Chapter 4, I examined Marx’s views on freedom and necessity, that is, his views 
on whether activity that must be done can also be free and fulfilling. On that issue, we 
can, I think, distinguish three different views in Marx’s texts: 
 
(i) The view of The German Ideology, where Marx says that future 
individuals will ‘hunt in the morning, fish in the afternoon, rear cattle 
in the evening, criticise after dinner, just as I have a mind.’53 Here, 
when individuals produce ‘just as they have a mind’, which is to say 
freely, they choose to perform necessary labour. On this model, people 
hunt and fish, but they do not hunt and fish because they want to 
supply their fellows with food. Rather, they hunt and fish because they 
find hunting and fishing to be intrinsically enjoyable. It is, on this 
view, a fortuitous coincidence that the activities they freely chose to 
do are also the ones that supply their fellows with the material goods 
necessary for their survival. 
 
(ii) The view of Capital III, where Marx describes work as belonging to a 
‘realm of necessity’ even under communism, and contrasts it with the 
‘true realm of freedom’, that lies beyond it in leisure.54 Here, while 
necessary labour is carried out under more humane conditions than 
under previous phases of human history, real freedom starts when 
activity that is determined by necessity ceases, that is, in leisure. On 
this model, people hunt and fish because they have to, that is, because 
their fellows need food, and while such activity can contain a species 
of freedom, real freedom – the self-realisation of the individual – is 
enjoyed when the necessary work is done.   
 
(iii) The view of the Comments, where Marx says that I derive pleasure 
both from the exercise of my powers and capacities in my labour, but 
also from the knowledge that I had produced an object that satisfied 
‘the needs of another human being’.55 Here, as in The German 
Ideology but unlike Capital III, Marx thinks that necessary labour can 
be really fulfilling. But, unlike The German Ideology, Marx thinks that 
necessary labour is fulfilling in virtue of its necessity, that is, because 
it is an activity that must be done. On this model, individuals hunt and 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
53 Marx and Engels, The German Ideology, p.47. 
54 Marx, Capital III, p.807. 
55 Marx, ‘Comments on James Mill’, p.227. 
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fish, but part of what makes hunting and fishing enjoyable is that it 
provides their fellows with the food they need. 
 
So there are three different models of freedom and necessity. The question, then, is 
which provides the most plausible and desirable conception for a good society.  
In this regard, (i) seems unrealistic. To be sure, it is not unrealistic to think 
that some people will freely choose to perform necessary labour, for some necessary 
labour is desirable (e.g. cooking). Neither is it unrealistic to think that more necessary 
labour will be desirable in the future, for one could plausibly argue, as Marx does, 
that what counts “necessary” expands over time, so that a future ‘realm of necessity’ 
will come to include more creative activities (e.g. art). Neither, finally, is it 
implausible to think that people may ‘freely’ choose to perform unpleasant necessary 
labour, for they may have good reason to do so (for example, they may recognise its 
social importance or be compensated with additional leisure time). Rather, it is 
implausible to think that people will ‘freely’ choose to engage in necessary labour – 
all necessary labour – because they find it intrinsically enjoyable. To see the 
implausibility of this view, we only need to replace ‘hunting’ with ‘cleaning the 
streets’, and ‘fishing’ with ‘maintaining a sewer’. Then, Marx would be committed to 
the view that people will sweep the streets or maintain a sewer, not because they 
recognise it as an activity that must be done, but because they find such activities 
intrinsically enjoyable. I take it that the picture now looks less attractive but also 
more obviously unrealistic.  
In contrast, the account developed in (ii) is a good deal more realistic, for it 
accepts that a good deal of work will not be intrinsically enjoyable even under 
communism, and thus looks to leisure rather than labour for individual self-
realisation. However, while that is not a positively unattractive, it seems to me 
inadequate for at least three reasons. First, as we have seen, it rests on the fallacious 
argument that activities that must be done cannot also be truly fulfilling. Second, for 
reasons given, it is questionable whether the leisure society it holds up as an ideal is 
an attractive one. Third, even if we think that its view of a leisure society is attractive, 
it is not really that different from non-Marxian conceptions of the good life, for they 
have also tended to see leisure as the ‘realm’ of human existence that is most 
conducive to self-realisation. To put the same point another way, accepting this as the 
model of the good life would entail giving up on the Marxian idea of self-realisation 
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in labour – that is, on the idea that labour is not only an activity of need satisfaction, a 
means to a further ends, but a valuable activity in itself. 
What about the view in (iii), that is, the ideal of producing for others? First, 
compared to (i), the ideal producing for others provides a more realistic conception of 
the good life. As in (i), Marx thinks that necessary labour will be fulfilling under 
communism; but – unlike (i) – part of what makes labour fulfilling is that people 
recognise labour’s necessity, its vital role in meeting human needs. This seems 
plausible. After all, even under capitalism many people – nurses, teachers, social 
workers, fireman, for example – derive fulfilment from the knowledge that their 
labour serves a socially useful end; indeed, the usefulness of their work even seems to 
compensate for the less attractive aspects of their work, like long hours and low pay. 
Second, compared to the conception of the good life in (ii), the ideal of producing for 
others provides the more interesting and philosophically distinctive conception of the 
good life. The position developed in (ii) is coherent, but it is a retreat from the ideals 
that Marx’s expressed in the Comments (and other writings), where it is necessary 
labour that constitutes the good life for man.  
Nevertheless, while the ideal of producing for another seems more plausible 
and attractive than the position staked out in (i) and (ii), it also has problems of its 
own. One is that while producing for another is more realistic than (i), it is still overly 
optimistic in thinking that individuals can produce in interesting and creative ways 
and yet cumulatively generate the mix of products and services that society needs. It 
is not too hard to envision a situation where ‘the labour that individuals want to do’ 
and ‘the labour that society needs’ come apart. For instance, it does not seem at all 
implausible to think that there may be no social need for some people’s free creative 
labour (think of a designer whose passion for art nouveau is totally out of sync with 
current trends in design), or, alternatively, that there may be social needs which the 
free creative labour of individuals will not meet. Put differently, it seems eminently 
likely (to use one of Marx’s more famous phrases) that ‘from each according to his 
abilities’ may not in fact make the distribution ‘to each according to his needs’ 
possible.  
A second related problem concerns the persistence of unpleasant labour. It is 
an unfortunate fact that some of the things that society needs can only be secured 
through inherently unpleasant labour (think, for example, of the work done 
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maintaining a sewer). Marx could respond to the unpleasant labour problem by 
suggesting that even if one’s work is not intrinsically enjoyable, people can still attain 
a degree of fulfilment from their work comes from the knowledge that they had 
provided a service to society: that is, from the knowledge that they ‘had satisfied a 
human need’ in their work, and ‘created an object corresponding to the needs of 
another man’s essential nature’. 56 The fulfilment that comes from serving others is 
not in doubt. Yet I suspect that there are limits to the redemptive power of service: 
someone who spends their entire working life engaging in unpleasant labour is 
unlikely to be happy in the knowledge that they are providing a service to society. To 
be plausible, I suspect that Marx’s argument in the Comments would have to be 
supplemented with arguments about a fair distribution of unpleasant labour. That is to 
say, unpleasant labour would have to be equitably distributed across society as a 
whole (or compensated through other means), so that no one individual has to spend 
his or her entire working life performing the same, soul-destroying task.   
 
5.5. Conclusion 
 
In this chapter, I have been concerned with the vision of the good life that Marx 
formulated in the concluding paragraphs of the Comments, where Marx invites us to 
imagine that we had ‘carried out our production as human beings’. 
 Here, I have argued, Marx puts forward a vision of the good life that can 
respond to the family of objections that have been shown to undermine some of his 
other visions of a future communist society. First, it was argued that in the Comments 
Marx takes a broader view of the human good, which not only consists in the 
development of certain creative powers and capacities (as seemed to be the case in 
some of Marx’s other descriptions of communism), but also in producing for others’ 
needs. Consequently, the Comments provide a foundation for a richer and more 
inclusive account of Marxian perfectionism. Second, it was argued that the Comments 
– unlike some of Marx’s other descriptions of communism – do not rely on a utopian 
‘technological fix’ to solve the ‘circumstances of justice’; on the contrary, the 
Comments actually presuppose conditions of moderate scarcity. In this respect, the 
ideal of producing for others provides a more realistic and less fanciful vision of the 	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  Marx, ‘Comments on James Mill’, p.227.	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good life than Marx tilted towards at other points. Third, it was argued that the vision 
of the good life in the Comments is compatible with a division of labour, albeit one of 
a certain kind, and that this redounds to its plausibility as a conception of the good 
life for modern society. Fourth, it was argued that the Comments provide what the 
brief descriptions of future communist society in The German Ideology and The 
Communist Manifesto lack: namely, a model of non-instrumental community. Finally, 
it was argued that the Comments provide a more satisfactory response to the issue of 
self-realisation and necessity than that which he put forward in the ‘hunt in the 
morning’ passage and the famous description of labour as a ‘realm of necessity’ in 
Capital III.  
 Whilst the vision of the good life in the Comments can respond to this family 
of problems, however, we have also seen that it faces some problems of its own. 
Thus, for instance, we have seen that while the ideal of producing for others is 
compatible with a moderate division of labour, it is not compatible with the kind of 
intense division of labour that is characteristic of mass production. This does not 
mean that Marxists must give up on their conception of the good life, for, as Cohen 
puts it, efficiency is only one value amongst others. But it does mean that Marxists 
must give up the claim that communism will be just as efficient as capitalism. 
Second, we have seen that while the ideal of producing for others puts forward a non-
instrumental conception of community, we may worry that it is an unrealistic model 
for modern conditions. I have given some reasons for thinking that Marx is not 
committed to the idea that communists will love one another, but it is undeniable that 
he thinks that strong communal bonds will obtain. Third, we have seen while the idea 
of producing for others puts forward a more plausible and attractive conception of 
self-realisation and economic necessity, it still exhibits an unreasonable confidence 
that we can produce in interesting and creative ways and yet cumulatively generate 
the products that society requires. To be plausible, the ideal of producing for others 
would have to provide an account of how creative activity and the demands of society 
can be balanced and coordinated.   
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CONCLUSION 
 
My aim for this thesis has been to provide an interpretation and critical examination 
of Karl Marx’s vision of the good life. Having discussed these themes at length in the 
foregoing chapters, the core claims can be quickly summarised here.  
The first claim concerns how Marx’s vision of the good life should be 
understood. No doubt partly as a result of the Soviet communism, where individuals 
really were treated as dispensable cogs in the socialist machine, Marx’s vision of a 
vision of a future communist society has also been interpreted in a strongly 
communitarian light. I have argued that this is a misinterpretation of Marx’s ideas 
about the good life under communism, and that, properly interpreted, it is far more 
individualistic than is commonly supposed. Indeed, I have argued that ethical 
individualism pervades Marx’s writings about the good life. Thus, we have seen that 
Marx’s rejection of the division of labour is underpinned by the individualistic view 
that the enrichment of the powers and capacities of society cannot come at the 
expense of the powers and capacities of individuals (Chapter 2). Likewise, we have 
seen that Marx rejects the communitarian idea that self-realisation consists in 
fulfilling a worthwhile social role; on Marx’s view, by contrast, really free activity is 
unconstrained by the existence of roles (Chapter 3). Even Marx’s life-long oscillation 
between two different conceptions of the good life (which we examined in some 
detail in Chapter 4) is itself generated by a concern for individuals – specifically, a 
concern over whether labour or leisure is the ‘realm’ most congenial to their free and 
full development. By focusing on these themes in the foregoing chapters, I hope to 
have provided a vindication of Marx as an individualistic thinker against overly 
communitarian readings of his account of communism that have historically held 
sway.  
The second interpretive claim concerns Marx’s intellectual development. 
Since the publication of the early writings in the 1930s and the subsequent translation 
of those writings into English in the 1950s and 1960s, this has been one of the major 
debates in Marx scholarship. Is the transition from the early to the late Marx to be 
viewed in terms of continuity or rupture? Is there one Marx or two? My contribution 
to this much-debated issue is limited to Marx’s ideas about the good life under 
communism, but it suggests that Marx’s ideas on these matters are not of a piece. 
Thus, we have seen that Marx gives different answers as to why community is 
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necessary for self-realisation (Chapter 3), and different answers, too, about whether 
labour or leisure is the primary site of self-realisation in a future communist society 
(Chapter 4). However, the claim that these changes can be allotted to the ‘early’ and 
‘late’ Marx is at odds with the exegetical evidence. Instead, I have argued that some 
of the tensions and inconsistencies that commentators attribute to the supposed break 
between the early and later writings are implicit in the early writings, while the later 
writings are also not free from oscillations and discordant elements. Of course, it may 
seem surprising that a would-be systematic thinker like Marx did not work out a 
consistent account of the good life under communism. But given the diverse 
influences upon Marx’s thought (some of which we tracked in Chapter 4), and his 
extreme reticence for detailed ethical reflection on the nature of a future society, the 
fact that some discordant elements remain is, perhaps, not wholly unexpected.  
On top of these interpretive claims, the thesis has also contained a more 
critical component. More precisely, it has examined in some detail Marx’s most 
extensive descriptions of descriptions of a future communist society, and argued that 
the model Marx puts forward in the Comments represents the best foundation for a 
Marxian account of the good life. Needless to say, not everyone will find my 
arguments for this compelling. For those who take a more pessimistic view of modern 
labour, the ideal developed in Capital III, where the emphasis is on reducing time at 
work to extend the real ‘realm of freedom’ that lies beyond it, will represent the 
superior ideal. For others (though surely not many), hunting in the morning may still 
represent the ideal to which Marxists should aspire. But for reasons given I think the 
model in the Comments is Marx’s richest and most normatively attractive conception 
of the good life. To be sure, it is an exacting ideal and questions about its feasibility 
as a model for mass society remain. But I have given some reason for thinking that it 
may be less implausible and more feasible than it may initially appear. 
Since the fall of Eastern European communism, when Marx’s relevance as a 
social and political theorist could no longer be taken for granted, it has become 
customary for commentators to conclude their critical assessment of Marx by asking 
the question that the Italian idealist Benedetto Croce first asked of Hegel: What is 
living and what is dead in the philosophy of Hegel? It is now our turn to do the same. 
So, with regards to the topic pursued here, what is living and what is dead in Marx’s 
vision of a future communist society? 
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We have seen that a lot of what Marx says about communism does not survive 
unscathed. For instance, a future communist society could not abolish the division of 
labour. Nor could it abolish social roles. Nor could it be one in which machines do all 
the dirty work, leaving us free to engage in whatever activity we please. Nor could its 
work be free of alienation and yet forego none of the productivity and efficiency of 
capitalism.  
In this way, a plausible Marxian conception of a future society would be quite 
different to the one envisioned by Marx. It would retain a division of labour and a 
structure of social roles. It would also, though I have said little about this topic in the 
foregoing chapters, retain a role for justice to adjudicate between claims – the 
evanescence of justice sometimes envisioned by Marx being, as Rawls puts it, neither 
possible nor desirable.1 It would provide an account of how unpleasant work would 
be distributed, and seriously consider how self-realising labour and production for 
needs would be coordinated in mass society. 
To the dyed-in-the-wool Marxist this may sound overly concessionary. But in 
reply we should note that rejecting these aspects of Marx’s vision of the good life 
does not mean reproducing them in their existing form. With regards to the division 
of labour, for instance, a better Marxian solution to the problem of specialism would 
focus on how the division of labour could be transformed so as to provide all 
individuals with the opportunity to engage in more interesting and creative forms of 
work. Likewise with regards to social roles and justice: a more plausible Marxian 
view would provide a ‘Marxist conception of social roles’ and ‘Marxist conception of 
justice’ rather than putting forward as a prescription of a future society their abolition 
(in the case of social roles) or evanescence (in the case of justice).2   
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1 Rawls, Justice as Fairness, p.177. 
2A second, more sober, objection would claim, not that my account is too concessionary, but 
that, in rejecting large parts of Marx’s vision of the good life (e.g., his abolition of the 
division of labour and its roles), I may have put forward a more plausible account of a good 
society, but it would no longer be Marx’s account of a good society. In reply, I would claim 
that while significant aspects of Marx’s vision of the good life have been jettisoned, the 
underlying values (e.g. all-round-development, community) have be retained and, indeed, 
defended. What have been rejected in the foregoing chapters is not the values to which Marx 
subscribed, but the means through which he sought to realise them. To take an example from 
Chapter 3, it is the division of labour, and not the ideal of all-round development, which has 
been rejected. In general, then, my approach has been committed to Marx’s values, but not at 
all reverential to Marx’s way of implementing them. 	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It is interesting to note that the retention of these aspects of the modern social 
world bring Marx’s vision of the good society closer to Hegel’s. The idea that the 
division of labour is a central, ineliminable aspect of modern life; that social roles are 
necessary, not only for social coordination, but also for self-realisation and 
community; that at least some circumscribed role for rights and justice is necessary 
for any serious political philosophy for the modern world:  these are all central 
aspects of the rational state as described in the Philosophy of Right. They are aspects 
of Hegel’s political philosophy that Marx rejected for being insufficiently radical, yet 
they are ones that a plausible Marxian view must now accept. 
Thus, much of what Marx says about communism is dead. Yet significant 
aspects of Marx’s vision of the good life remain alive. First, Marx’s humanist ideal of 
self-development is alive. The emphasis placed on all-round development (discussed 
in Chapter 2) may be a touch overdone, but it is not as implausible as its critics 
suggest. A moderate version of that ideal – stressing the value of well-roundedness 
over a narrow cultivation of one’s powers – constitutes a worthy ethical ideal.3 
Second, the conception of community in the Comments is alive. In particular, the 
position that Marx adopts in the Comments (discussed in Chapters 3 and 5), which 
stresses the themes of reciprocal dependence and mutual completion, could provide 
the foundation for a philosophically distinctive and normatively attractive conception 
of community. I have addressed some issues of its feasibility as an ideal, but it will be 
clear that more work needs to be done on the issue of how that ideal could be applied 
to mass society and implemented institutionally. Finally, the emphasis Marx’s vision 
places on labour is alive. Given the enormous significance of work in people’s day-
to-day lives, the paucity of philosophical interest in work – both historically and 
contemporarily – is striking. Whatever one thinks of Marx’s own ideas about labour, 
he surely deserves credit for inviting us to think harder about a central but 
philosophically neglected aspect of human existence.  	  
 
 
 
 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
3 It also differentiates Marx’s vision of the good life from Hegel’s. For, as we saw in Chapter 
3, the ideal of all-round development was not one that Hegel was attracted to.  
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